740.5/10–1751: Despatch
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State 1
No. 721
On October 9 it was announced officially that the Netherlands Government had decided to join the European Defense Force as an active participant and that the Dutch delegation at the Paris Conference would be headed by Jonkheer van Vredenburch, ex-Administrator to the free territory of Tangiers.
The Embassy Counselor was informed by Netherlands Defense Minister Staf that this announcement had followed a Cabinet meeting of October 8, when a final decision was taken to participate. Until this Cabinet meeting and final decision was taken, no information could be released. Minister Staf indicated that the decision had been somewhat conditional and until the French answers had been obtained, it was necessary to keep the entire subject secret. In spite of Dutch participation in the Pleven Plan, it is well-known that the Cabinet and many high-ranking Dutch officials, including General Hasselman, Chief of the Army General Staff, are most skeptical of the usefulness of a European Defense Force as envisaged by the French.
Why the Dutch Finally Decided to Join.
In short, the Dutch did not want to stand alone. Their neighbors had signed up, and economically, as well as politically, they felt themselves obliged to follow suit. Another important factor was General Eisenhower’s active support of the Plan, for when this became known, many Netherlanders concerned with the subject, including Defense Minister Staf, believed that his support was reason enough. It is difficult to over-estimate Eisenhower’s influence in the Dutch Government and among the people. Furthermore, as mentioned above, within the Cabinet, Defense Minister Staf had been urging participation and [Page 889] on lower levels, such highly regarded and energetic officials as Ernst van der Beugel, Commissioner for the Government’s Bureau for ERP, as well as others who had worked on the Schuman Plan, all supported joining.
The Embassy understands that when the Cabinet finally decided to participate, it was only after having received some sort of agreement by French that the member nations would look into the Dutch request that there be a clearly understood link between the EDF as a subordinate unit and the NATO as a higher authority. In addition, the Dutch wished assurance that the EDF would not mushroom into another unwieldy bureaucracy.
Why the Dutch are Skeptical about the EDF.
The Netherlands Embassy in Washington submitted a Memorandum of August 31 to the Department specifying a number of questions and doubts in the minds of the Dutch.
Behind these doubts lie many years of traditional Dutch neutrality and abstention from international affairs. In addition, through the years, Dutch diplomatic and economic ties have been close with Great Britain and Scandinavia. Therefore, what Foreign Minister Stikker has described as only “platonic” British interest in the European Army had its effect in the Netherlands.
Some Foreign Office officials are highly dubious of the basic French motives behind the Plan. More specifically the views of the officials responsible for European Army affairs are something along the following lines:
The Plan is brilliant, they say, but only so far as France is concerned. French economy, her government, and her army are all weak and only in her fear of the Germans is she really united. Resentful of the need for economic aid from America, she strives, above all, to tie Germany to some sort of an organization where, militarily speaking, the Germans will not outstrip the French. French nationalism and her desire to develop a “Third Force” in Europe, with France as the leader, have not been thoroughly understood and have, so the argument goes, been underestimated in Washington. This Third Force is not to be confused with the neutrality concept, for it is, these Dutch officials point out, the conviction that Western Europe must become militarily and economically strong under French leadership and entirely independent of any large power.
As to the Plan itself, it is pointed out that in France, De Gaulle is opposed to it and so are the French Communists. West Germany, under the decreasing power of Adenauer is for it, but not Schumacher. Furthermore who can tell if the Socialists will not be in power when it comes time to submit any EDF ratification bill before the Bundestag at Bonn? Italians are so bent on obtaining American economic and [Page 890] military aid that they will support the EDF just to placate the Americans. And the British are only lukewarm. In brief, they ask, has anyone really thought the Plan through?
As evidence of the questionable practicability of this Plan, these officials direct attention to the Council on Europe, where, it is stated, in discussing generalities, there was reasonable accord among the various deputies. But as soon as specific proposals and resolutions were made, “sparks flew”, particularly between the French and Germans. The disillusionment which they allege has resulted from Strasbourg has, therefore, in some circles, a direct relation to the disbelief in the realism of the European Army concept. (See section below on this “disillusion”.)
Netherlands States General.
In contrast with the above doubts and arguments, a sizeable segment of the Dutch Parliament supports the Plan. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, by tradition, Dutch Parliamentarians, many of whom are lawyers by profession, have great regard for erecting legal structures and devices as the solution for a given problem. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union Charter is an example. Therefore, the deputies see the European Army, with its higher authority and representative council, as a neatly arranged mechanism to manage a European defense force. Secondly, ever since the war, the deputies have been more and more conscious of a shift in power from the States General to the executive. Sensitive to this gradual loss of power to the Government, they look upon the supra-national authority as an opportunity for Parliamentarians, not only in the Netherlands, but throughout Western Europe, to regain that lost power.
At this writing, any draft legislation favoring the EDF will in all probability be sustained by a Parliamentary majority. The Catholics favor it. The conservative Anti-Revolutionaries and Christian Histories also support, as do the Liberals, the Party of Foreign Minister Stikker. One factor which is largely responsible for the pro-European Army views of the normally ultra-nationalistic Christian Historic and Anti-Revolutionary deputies is the educational effect of the Council of Europe and the influence which those sessions have had among formerly provincial Dutch Parliamentarians. Mr. Schmal, leader of the right-wing of the CHU is an example. At this writing, the Party of Labor is divided but will probably fall in line too. Opposition elements in that Party can be traced to those of neutralist or pacifist tendencies.
Press and the People.
The average Dutchman has little interest and less understanding of a European Army. The press has covered it from time to time, but its lack of enthusiasm has reflected the attitude of many Dutch officials. [Page 891] Today, what the press needs and is requesting is a clear explanation of the problem and the contribution of a European Defense Force. If the Plan fails, it will be regarded by those practical minded Dutchmen who give it any thought as another good theory which collapsed when put to the test.
For the Ambassador:
Secretary of Embassy
- Copies of this despatch were sent to the Embassies in London and Paris.↩