Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/8–2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, August 24, 1951—5 p. m.

1184. Dept pass Defense. Subj is Eur def force. In response to your 1031, Aug 17² and 1066, Aug 18³ I will send series related msgs. This one contains my comments on course of conf as a whole. Second cable⁴ will report on present status of conf and progress since approval of interim report. Fol msgs⁵ will contain comments and analysis of certain major points in conf interim report. Final msg⁶ will contain my recommendations on best approach to Schuman on EDF and Ger contribution.

Course of the Conference.

1. In evaluating interim report, it is essential to consider course of conf and background and purpose of report itself.

2. From beginning, it was clear to objective observers that success of EDF conf in creating Eur def community wld depend on whether members could agree, in reasonable time, on plan which wld:

a. Provide effective mil force which wld receive support of US, Brit and other NATO members;

b. Assure equality of treatment for all participants including Gers, who rejected from start any discrimination.

Necessity for speech in working out plan and treaty was also apparent.

3. For several months conf made less progress than it shld have in developing a plan meeting these tests. Work of conf was impeded by several factors:

(a) French del, largely on account of pre-election atmosphere, was not prepared fully to apply; criteria of efficiency and equality. Thus in dispute over size of basic unit, which received undue attention, French delegation had to adhere to original instructions for “combat teams” despite general recognition of military defects. Again, Gers were certain to reject as discriminatory original French proposal for maintenance by other countries of natl forces outside Eur forces while all troops from Ger wld be Eur, and for transition period during which Ger recruits wld have been trained under allied direction while recruits other members were trained under natl direction.

(b) Belief was general among Gers and others that US strongly preferred Brussels approach which formed basis of discussions at Petersberg, and did not take seriously idea of Eur def community. It was recognized that active US support was essential to successful creation of such a community.

(c) These conditions led to skepticism among participants about real importance of conf and consequent lack of interest by govts. Within French Govt this in turn played into hands of those who may have seen conf largely as opportunity for delaying German contribution, and weakened position of those who sincerely desired prompt creation of Eur def community.

4. Since early in July, atmosphere and attitude of conf have changed completely. French began to take initiative and others to play more active role. This was due to variety of causes:

(a) Submission of Petersberg report⁷ to govts led French delegation to call for progress report by Paris conf. In taking stock of work up to that time, French del, without a govt, cld not yet change its position on size of units, it did, however, propose and secure adoption of number of other major decisions to meet requirements of mil effectiveness and equality. Certain of these are mentioned in this and subsequent msgs, especially radical inclusion of all troops in EDF from beginning and radical change in handling of transition period to meet test of non-discrimination.

(b) Petersberg report itself undoubtedly helped to revive interest in Eur Army. Rejection by Gers of number of safeguards provided for in Brussels decisions⁸ led many Eurs to fear that outcome might be substantial recreation of Ger natl force, and that remaining safeguards which Gers did accept might prove illusory. These Eurs profoundly feared that creation of Ger forces under Ger natl control might endanger neighboring countries and Eur stability by encouraging Ger to attempt attain Ger unity, return of lost territories or other advantages vis-à-vis East by direct action.

(c) Experience with effort to organize def on continent by coordinating natl programs under NATO was leading many responsible officials to conclude that this method might entail so much waste and delay as to endanger maintenance of essential level of def or to risk undermining economies of Western Eur. These officials were reaching conclusion that creation Eur def community was best way to enable Western Eur to make adequate and sustained def effort.

5. Major substantive change agreed to in July meetings of conf and recorded in interim report was decision that all existing forces of member states and all new forces created in those countries for def of Eur are to be included in EDF from time treaty comes into force. Only forces to be excluded will be those assigned to def of overseas territories and those required for internal security.

Initial French proposal had been that during eighteen-month “first phase”, Ger forces wld be created under allied supervision while French, Ital and Belgian forces wld be prepared under natl direction. At end of that period, first segment of Eur Army wld have been created by amalgamating forces thus prepared. Even after end this first phase, natl forces wld have continued to exist. Eur Army under this formula could easily have been merely a device to keep down or to postpone Ger def contribution.

It was clear from beginning that it wld never be possible to reach Franco-Ger agreement on basis this proposal, in light Ger insistence on equal status. This position meant that if natl armies existed in other countries, Ger shld also have right to purely natl formations in addition to those assigned to Eur Army. Organization of natl formations wld have led to creation of Ger def min with full powers, German natl army and Ger gen staff. Conscious of fact that such a development wld have been entirely inacceptable to French and cld only have deadlocked and perhaps broken up conf, Gers did not press this line of argument; but it was not until concept was changed to include all forces for def of Eur in EDF that realistic planning for EDF became possible.

Furthermore, under initial French proposal, creation of Eur forces wld have meant simply addition of another separate army to existing natl armies. In each country one group of forces wld have been equipped and supported by single budget and production program and single administration, pay and training system of Eur community and another group by present natl organization. US wld presumably have had to provide equipment separately to each nation and to Eur force. Thus potential benefits of common Eur def effort wld have been largely lost and problems of NATO’s and SHAPE wld have been further complicated.

6. Interim report itself was prepared at stage when implications of change in French approach and new influences of SHAPE and US Govt support had not yet had their full impact, and show this to some extent. Its purpose was to record progress so far in developing workable plan and to define certain basic issues which remain to be settled before plan can be made reality.

Present status of conf is reported in second tel this series.

Bruce

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague.
2. Sent personal for Bruce and repeated as telegram 1010 personal for Gifford, not printed. It asked for Brace’s (and Gifford’s) advice and recommendations as to the most effective approach to Schuman (and Morrison) regarding the European Defense Force and the German contribution when those matters were taken up at the forthcoming meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in September. Bruce was also asked to provide a short summary on the status of the European Army Conference meetings. (740.5/8–1751).
3. Not printed; it urgently requested an analysis of the Interim Report of the European Army Conference (740.5/8–1851). For extracts from that report, dated July 24, see p. 843.
4. Telegram 1185, August 24, from Paris, infra.
5. Telegrams 1265 and 1266, both of August 28, from Paris, the third and fourth In a series of five messages, neither printed (740.5/8–2851).
6. Telegram 1216, August 25, from Paris, p. 865.
7. For the Report of the Allied High Commissioners for Germany of June 8, sometimes referred to as the Bonn or Petersberg Report, see p. 1044.
8. Regarding the “Brussels decisions” under reference here, see the Paper Prepared by the Department of State, Pleven D–2/1a, January 26, p. 755, and footnote 7, thereto.