Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Defense Forces: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, at Rome

top secret priority

Paris, December 3, 1951—5 p. m.

273. Personal for Secretary from Bruce. Have discussed with Byroade message he is sending you today as regards the British position on the EDF¹ and am in complete agreement with its contents. Since returning to Paris I have been weighing in my mind a closely related problem.

You will recall that when the Paris Conference on the EDF started the US and UK designated their Ambassadors here as their official observers. This was probably a good solution for the long pull, but I believe in the remaining few weeks a different approach might be helpful. My reasons for this are as follows:

(1) The British Ambassador here is quite ineffective on this problem. I feel it most desirable that the British have a really qualified man, with political stature and imagination, during the remaining phases of the Conference. I do not see how we would approach the British with the suggestion that they nominate a new individual to this mission unless we both change the procedure of using our Ambassadors as observers.

(2) Believe we should find some way of publicly impressing Europe of great importance we and the UK attach to successful and early completion of plans for the European Defense Force. One method of accomplishing this would be for US and the UK each to send a well known and highly placed individual to Paris in the immediate future as our official representatives. I would of course continue to devote myself almost exclusively to project.

Have discussed this only with Doug and Hank² who agree that on our side John Foster Dulles would be a possibility, particularly in view of his recent success on the Japanese peace treaty. Do not of course know whether his services could be obtained but task should be only of few weeks duration if we are to succeed with our present time schedule.

If you consider idea has merit, we should have to determine whether British would follow suit (and whether qualified individual could be found as US observer). While direct message from you to British would be best approach, I could, if you desire, discuss matter with Gifford and British in London in view of your imminent departure.

As time schedule we have fixed is pressing, it would be desirable if you approve for you to start some wheels in motion on our side so that US observer could be prepared to depart at least shortly after your arrival in Washington.

Sorry to complicate your last day in Rome. If you wish, perhaps your views could be forwarded to us from Gibraltar as suggested in message from Byroade.³

You have undoubtedly heard that prospects of passage of the Schuman Plan by the French Parliament were unfavorable. The corner has however in my opinion been successfully turned and Pleven, his colleagues and prominent parliamentarians expect its ratification after debates this week end.

Bruce

1. Telegram 272, December 3, from Paris to Rome, supra.
2. Presumably the references here are to MacArthur and Byroade.

3. In telegram 367, December 4, from Rome to Paris, not printed, Secretary Acheson replied to this message as follows:

   “As to Bruce’s suggestion (Paris 273) re Dulles, this seems wholly impossible. He is either in Japan or on his way on a major assignment. To change him now would confuse everything. I believe on our side that you should continue. Perhaps you can discuss with Lloyd or otherwise [seek?] an improvement in British situation.” (Paris Embassy files, 400 EDF)