Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 32

The Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe (Riddleberger) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)¹

secret
priority

Paris, October 31, 1951—4 p. m.

Repto 5474. Ref: Wash Torep 8081, rptd info London Ecato 1551, Oct 26, 1951.²

1. Reftel plus conversation with Stettner just after his arrival, leads us to believe that our previous exchanges have been based on misunderstanding of our original proposal Repto 5257.³ Following is restatement our position on which we hope to reach full OSR–ECA/W agreement herein discussions with Harriman, Porter, Bissell, and Cleveland.

2. We are, of course, in agreement with you that US aid shld be used in such a way as to get maximum effective def effort in Europe. This was meaning of para 7(a) in Repto 5257. Sorry it was not clear to you, but somewhat surprised you should think we had ignored this basic objection when in fact our msg was directed solely towards attaining it. Pls read balance this msg as representing our considered judgment best way to make progress towards this goal.

3. We want to keep FEB strictly out of business on US aid questions for time being because:

(a) We feel strongly that, until there is realization at top level in Europe (where presumably mature polit responsibility rests) of both magnitude of def job needed and on limits to US aid, understandable tendency FEB representation wld be to emphasize European weakness and to lay basis for requesting unrealistic US contribution. Your proposals para 3 reftel wld not stop this. In particular, there is, in European view, no basis for judgment in FEB on questions raised paras 3b and 3c. Providing necessary basis is purpose of TCC exercise, as we pointed out para 4, Repto 4425.⁴

(b) Very minor, but quite practical, reason that FEB Secretariat and better representatives (Roll, Skaug, Malagodi) are properly tied up with TCC.

4. After the appropriate basis is established for FEB negotiations, we believe FEB negotiations will be responsible, technically competent, and complete (including full treatment of problems mentioned para 5 reftel). More important, in a setting where European countries will tend to examine one another instead of ganging up on us, the chances are much better for bringing out ways and means of improving the collective performance. There is, of course, the possibility that we are overly optimistic on this point. Nevertheless, we think we shld recognize its potential merit, while at the same time we reserve to ourselves the well known and well understood right to reject multilateral recommendations which run counter to our statutory responsibilities (see para 2 above).

5. We believe also that any comprehensive negotiations involving both levels of US aid and levels of def expenditures, if conducted during early phases of TCC operation, wld seriously compromise the atmosphere of genuinely mutual confrontation which Harriman wants to create. This is point on which TCC delegation is more competent than OSR to comment, so we will not pursue. However, related and very practical point is that European country plans are not responsive to unilateral pressure, except very superficially, until results of TCC operation are known. Exceptions may be that in some countries (e.g., France) minimum aid commitments may now be needed to encourage preliminary budgeting for previously announced plans. This possibility is covered by our proposals para 7, Repto 5257, as further explained by Repto 5425.⁵

6. We now reiterate our recommendations in Repto 5257. We can see no reason for hesitating either to start bilateral talks now with French, for example, or to decide to throw final question of FY 1952 aid into FEB at early date, except for possibility that US position on some very important matters not yet clear (e.g., off-shore procurement policy, EPU settlement, etc.).

Riddleberger

1. Repeated to London.
2. Ante, p. 335.
3. Dated October 19, p. 324.
4. Dated September 6, p. 265.
5. Not printed; it stated that a judicious combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiations would yield the best results for the United States and suggested that bilateral discussions proceed as long as they did not reach conclusions which might be outside the range of possible conclusions in later multilateral negotiations (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 32).