Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/10–2751: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret

Paris, October 27, 1951—8 p. m.

2485. Deptel 2343, Oct 20 (rptd London Todep 250, Frankfurt 2533, Bonn 150).² Whatever the substantive merits might be of having Ger in NATO, as far as Parliament and public opinion here are concerned such merits are relatively unimportant and question is primarily emotional and political in nature. National Assembly will in near future consider Sehuman Plan, EDF and other items bearing on Ger more or less as single package, and whether or not Ger accession to NAT is understood to be implied on that occasion may make crucial difference in the voting. We believe that if govt is unable to side-step question and if impression gains ground in Assembly that Ger accession to NAT is implied, entire succession of these important measures wld fail of acceptance here, involving disastrous setback to our policy objectives and very substantial loss in time.

The parliamentary picture is this: While Gaullists may conceivably abstain in voting on Schuman Plan, there is every evidence that they plan to make major issues of EDF, so that one must count with Gaullist plus Commie opposition block of over one-third of votes to start with. Of the four remaining groups (the Socialists) is virtually certain to vote en bloc against project that implies Ger admission to NATO, since even now their acceptance of EDF is shaky and they have certainly not yet fully faced up to implications of fact that France and Ger wld be equals in EDF. Given the symbolic value of NATO membership (which Socialists have furiously denied to Spain, for instance), raising it in connection with EDF wld in our view almost certainly drive them into arms of opposition. Even assuming that MRP, as the most disciplined of the remaining parties, might vote solidly for govt in such contingency, which is not certain, substantial portion of RGB, and independents are sure to oppose plans whose acceptance in their view involved acceptance also of Ger accession to NAT. Our estimate therefore is that if Ger NATO membership is thought by Parliament to be included in package, govt wld go down to defeat by heavy adverse vote in Assembly.

Govt is aware of this, but it is also becoming more and more aware of compelling necessity of including Ger in NAT as soon as may be possible. Question keeps presenting itself with insistence at EDF conf in connection with use of EDC Forces and with relationship between EDC and NATO, and it is obviously also troublesome in connection with security guarantee in contractual negots. The logic of the basic French European initiative, the complexity of the above problems if Ger is not admitted to NATO, and of course the exigencies of the political situation in Ger which France realizes cld jeopardize acceptance of EDF treaty there, all suggest that question cannot be dodged in the long run.

We ourselves have let no opportunity pass to do missionary work in persuading French officials of inevitability of Ger NATO membership, and feel that we are mtg with increased receptivity. In addition to arguments implied in the above, we have pointed out that it is only means whereby Ger can accept full obligations of NATO without establishing direct military arrangements with non-EDF countries, and that from US point of view it is formula that allows us best to support French initiative for irrevocable incorporation of western Ger into Europe.

We agree with Dept’s view in reftel that it is best not to attempt to force issue at this time since that might merely crystallize French opposition, whereas need for simple solution is bound to reveal itself more insistently as discussions proceed. We also agree with McCloy’s view in Bonn’s 238 to Dept (rptd London 85)³ where, speaking of security guarantee, he envisages that Sept guarantee shld be left in force until Ger enters EDC “at which time” we cld undertake to support its admission to NATO. We note that this implies not attempting to obtain French commitment on this prior to Ger accession to EDC, but we fully realize that it will not be possible to leave matters simply in suspense until that time.

It seems to us that there is in effect only one way of mtg this situation and that is by gradual approach. We believe Pleven’s and Schuman’s statements on European Federation were designed to create atmosphere in which question of relationship of one individual European country to NATO cld become submerged in larger question of continental unity. It is true that federation idea will not move ahead quickly enough to solve the problem of Ger NATO membership for us, but we believe in any event it is preferable to work with Schuman and his European-minded subordinates in this matter, helping them to ease France into posit where Ger NATO membership will be accepted, rather than to exert high-level pressure that may find French individually receptive enough, but unable to give way because of the hard facts of the internal polit situation.

What has to be found, then, is formula that can bridge gap between time of EDF ratification and time afterwards when full attention can be focussed on admitting Ger to NATO without danger of upsetting entire train of agreements that must pass through Assembly here during months immediately ahead.

Bruce

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

   Secretary of State Acheson departed by ship from the United States on October 25 for Europe where he and a party of advisers participated in the opening meetings of the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on November 6; regarding the Secretary’s activities in Paris, see the editorial note, p. 1312.

2. Not printed, but see footnote 3, supra.
3. Not printed.