Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

Bonn Embassy files, lot 311, McCloy project

Memorandum by the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)

secret

[Washington,?] September 1, 1951.

The course proposed in the Memorandum of 25 August 1951 entitled “Preliminary Solutions of a European Defense Community”¹ seems to me open to objections in respects which I feel are most important. In order to make clear what I feel should be our course I would like to restate briefly: (1) what is our goal; (2) how can it be reached most quickly and effectively.

I

1. The objective is to create effective defense of Western Europe promptly in such a way—

(a) that the European countries can maintain and support over a long period the essential defense forces without undermining their economic stability;

(b) that it will foster rapid development of a federated European Community;

(c) that Germany can participate in such defense without recreating the fears of German militarism which have plagued Europe for generations.

2. By creating a single integrated force under its direction, the European Defense Community will meet these basic tests in the most direct and acceptable form:

(a) it will enable Europe to provide the maximum defense with its men and resources by eliminating duplication and waste;

(b) it will overcome, by uniformity of training and equipment and unity of command and use, the weakness and confusion inherent in separate national forces in Europe;

(c) it will create an acceptance of German participation without distrust;

(d) it will be a major, and probably decisive, step toward European political federation.

These benefits depend on the transfer to common European institutions of full power and responsibility for creating and maintaining the single integrated defense force.

II

3. Accordingly, the most expeditious course to the basic goal of effective defense and a German contribution is, in my opinion, as follows:

(a) The Treaty establishing the European Defense Community and the Transitional Convention should be negotiated, signed and ratified as rapidly as possible. The Treaty should establish the institutions, and confer on them the necessary powers to create, maintain and use the defense force. The Treaty need not contain all the detailed provisions, but like a constitution, should authorize the institutions to work out and put into effect such provisions by legislation and regulations of the Community. In this way, it should be feasible to complete and sign the Treaty within three months. In my opinion, it is essential to execute first the document of greatest dignity which embodies the definitive act creating the Community and provides the foundation for its implementation.

(b) A Transitional Convention should provide, as the Conference has already agreed, that recruiting can begin in Germany as soon as the Treaty is ratified without waiting for the Commissioner and other institutions to be fully organized and ready to exercise all their functions directly. During this interim period, all of the forces would be European at once, but certain of the functions of the Community have to be delegated to suitable agencies in each country, and training would be handled by SHAPE. The Commissioner would have full authority to supervise and take over the exercise of these delegated functions as rapidly as he was prepared to do so. The Transitional Convention should contain the basic decisions necessary to carry out this program, such as the number and size of units of the European Forces, the number of men to be provided by each participating country, the powers to be exercised during the interim period for the Community by SHAPE, and those to be delegated to agencies in each country.

(c) Meanwhile the Conference should at once create a military planning staff to begin work on military problems which will have to be solved for the Transitional Convention or by the Commissioner in establishing the EDF, such as regulations regarding organization, equipment, training, discipline and administration. This staff should be fully integrated, should include Germans, and could be the nucleus of the future European General Staff.

(d) As soon as the basic structure has been settled, and before the Treaty has been ratified, the Germans would be authorized to begin preparatory work to enable action under the Treaty to begin as soon as ratified. This work might include preparing legislation to create national agencies for performing agreed functions, and to provide the basis for recruiting under the Treaty; selection of people for whatever posts are to be filled; planning and acquiring of necessary facilities, etc.

In my opinion these various measures, taken together, should permit the Treaty to be put into force promptly and the Germans to be recruited on the basis of the ratified Treaty as quickly as could be done in any other way. To accomplish this, however, the French and Germans in particular, will have to devote themselves wholeheartedly to working out the Treaty and solving the basic problems as quickly as possible.

III

In my judgment efforts to find short-cuts outside the Treaty, except as outlined in II above, will only divert energy from the main job, create doubts and suspicions, and delay the accomplishment of the final objectives.

The proposals in your Memorandum of August 25, as I read them, cause me concern. Under these proposals, it appears that German national forces would be created under a German Defense Minister and a “superior German Military Authority”. The only European body would be the “Defense Council” composed of Defense Ministers of the participating countries, with authority merely to “coordinate” the activities of the national agencies and to issue “factual directives” to a limited extent. The basic objections to this proposal are as follows:

(a) It would not save time. Drafting of an Interim Treaty and its ratification would take about as long as a final Treaty in the terms outlined above. The work on an Interim Treaty would only delay the completion of the final Treaty.

(b) It would not attain the advantages of the European Defense Community. There would be a German national force and its merger into European defense forces would depend on an European Defense Community Treaty being negotiated and ratified by the Bundestag. The economic advantages of integration would also not be achieved as the experience with NATO has shown.

(c) The proposal would endanger the creation of the European Defense Community. If separate German forces were created and a new political status were granted, this would strengthen the hands of all those opposed to a European Defense Community. Having obtained the political concessions, the opposition could freely oppose the European Defense Community. Likewise, with a national force started, many of the military men, who are now neutral or mildly favor a separate force, would be inclined to oppose the “experiment” of the European force, and be better able to stir up nationalist sentiment against it. The nationalists of all types would certainly respond to this type of appeal.

(d) In view of these objections, the proposal is hardly calculated to induce the Allies to make the basic change in political status envisaged as essential for Bundestag approval of a German defense contribution.

Moreover, unless safeguards are provided by the integration from the beginning of German forces within the European Army, other safeguards would need to be established to prevent the recreation of a German national army. The latter safeguards would in all probability be less acceptable to Germany from both a military and political stand-point than European integration.

IV

For all these reasons, and they appear to me to be most weighty, I strongly urge that the Federal Government concentrate on the early solution of the limited number of basic issues required to complete a general Treaty for the European Defense Forces, and on the prompt drafting, signing, and ratification of the Treaty itself.

J. J. McCloy

1. Ante,p. 869.