Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Mr. Eden asked me to lunch with him today, sending word that there were some matters on which he really wished to have some words with me before leaving Rome for London. We talked alone for a half to three-quarters of an hour before lunch. He had in mind two main subjects.
The first was the European Army. He thought that the situation here was very critical. We either did something with the European Army or we endangered the whole NATO structure. This raised in his mind the question whether the United Kingdom could make any useful contribution at this point.
He referred to his press conference of yesterday saying that in fact he believed his attitude had been too negative. He believed that one paper had construed his remarks as being the introduction of new proposals. The other Italian papers had gotten what he really said, which was a somewhat negative attitude.
The question which he asked me was whether the UK, by doing something more positive and possibly by suggesting some sort of an institutional association, would help or hinder. He said that he had discussed [Page 747] this with General Eisenhower, who had urged him to stay out of the situation at the present time. I said that in my judgment the time was too short for any new initiative by the UK. Such action would give both the French and the Benelux exactly the excuse they needed to delay negotiations, and I, therefore, urged that he should not intervene in any way now.
He asked whether it would be helpful if General Eisenhower, General Montgomery, or Mr. Churchill, or all three expressed the purely military and professional judgment that from a military point of view a European Army would be effective. I said that I thought that this had already been done by General Eisenhower and might be done again, and that it would certainly be helpful to have professional military views in favor of it. I doubted whether Mr. Churchill would stick to professional military views and by some oratorical chance might introduce a confusing note.
Mr. Eden expressed the view that the release of General Eisenhower’s speech to the North Atlantic Council would be a mistake. He thought that he should find another way of supporting the European Army from the military point of view. I agreed with this.
Mr. Eden said that he was at a loss to understand the exact status of the discussion or the exact nature of the differences between the French, Benelux, and others. I said that I was in the same state of confusion and had urged our Ambassador to get the Conference to reduce its view to drafts of a treaty. Mr. Eden thought that this would be of tremendous help. He thought that both the State Department and the Foreign Office should be vigorously engaged in thinking about this subject, because by the time we met in Washington in early January, we might be presented with a very critical problem. He thought that the matter had been restricted too much to a small circle in Paris and that nobody else knew what was going on. I agreed and said that I would alert the State Department.
[Here follows the second part of this conversation, which deals with Korea. For text, see volume VII.]