Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/7–3051

Memorandum From the Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President ¹

top secret

Washington, July 30, 1951.

Subject: Definition of United States Policy on Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution

It seems to us desirable that you should determine certain general principles which will guide United States policy in bringing about most effectively and most rapidly German participation in the defense of Western Europe without arousing European antagonisms which would militate against continued European cooperation in the defense effort.

It is a basic assumption that a German military contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense force in Europe is necessary. This contribution cannot be secured until existing German and French objections have been harmonized. The Germans will not adopt the necessary amendment to their Constitution and the necessary legislative action authorizing military contributions until they are assured that they are to have a position of political equality and of nondiscrimination in military matters. From their point of view, this requires the restoration of a large degree of sovereignty. The French will not cooperate in the essential program of restoration of sovereignty to Germany until agreement is reached on certain limitations controlling German rearmament in order that they may secure what they regard as adequate safeguards for the future. At present, the French and German demands conflict with each other and produce a stalemate. By the very nature and interrelation of these two sets of demands, the stalemate cannot be broken unless simultaneous progress is made toward meeting them.

In the long run, the problem can best be solved in terms of more general Continental European arrangements. Due to the British attitude and the consequent attitude of certain European peoples such as the Dutch, satisfactory progress in terms of an increased measure of Continental European integration can be secured only within the broader framework of the North Atlantic community. This is entirely consonant with our own desire to see a power arrangement on the Continent which does not threaten us and with which we can work in close harmony. Under this pattern Continental European arrangements can be utilized to offset the individual fears of the French and the Germans while the broader North Atlantic Treaty Organization relationships, in which the United States participates, can be utilized to mitigate British and other fears of Continental European integration. These are, however, complex problems which can definitely be solved only over a period of years. The situation does not permit delaying progress on the defense of Europe and therefore on the German contribution until these problems are fully met in detail.

It is our conclusion that the solution is to be found in simultaneous progress on three points:

1. Agreement on the creation of a European Defense Force which would serve under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

2. A specific plan for raising German contingents at the earliest possible date; and

3. A political arrangement with Germany restoring substantial German sovereignty.

These three matters should be settled prior to November 1 and presumably be ready for action at the North Atlantic Council meeting now contemplated for the end of October. The United States position would be that our support of point No. 1 would be contingent upon the three points being treated simultaneously and within the indicated time period.

In regard to a European Defense Force, you are familiar with General Eisenhower’s views as expressed in his telegram No. Alo 208,² and you have approved the favorable reply which we sent expressing our concurrence in his designating an observer to attend the Paris Conference dealing with this matter. We recommend that on this subject the position of the United States would be that we would make known in the clearest terms to the French as well as to the Germans and other countries concerned that the United States supports the concept and will be prepared to assist in its execution and implementation provided that certain conditions are met. These conditions would include the following:

1. The concept of a European Defense Force would include the evolution of such necessary administrative arrangements as would enable it to participate in the common defense of Europe, not simply for the support of individual national aspirations.

2. The European Defense Force would not constitute a separate European field army but would be based on the idea of European contingents which could be disposed of by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe in accordance with military necessity.

3. The elaboration and implementation of the necessary administrative structures and political arrangements would not be a condition precedent to the actual beginning of the German contribution to the defense effort.

4. The administrative machinery for managing the European Defense Force would be appropriately related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In regard to raising German contingents at the earliest possible date, the position of the United States would be that a plan should be agreed to which would provide for the earliest possible application on an interim basis of those aspects of a European Defense Force plan which would permit the immediate recruitment and training of German soldiers under such safeguards as may be required. Such a plan might provide, for example, that existing defense agencies or national agencies to be created could provide for the training of recruits under delegated authority from the European Defense Force during the interim period until the European Defense Force agencies become operative and can progressively assume this function. The United States would place great emphasis on including in the plan agreement which will allow initiation of German units at a specified target date and that completion of the plan for a European Defense Force should not defer this date.

In regard to the contractual arrangements with Germany for the restoration of German sovereignty, the position of the United States would be that we must move broadly and decisively in creating a new status for Germany. We believe that in general the Germans should be given full power to run themselves and that our mission there should be changed from one of “occupation” of the territory of a defeated enemy to one of military assistance to a partner who is freely contributing to our mutual defense. This will involve abolishing the unilaterally-imposed Occupation Statute and replacing it with a negotiated agreement or agreements. It will involve the substitution of Ambassadors for High Commissioners and the consequent abolition of the High Commission. We expect to retain supreme authority in four fields only: (a) the right to station troops in Germany and to protect their security; (b) Berlin; (c) the unification of Germany and a subsequent peace settlement; (d) territorial questions. In keeping with its new status and its contribution to Western defense, Germany should be admitted as a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So far as procedure is concerned, we plan to push forward the work now being carried on by the High Commissioners, but we are considering a proposal for a short cut to high-level government consideration which we would expect to lay before you for your approval.

Dean Acheson
Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett
Acting Secretary of Defense
Harry S. Truman

Approved, July 30, 1951.

1. The source text was approved by President Truman in his own hand. This memorandum, as subsequently concurred in by the other members of the National Security Council and again approved by the President, was circulated as document NSC 115, August 2, 1951. Regarding the preparation, original signing, and promulgation of this document as NSC 115, see the editorial note, supra.
2. For the text of the telegram under reference here, see telegram 382, July 18, from Paris, and footnote 2 thereto, p. 838.