Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/8–2551: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Paris, August 25, 1951—5 p. m.

1216. Personal for Secretary. Re Deptels 1031 and 1066.² This is fifth and last in series of msgs responsive reftels. First two have gone forward as Embtels 1184 and 1185 and intermediate msgs will follow.

This contains my recommendations on best approach to Sehuman in Sept, subj to possible further comments after receipt his reply your msg Aug 9 (Deptel 905³).

The most effective approach to French FonMin to obtain desired Fr Govt action on three major questions, namely, Eur def forces, contractual arrangements with Ger and an adequate Fr def effort wld be to eliminate possible uncertainties in his mind and in those of his colleagues as to US policy on these questions.

A. In order to encourage progress in Eur def forces conf US shld make clear that its policy is as fols:

1. That US is convinced that Eur def community is most practicable means:

(a) To create and maintain effective Eur def with the minimum drain on Eurs econ resources for this purpose;

(b) To obtain Ger contribution needed for Eur def with minimum risk of revival of Ger militarism.

2. That accordingly US is actively supporting creation of Eur def community on the fol assumptions:

(a) That present Fr Govt is determined to create Eur def forces as rapidly as possible;

(b) That since decisions facing the Eur countries are very fundamental and hence require reasonable time to obtain firm acceptance by both Parliaments and public opinion—even if this requires modification of existing deadlines—pressure will be maintained by all participating govts for rapid settlement of outstanding questions;

(c) That treaty will be rapidly signed and ratified;

(d) That oustanding questions will have been settled in manner to create an effective def force;

(e) That Ger recruitment will begin immed after treaty has been ratified and in any case without waiting for commissioner to be able to exercise his full functions.

3. That US will actively support all realistic steps toward Eur integration as best means for effective def, econ progress and pol stability. In particular the US:

(a) Will work to strengthen Eur institutions (such as Sehuman Plan High Auth and EDF commissioner) as they are created;

(b) Will as appropriate act thru Eur agencies, rather than with the member states, in the areas of their competence;

(c) Will strongly urge active Brit cooperation and support of integration on continent even if they do not wish to join.

B. In order to obtain French cooperation in working out new pol status for Ger consistent with role as freely participating member in common def, US shld ask Fr Govt to conduct negots on contractual arrangements on premise of establishment of Eur def forces. It wld be understood that French position is conditional on Ger ratification of Eur def forces treaty. In this way the nonrestrictive sitn permitted by creation of EDF cld reduce controls established under contractual arrangements to minimum. It is preferable to give generous arrangements immed in order to strengthen democratic forces in Ger sincerely committed to Eur community rather than have concessions extorted later by extremists in detriment to status of Adenauer and his supporters.

In pressing this policy on FonMin Schuman it should be made clear that US will take account of extra risks assumed by France and other countries in forming def community with Ger and will urge Brit to do the same. In particular, this will mean:

(a) That US, France and, we hope, Great Brit will assure in some way continuance in Ger of a stable democratic order which will live up to its engagements, and

(b) That the US intends to continue its support and assistance on which the success of the Eur community depends;

(c) That US hopes Schuman will be successful in obtaining rapid ratification of coal-steel community treaty;

(d) That, if Schuman raises problems of Saar and developing Eur coal crisis, US hopes he will propose Eur solutions for their settlement.

C. The French rearmament program as it presently exists is a subj of grave concern to Fr Govt. Competent officials and certain mins sense substantial revision and postponement may be inevitable for fol reasons:

1. In their view, additional substantial increase which wld be required in calendar 1952 def appropriations to carry out present program is out of question because econ assistance from US and other countries will not be large enough to provide flow of supplemental resources into French economy adequate to justify risk of substantial new inflationary financing and to prevent serious depreciation internatl value of French franc. Rightly or wrongly there is considerable dissatisfaction with admin of US assistance since bilateral talks last Oct. Revelation that $290 million was ECA figure allocated to French for US fiscal 1952 in light of French plans came as surprise. Assuming additional cuts by Congress will reduce this figure to little more than equivalent of amount necessary to cover their dollar debt servicing, they do not see how US Admin can commit itself to additional help even if it shld wish to do so.

2. In their view French forces have real significance for security of France and for NATO only in conjunction with collective Allied forces and it is questionable whether present French rearmament program provides for creation of type of forces and equipment adequately related to those of France’s allies. Opinion is increasing that substantial revisions in French program are required if French build-up is to proceed in a balanced way and to be fully consistent with Eur def force and collective NATO forces.

3. In their minds there is an increasing political and mil urgency for France to make its full contribution to Eur def in view of necessity for quick solution Ger problem. This will require a new assessment of the French effort in Indochina. The question is very acutely raised as to how France can carry Indochina and Eur def tasks at same time. This relates not only to financial capabilities but also to capabilities in terms of officers, technicians, men and resources as well.

Maximum encouragement will be given France to continue its def efforts both in Eur and in Indochina and to take lead in committing member nations to undertake a maximum feasible goal in EDF treaty if the Secretary can declare that US policy will be along fol lines.

(a) To continue to provide such margin of financial assistance thru ECA as wld enable France and other countries to carry out level of def substantially in excess of amounts which wld be possible if plans had to be based only on their own resources. If Congressional action shld not make it possible to realize this policy fully, to be prepared to consider maximum flexibility in use of US funds, for example, by utilizing US def appropriations for off-shore procurement to assist in meeting payments problem, or by accepting broader definition of enditems in mil assistance program. If this is still not adequate, to seek a supplemental appropriation;

(6) To assist the EDF conf, and later the institutions of the EDF, in working out a balanced def program to develop in an orderly way over three years;

(c) To provide a single program of mil equip and supplies in specific quantities for EDF to complement a single production program to be provided by EDF.

René Mayer, as well as Sehuman,⁴ will probably wish to raise these questions while in Wash. In view of delay and difficulties being encountered with respect to enactment of aid legis for FY 1952 they realize that it may not be possible to obtain any positive commitments from US in immed future. However, they feel they must begin to seek your views on these questions in connection with preparation of their 1952 budget, which is scheduled for submission to French Parliament during autumn months. In this connection, they may indicate that if it shld appear that an agreed balanced program and an understanding with US will be long delayed, they may have to present mil budget on an interim basis on assumption of no US econ assistance with understanding that voting of supplementary program wld be requested later in line with agreed allocation of tasks and with amount of assistance forthcoming.

Obvious that French Govt feels great concern at repercussions both at home and abroad which wld result from announcement of downward revision or postponement of French defense program.

Bruce

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy. The text was subsequently included as an annex to document WFM T–4/2a, September 8, 1951, a briefing paper entitled “European Defense Force and the Question of a German Contribution to Defense,” prepared in the Department of State in connection with the forthcoming meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in Washington in September. (CFM files, lot M–88, WFM papers)
2. Neither printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, p. 856.
3. The telegram under reference is not printed. Regarding Secretary Acheson’s letter of August 9 to Sehuman (and to Morrison) and Schuman’s two replies of August 25, see the editorial note, p. 853.
4. French Finance Minister Mayer was in Washington for the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, September 10–14. Foreign Minister Sehuman was in Washington for the meetings of American, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 10–14; see the editorial note, p. 882.