Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Paraphrase of Briefing by Ridgway B. Knight on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Rome, November 24–28, 1951¹

secret

[Washington, November 30, 1951?]

In appraising the result of the Rome meeting, one should bear in mind that the objectives of the meeting were of a limited character. We wished to put across to other NATO countries the Eisenhower objective of securing for European defense battle-worthy forces as soon as possible, de-emphasizing somewhat the longer range force requirements. We also wish to pave the way for the final report of the temporary committee of the Council (TCC). Finally, we wish to establish in the minds of the NATO countries the possible necessity of setting a cut-off date for the formation of the European defense community; the thought being that if by a certain date sufficient progress toward EDC had not been made, that we would re-examine the other possibilities for a German contribution to western defense.

The part of the participants of Rome was one of great seriousness. The atmosphere was heavy almost to the point of pessimism. This was probably due to the fact that the Europeans realize they must soon decide the extent to which they are able to go on rearming themselves and at the same time retain viable economies.

Major Topics in Rome

(1) Probably the most dramatic event at Rome was the triple presentation of the European defense problem by Gruenther, Harriman and Eisenhower. General Gruenther gave a masterful presentation of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Mr. Harriman was not so gifted at speech making but in the last five minutes of his presentation he managed to convey his personal views vividly. General Eisenhower’s talk surprised a great many Europeans, coming from a military figure, because he talked mostly in terms of morals and psychology. There was some criticism of this at the time but the impression seems not to have lasted.

(2) EDC —The Council adopted a resolution which says very little. The U.S. had wanted to lay the groundwork for fixing EDC–NATO relations and to set deadlines for a completion of action on EDC. The French proposed this idea, wanting more time. The Benelux countries opposed, too, but on different grounds; they did not wish a U.S. resolution to pass which would give to the French representatives at the European defense conference a lever for extracting undesirable concessions from the Benelux countries. The U.S. resolution did not pass, but we think that in the corridor conversations we put across the U.S. views. Personally, the present plan for EDC seems least likely of adoption. The proposals for a common defense budget and common defense production arrangements involve too great an abandonment of sovereignty for acceptance in the near future. An alternative which would retain the agreed military setup for EDC but adopt only the principal of a common budget and common military production would seem more likely of adoption. Still another alternative, that of immediate European federation, seems quite premature. One was struck by the ignorance of the French people and even of French parliamentary representatives of the actual EDC proposals. It is quite possible that in the forthcoming French parliamentary debate on the EDC the government will retain the confidence of the assembly but that when the EDC finally comes up for ratification, it will be turned down when deputies learn the full truth about the extent of abrogation of national sovereignty involved. The French must put on an extensive campaign of education about the EDC if it is to gain acceptance. The German people, on the other hand, seem somewhat better educated with respect to the significance of the present draft EDC treaty.

(3) Germany and NATO—This topic is, of course, closely related to EDC–NATO relationships. It appears at the moment that the only practical way to achieve any kind of German guarantee toward the NATO countries not also members of the EDC is to get Germany into NATO as soon as possible. The approach which seems most likely to have some result in this connection is to leave the matter to Messrs. Schuman and Adenauer for solution. They will be able to guage the political situations in France and Germany and perhaps contrive to have an unofficial French statement issued which would make it clear that France would support German membership in NATO at the proper time. The U.S. must make sure in this connection that the EDC contribution through NATO is made in such a way that a few small countries cannot prevent the EDC group from taking action in the event of war. Reference here is to Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty where each country is pledged individually and collectively to lake action against aggression.

Tripartite Discussions on Germany

In the field of German financial contribution to defense we achieved success. We overcame French opposition to a plan for having the Germans contribute financially for a year ahead. In the field of security safeguards we made little progress. The London working group had come up with proposed controls which are almost unworkable in that they would require too extensive an inspection force. It would be better either to rely on a simple list of prohibited items such as submarines, planes and atomic weapons or to rely on the EDC arrangements regarding defense production to provide the necessary protection. On the latter alternative the French definitely said no, and on the former they asked to postpone discussions until they could study the matter further.

Minor Problems at Rome

(1) The report of the committee on the North Atlantic community was referred back to the committee for further study.

(2) The practice adopted at Rome of giving certain ministers assigned topics on which to speak instead of having a protracted discussion by all the ministers on the “world situation” proved to be an efficient method of proceeding.

(3) There were 300 people in the Council meetings in Rome, and this problem of numbers is one which must be solved if the Council is to engage in any sort of uninhibited discussion.

(4) The subject of parliamentary representation at Council meetings did not arise as such, but probably a majority of delegates share the views of the U.S. which oppose such representation.

(5) The subject of the Middle East Command was not debated at Rome. The Council merely adopted a factual report of progress in that field. However, there was a top level one-half hour discussion with the British and French on this matter and agreed matter of discussion resulted. We were agreed that for political reasons it will be necessary to start out with Greece and Turkey in a NATO command. The British wanted us to agree now that we would in the future support the “two-hat arrangement” which would mean that the commander of the Eastern Mediterranean theater would also serve as the Middle East commander. The British seemed to agree with us that it was not possible to finalize that arrangement now and that we would have to cross that bridge when we come to it.

Observations Made in Answer to Questions

There appeared to be much less fear of rash action by the U.S. than was displayed at Ottawa. The main reason why the European countries were so serious at Rome is that they fear that the risk of internal economic dislocations due to the defense effort may be greater than the risk of Soviet attack. For this reason, the TCC report is quite likely to call for lowered security goals. This connection may be worth mentioning that certain military officers wish to include in the Council resolution concerning the revised MTDP a statement to the effect that the MTDP would be altered when the TCC report was issued. We were able to forestall this concept, however, in place of a recommendation that the service chiefs would comment upon the TCC recommendations when issued. A long-range alternative to lowered security goals for the defense of western Europe is the stepping up of European federation. With respect to the lack of public knowledge in France and other European countries of the significance of the present draft EDC treaty, it is doubtful whether either the NATO information service or the national information services are doing enough.

The agenda for Lisbon will have three main problems before it: (1) action on the TCC recommendations; (2) NATO action with respect to the EDC; and (3) the relationship between Germany and NATO.

1. Knight, who was a member of the U.S. Delegation that accompanied Secretary Acheson to Paris and Rome, had the responsibilities for serving as Coordinator for International Conferences during the period from September through November 1951.