740.5/10–651: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
Depto 425. 1. I talked with Starkenborgh yesterday twice at some length on subj further NATO consideration MEC arrangements. I opened conversation by stating I had been giving thought to procedure for following up Ottawa decisions in the interest of speed and avoiding any misunderstandings; that I wld be interested to know his views in the light of the interest in the problem shown by Neth at Ottawa. He said he welcomed discussions since matter had been left somewhat fuzzy in Ottawa Council decision, adding that he personally felt Stikker “had backed down too quickly” on insisting that there be preconsultation with smaller powers before any contact with Turks. He asked what the SG was now proposing to do, to which I replied that SG was awaiting comments from mil reps on SG Command paper to [Page 589] be submitted, and that as of several days ago comments had been few and not of great consequence. Starkenborgh stated Neth views were of military and polit nature, and felt shld be dealt with both thru mil reps/SG and Deps. He offered to give me memo covering their views, which he handed later in the day.
2. As to proposed visit Gen Bradley, Marshal Slim and Fr officer to ME, Starkenborgh had heard from Brit that Gen Bradley was preparing to go but had not understood that Brit and Fr were included. In discussing purpose of mission I emphasized exploratory nature of talks, also suggesting timing was dictated by Egyptian crisis and gen Middle East tension, and that purpose of mission was much broader in scope than narrow problem NATO Command arrangements. At one point he said he understood Turks did not seem anxious to discuss Command arrangements at this time, to which I replied my info was also that Turks were not pressing matter but were anxious to be helpful in gen ME picture.
3. He came to my office later in day and gave me two documents, text of which being dispatched by separate cable.2 He described these as working papers which represented present Cabinet thinking, but not formal or final Neth Govt position. Paper A represents alternative ideas as to Command structures in order of preference. Paper B summarizes Neth objections to the SG proposal. I reserved final comment, but on paper B pointed out their whole series of objections proceeded on a misinterpretation of the SG paper, recalling statements of Secretary and others at Ottawa on equality status of Turk in NATO and other principles of Command arrangements.
4. My impression talk with Starkenborgh is that Neth insistence on pre-consultation may have modified somewhat since Ottawa. It is clear, however, that Neth, and same probably holds for the other small countries, expect to be heard on Command arrangements and will be very sensitive to anything that looks like too fast and firm action on Command structure as a result of forthcoming talks in Ankara. Public statements as to Bradley mission are particularly important for obvious reasons.
5. I suggest following procedure:
- a.
- That the SG notify mil reps of fact and gen purpose of Bradley mission to ME as soon as possible, if this has not already been done. Purpose wld be to emphasize exploratory and gen character mission. Deps cld be given same info at next mtg 10th.
- b.
- SG shld put some deadline on comments thru mil reps. Apparently not clear to non-SG powers that these expected.
- c.
- At some point Dept shld be asked to make any comments of political nature. This shld probably be deferred until results of Bradley mission are known and can be reported.
Precise timing of foregoing and subsequent steps depends on factors not known here. Earlier rather than later opportunity for non-SG powers to express views will, I believe, go far to avoid differences on subsequent steps, particularly with Neth and Den.