740.5/10–1251: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State
1707. Visit General Bradley and colleagues1 to Athens was outstanding success. General Bradley informed me that he was impressed by spirit and morale of Greeks and presentation their capabilities and needs by Greek Chiefs of Staff. Greeks were delighted and encouraged by conference with high NATO authorities even prior to their formal admission. Fol were most significant points emerging from military conversations:
Greeks urged that Greece should be part of SACEUR [’s Command] [Page 595] rather than Middle East Command. While NATO generals delivered no decision on this point, they raised no objection to Greek proposal. Some question arose, however, as to assignment Greek Navy since it appeared that Middle East Command would have responsibility for closing Turk Straits and defending Aegean sea. Greeks, however, felt it wld be very awkward for their Navy and Army which it is designed to assist, to be under separate commands.
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In closing conversations Field Marshal Slim emphasized heavy demands on US–UK for weapons and fact that while every effort would be made increase supplies to Greece no reinforcement of equipment to Greece either now or at start of war could be promised. As soon as Greece is integrated into NATO, it must present its needs to CINC South (Carney) who will do his best meet requirements. Slim concluded “it is better to expect nothing and get something than to expect much and get nothing”. Greeks were not discouraged by this pessimism and stated they would meet their obligations under whatever circum stances might arise.2
- Field Marshal Sir William Joseph Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, and Gen. Charles Lécheres, Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of France and their staffs.↩
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A copy of the U.S. minutes of the conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Military Representatives with the Greek General Staff in the Greek General Staff Building, Athens, Greece, at 1015 hours, October 11, is in file 740.5/10–1251.
General Bradley reported upon the meeting in telegram MATUR 17622, October 13, 1951 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That telegram read in part as follows:
“1. Had very successful exchange of views with Greek Chiefs of Staff on 11 Oct in meeting attended by Field Marshal Slim, Gen Lecheres and myself. Was favorably impressed by Greek attitude. They stated they are ready to assume their full responsibility in NATO. Although saying that they considered they should receive assistance, if required Greece would fight alone to carry out her assigned tasks.
“2. Greeks consider their primary role is in the Balkan theater and that they should be a part of Gen Eisenhower’s command. They consider that steps should be taken to secure the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the west. They were informed that if Greece were included in SACEURs Command it would probably be a separate command under CINC Southern Europe.
“3. Greeks were asked what would be their position with regard to Greek Naval Forces if the Middle East Commander was assigned the responsibility for the defense of the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles. In reply they pointed out that Greek Navy was required for defense of Greece and support of Greek Army and therefore should be under SACEUR. They would be willing to cooperate with the Middle East Commander on orders from SACEUR but did not wish to assign Naval Forces to the Middle East Command unless they had a surplus to the needs of the European Commander.” (JCS Files)
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