740.5/3–551
Memorandum by Laurence C. Vass of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Director of that Office (Martin)
Mr. Cabot phoned you again1 and conveyed to me the following message re Depto 586.2
He stated that Spofford had called him about 9:15 this morning to emphasize the necessity of a reply before tomorrow. I gathered that he was also putting in a plug for a favorable reply. Mr. Cabot also stated that Harriman had talked to him this morning3 and expressed his agreement with the proposal.4 However, he felt that there should be included in paragraph 3 some statement along the line that the seat of FEB should be in the same city as OEEC in order to bring about the maximum flexibility and transferability contemplated.
[Page 80]He then stated that he had been informed by Mr. Webb that Mr. Harriman raised the question of FEB with Mr. Lovett at lunch, and told him that we would be sending out a reply tonight. Mr. Lovett expressed interest in the subject and stated that Defense would like to consider the reply. Mr. Webb said that Mr. Lovett would have an opportunity to concur in the cable, whereupon Mr. Lovett remarked that they would need a little time to consider it.
Mr. Cabot stated that he took the line with Mr. Webb that he did not really think that Defense was directly involved in the subject of FEB and was not at all sure that such clearance was essential. I pointed out that Defense would have at least a negative interest in the subject, in the sense that they would wish to make sure that we were not pre-judging the decision on geographic location or NATO reorganization by this action. I pointed out also that Mr. Harriman’s suggested reference to location was particularly likely to invite close scrutiny by the Pentagon.
Mr. Cabot concluded by remarking that the important thing was to get something out tonight. If it turned out that we could not reach agreement on the proposal, we should at least tell Spofford why not.
My own initial reaction to Spofford’s proposal is that, whether intentionally or not, it forces us to attempt a shortcut to a decision on the major issues between State and Defense. I feel certain that the tabling of such a proposal would lead immediately to questions as to our position on the Canadian proposal, the location of NATO and OEEC in the same (and which?) city and the fate of DFEC. I think we should consider our decision on the reply as a part of our general strategy. If we feel that the introduction of this proposal at this time would accelerate favorable decisions, we should attempt clearing an affirmative reply. While I have a number of questions to raise on the text of the proposal, I have no substantive difficulty with it.
However, I am not at all certain that introducing such a limited proposal at this particular time is a particularly helpful move in the direction of obtaining agreement on the move to Paris and the establishment of FEB. I am particularly concerned at Harriman’s suggestion since it sounds to me as though this would imply U.S. willingness to split FEB from the Deputies. It is my recollection that our position is that NATO and OEEC must be together and that we take a dim view of FEB in Paris, unless there has been agreement that all of NATO is to move. On balance, I am not inclined to favor approval of the proposal since the inevitable disclosure that Spofford is not prepared to talk about the essential questions will at least create confusion and may well lead to suspicion of our motives in making so limited a proposal.