740.5/3–351: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 583. Todep 284.2 Wilgress did not say that he considered key to NATO reorganization problem was better working relationship between SG and military representatives but that key to SG–military representative problem was better working relationship between them (Depto 540).3 I gathered that he was referring more to day-to-day operational procedures and informal relationships between SG and military representatives than to any formal procedure which may have been in force. I regard Wilgress comment more as expressing hope that military representatives would as practical matter be held less at arms length by SG than as indication of intention to press for formal reorganization SG–military representative arrangement.
As I get background Canadian attitude probably more sensitive on this point than other non-SG nations since former have enjoyed close and intimate working relationship with both US and UK military since last war. Canada undoubtedly would like to forge closer relationship with US military, and as part of this are most desirous being taken into confidence as much as possible by them re SG operations. UK patronizing attitude of speaking for Canada on SG matters obviously irritating for latter who I think regard their military and strategic interests more in consonance with those of US than with UK.
We have consistently taken position with other deputies that question of military reorganization one which military itself should resolve. I propose continue this position and ward off CD discussion military organization unless appropriate military agencies ask for CD help. Furthermore it is obvious that CD must not attempt to intervene in day-to-day operational problems of military. There has so far been no sign of any desire to do so and I am confident it could be quashed if it arose.
Emphasis in all discussions on organization here has been on necessity for “streamlining” and substitution of command for committee structure wherever possible (e.g., DPB, SHAPE) and apart from some small nation pressure there is increasing support for view which I have always had that SG must be equipped to perform CCS functions. In these circumstances, to let organization move back to the committee type operation would to my mind be unfortunate. I therefore fully understand and agree that it would be highly undesirable to create permanent 12-power military body over SG to which military [Page 75] decisions would be referred before issuance and to allow CD get involved in military decisions. However, it seems to me important as practical matter that US military attempt work out arrangements to insure non-SG nations being kept as happy as possible without formal change in organization or jeopardizing authority or efficiency of SG. I believe this is what Wilgress had in mind.