Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the President
1. In accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Council agreement at Ottawa and with your messages of 20 September to President Bayar of Turkey and Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece,1 I proceeded to Athens, Greece, and to Ankara, Turkey, between 9 and 15 October, accompanied by Field Marshal Sir William Slim of the United Kingdom and General Charles Lecheres of France, to exchange views with the pertinent authorities of those nations concerning their admission into NATO.
Paris
2. As a preliminary step, it was necessary that there be resolved the French demands for a substantial naval command in the Western Mediterranean, upon which point at Ottawa the French had secretly conditioned their approval of the acceptance of Greece and Turkey into NATO. This question was resolved at a conference at SHAPE between the three NATO representatives and General Eisenhower.2 The resulting agreement was accepted by the French Cabinet and was well within U.S. position, in that it provided for only two major naval commands in the Mediterranean (U.S. and U.K.) and placed the French Western Mediterranean naval command directly under Admiral Carney, COMNAV South, under the over-all command of General Eisenhower.
Greece
3. The conferences at Athens between the three representatives and Greek military authorities resulted in a very successful exchange of views.3 I was very much impressed by the friendliness, determination and attitude of cooperation of all Greeks I met, from the King and Queen on through the Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of the Services. They emphasized that, although they needed much material assistance, [Page 598] they would fight under any conditions in order to defend Greece and to meet her NATO obligations.
4. The Greeks believe that they should be a part of General Eisenhower’s command, which view is generally concurred in by the Standing Group nations. They presented very positive views that all possible steps should be taken at the earliest time to secure the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the West. A major problem which presented itself was that of the responsibility for the defense of the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles; this will require resolution as soon as the outlines of commands contiguous to Greece can be definitely decided upon. Each Greek Chief of Staff emphasized the many equipment deficiencies in his arm, but pointed out the Greek potentialities in manpower and trained reserves, which potentialities have already impressed us.
Turkey
5. The situation in Turkey was more complex, but I consider that our exchanges of views there with the Prime Minister and other high Turkish authorities were most illuminating and helpful as an initial step.4 The Turks were insistent that their nation be considered an inseparable part of the Europe which is facing Russia (not as a Middle East nation on a parallel with the Arab States) and that they should, therefore, be under the command of General Eisenhower; most important to them is their prestige and their internal political situation. They insist that they must first become a member of one of the already-established NATO commands. However, Turkey recognized the need for and promised to strongly support the establishment of a command in the Middle East which will include non-NATO nations; in this connection, Turkey is insistent that this problem is separate from and secondary to their prompt integration into an existing NATO command. One important facet of the problem which was deliberately avoided was that of the nationality of the Middle East commander under whom the Turkish forces would be operationally assigned. Our advice from all informed sources in Ankara was that the Turks would not accept being directly under a United Kingdom commander, which, as you know, is presently contemplated. As a result of the discussions, general agreement was reached that:
- a.
- Turkey should be integrated into NATO on a full equality basis as soon as possible, and
- b.
- That a Middle East command, in which Turkey would participate, was necessary.
Near the end of our discussions it became evident that the Turkish aversion to being considered as a Middle East nation remained so strong that the three representatives tentatively agreed to call the proposed new organization the Eastern Mediterranean Command.
[Page 599]6. As in the discussions in Athens, I was much impressed by the resolute spirit of the Turks, their attitude of cooperation, their deep respect for the United States, and their eagerness to assume their new obligations in NATO, as well as in a command structure in the Middle East.
Egypt
7. The military representatives were prepared to visit Cairo also, presumably with a Turkish military representative, for the purpose of exchanging pertinent military views with the Egyptians concerning the importance of their joining in a Middle East command structure. From both the political and military points of view, the maintenance of efficient Allied bases in the general Suez area in peace or in war is a vital necessity; a cooperative attitude on the part of the Egyptians would assist materially in solving this problem. However, as you know, the preliminary political discussions in Cairo had not, in the view of Mr. Acheson, progressed sufficiently to warrant military representations, and therefore the trip to Cairo was not made.
General
8. In my opinion these visits were most successful and worthwhile, even though they were only for the purpose of exchanges of views and, therefore, did not result in any decisions being reached. The Greek and Turk authorities were highly gratified at the opportunity to emphasize to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff their respect for the United States and their gratitude for the assistance the United States has already given them. Both nations are pleased at the invitation to join NATO, and I am convinced that each of them will be a valuable asset to NATO.
9. Of course, there are many equipment deficiencies in both the Greek and Turkish armed forces. On this point I assured authorities in each nation that the United States would maintain its interest in their welfare, but I emphasized that the people of the United States were of the sure conviction that U.S. aid could not continue indefinitely in its present proportion, and that each recipient nation must take positive steps toward its own self-sufficiency.
10. In my opinion, we must now move forward with all possible expedition to accomplish NATO ratification of the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, and then to be prepared to take at once the necessary steps toward placing each nation in its proper place in the NATO command structure. Particularly with respect to Turkey, this problem will be complicated, since it will eventually involve political arrangements with the Arab and other non-NATO nations.
11. I am initiating the necessary recommendations for action to accomplish the above at the earliest time.
- Regarding these messages, see telegrams 213 and 214, September 20, pp. 575 and 576.↩
- Regarding this conference, see telegram 2096 from Paris, October 9, p. 592.↩
- Regarding Bradley’s visit to Greece, see telegram 1707, October 12, p. 594.↩
- Regarding Bradley’s visit to Turkey, see telegram 349, October 12, p. 596.↩