PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin)

top secret

Participants: Mr. Steel—British Embassy
Mr. BonbrightEUR
Mr. MartinEUR

Mr. Steel opened the conversation by expressing his desire to correct an impression, which apparently we had received through Mr. Achilles in London that the British no longer held as firmly as they had to the idea that the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO should be conditional on agreement with the Turks on Middle East Command arrangements.1 Mr. Steel stated there had been no change in the UK position and they still felt it was essential that an understanding be reached with the Turks before they were admitted.

He also made reference to several press reports suggesting that the Turks may have reconsidered the general expression of willingness to work out Middle East Command arrangements which they had given to the British in response to the British note informing the Turks that they were supporting their membership in NATO subject to the working out of Command arrangements.2 He wondered whether we had received any indication that the Turks were now unprepared to go ahead in the Middle East. He was informed we had no indication of any such desire of the Turks to back out, but of course this was a question which we had not undertaken to discuss with the Turks, still believing strongly as we did that Turkey and Greece should be admitted to NATO with no conditions attached. So long as this was the case, we thought it inappropriate to raise with the Turks the question of their views on Command arrangements.

Mr. Steel said he thought he understood our opposition to any conditions on the admission of Greece and Turkey but he thought it was a quite untenable position. He had the impression from the reports of the Deputies that not only the UK but many of the smaller countries would be unwilling to act favorably on the admission of Greece and Turkey until they knew what the Command arrangements would be and what they would be committing themselves to support. He thought it would be better to face up to this fact and be prepared at the September [Page 566] meeting3 to state on the basis of discussion with the Greeks and Turks what Command arrangements were likely to be established.

Mr. Steel expressed the personal idea, which he planned to send to London, that a desirable next step would be for the British and US Ambassadors to outline to the Turks the Middle East Command arrangements set forth in a document recently submitted to the Standing Group, and reflecting the agreed note of June 19,4 in order to insure that there was no question about the Turks going along with what we had in mind. We repeated our opposition to attaching any strings to Turkish admission.

Mr. Steel went on to say he thought it would be desirable for the Standing Group to complete action on the UK paper now before it and distribute it to the members of the Military Representatives Committee so that all the other NATO countries would know what the Standing Group views were. He indicated that Air Vice Marshal Elliot had made such a proposal at a recent meeting5 and thought it was favorably received. In passing, he also indicated he understood the US agreed that the three questions on Command in relation to admission of Greece and Turkey, submitted by the Deputies to the Standing Group,5 should be put aside and that effort should be concentrated on getting out the Standing Group paper referred to.

He implied several times in the course of the conversation that there was complete US–UK agreement with respect to Middle East Command arrangements. He referred to an arrangement under which Turkey would be under a Middle East Command which would report to the Standing Group of NATO, with which Turkey would sit when Middle East questions were under discussion.

He suggested that the next step might well be for the British and American military to get together to discuss procedures in acquainting other NATO countries of our Command ideas and undertaking discussion with the Turks. It was suggested to him that we had heard that the British were anxious to have another substantive discussion on Command arrangements which might well be undertaken before procedural matters were discussed. He indicated he thought perhaps this was the case. (It was not wholly clear whether he actually believes that there is virtually complete US–UK agreement on Middle East Command. In any event that was the idea which he seemed to wish to convey.)

  1. In telegram Depto 139 from London of July 31, Theodore Achilles, Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, informed the Department of State that the United Kingdom had agreed to a September meeting of the Council but was “insistent on linking ME command with Gr-Turk decision …” The telegram is printed in full on p. 628.
  2. See memorandum of conversation, July 6, p. 554.
  3. Reference is to the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met at Ottawa, September 15–20. For documentation, see pp. 616 ff.
  4. See the draft memorandum prepared by John Ferguson on July 6 entitled Command in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East and the undated British counterdraft submitted to Admiral Sherman by Air Marshal Elliot in mid-July, pp. 551 and 559.
  5. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
  6. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.