Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–1451: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

secret priority

Washington, November 15, 1951—7:16 p. m.

341. Following-up comments in Todep 317² and having in mind in particular discussion in Depto 618,³ wish to suggest following points.

1. Agree wld be desirable from many standpoints to take decisions in Rome mtg on EDF or EDC matters of concern to NATO. Have felt desirable to keep pressure on Fr to reach conclusion in Paris conference to permit this. However seems to us time has now come to take stock of where we now are and to make our decisions accordingly. Use of Rome mtg as further pressure device seems to us to have lost value as time too short.

2. Continue to see serious objections to taking definitive NATO action on some aspects EDC proposal without having clearly before NAC proposal as whole in its broad outlines. In particular, still foresee great difficulties in resolving EDC–NATO relationship with respect to Ger without facing up to Ger membership in NATO problem. Forcing issue prematurely in NAC wld probably have harmful rather than helpful effect particularly re Fr position in EDC and Contractual negots. Unless there shld be quite major changes of view between now and Rome mtg, seems quite unlikely we can be in position by Rome mtg to take clear position one way or another on question Ger membership in NATO shld this become necessary precondition to satisfactory contractual arrangements or EDC.

3. Agree fully in necessity keeping all NATO members informed on progress of discussion and assume reports now planned will do so. See no objection to gen discussion of problems raised by NAC as guide to further negots. Agree also important to have NAC action before EDC treaty finalized. Assume here that for this and other purposes Jan Council mtg will be necessary and will be quite in time for final EDC action.

4. As practical matter seems to us unwise to be in position of pressing countries relatively uninformed about EDC developments to take action during Rome mtg on any part of report received by them as late as Nov 23.⁴

5. Assuming as we do there will be Jan mtg at which this matter can be dealt with, do not feel there is any need for action at Rome from standpoint US Congressional attitude. Present tentative thinking here is that MSP hearings cannot at earliest begin before February and if past experience any guide may well be later. Do not think problem will arise in acute form prior to these hearings.

6. While we agree that action by NATO shld be in form of gen statement of principles, believe these principles must be founded on carefully worked out understanding of how in fact the relationship will work on all major points in the political-mil field. By “how it will work” mean what the authority and responsibility relationships will be and not organizational details.

In summary, believe we are in agreement on everything except desirability land possibility of formal NAC action at Rome. Agree further that situation may develop rapidly in course of next ten days and final decision must be made by NAC but believe it shld be made in light considerations outlined above.

Webb

1. This telegram, which was drafted by Edwin M. Martin, cleared by Calhoun, and approved for transmission by Parsons, was repeated to Paris for Perkins and Byroade.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 917.
3. Not printed. In it Ambassador Spofford emphasized the importance from the congressional and other points of view that maximum action be taken at the forthcoming Rome session of the North Atlantic Council on European Defense Community problems and the relationship to NATO. Spofford considered it important that the matters receive NATO consideration before the EDC treaty was completed and that other NATO members be brought into the discussion. (740.5/11–1451)
4. Telegram Depto 618 (see footnote 3, above) reported that Foreign Minister Schuman’s report on the progress of the European Defense Community Conference would not be presented to the NATO Deputies until November 23 in Rome, making it difficult to plan definitive NATO action in the absence of the report.