Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/10–2651

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] October 26, 1951.

Subject: Defense Reaction to Repto 5360²

When I received Repto 5360 I immediately communicated with the office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs in Defense and spoke simultaneously to Capt. Matter and Mr. Ernst. Re submission of the military stock-taking questionnaire I was informed that we could “expect” to have an answer in complete form by the time Mr. Harriman returned on Sunday but that of course the dispatch of this answer would be subject to a policy decision to be reached after Mr. Harriman’s return.

Re participation by Defense officially at the secretarial level in the examination of the U.S. submission, it was apparent that the Department of Defense is considerably troubled by the present multilateral orientation of our policy. I was told that Mr. Lovett wants to discuss with Mr. Harriman this entire problem and reference was also made to Repto 5296³ and Depto 485⁴ which endorsed the multilateral approach in our 1952 aid negotiations. Furthermore, it appeared that Defense (and Mr. Lovett’s name was mentioned somehow in this connection) is concerned that we not give the TCC the impression that it is deciding U.S. affairs for the U.S. It was also said that Defense did not like the implication of “the U.S. defending itself” in front of its NATO allies in view of the size of our contribution, etc., etc.

In order to clear up Defense’s position at this level I asked whether or not I could inform Mr. Gordon that (a) Mr. Lovett wished to discuss with Mr. Harriman the policy aspects which may be causing him concern, and (b) whether I could say that a Defense representative at the appropriate level would participate in the examination of the U.S. military submission.

I received a categoric no to both questions. Thereupon, and after having so informed Messrs. Matter and Ernst, I spoke with Frank Nash who immediately agreed that both Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman should have a heart to heart talk and that either Mr. Pace or himself would participate in the examination of the U.S. position. Mr. Pace and Mr. Nash are arriving in London on November 8 and expect to be in Paris on November 10.⁵

Notwithstanding the successful conversation with Frank Nash, I have reasons to believe, based on all my recent experiences with the Pentagon, that the position taken by Messrs. Ernst and Matter is not without foundation and that a talk between Messrs. Harriman and Lovett is much required. The essence of the problem is clear: The Department of Defense refuses to consider that our NATO relationship and commitments could at any time modify U.S. decisions. Defense seems to adhere to the view that U.S. military decisions are exclusively arrived at unilaterally by the U.S. While no one in the U.S. Government would advocate a policy under which U.S. decisions would be subordinate to NATO decisions, it seems imperative there be greater recognition of the direct importance of NATO to U.S. security and therefore greater importance placed on NATO decisions and recommendations.

Ridgway B. Knight

1. Copies of this memorandum, which was written for the files, were sent to Perkins and Martin.
2. Not printed; it contained recommendations by the U.S. Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee concerning the composition of the U.S. representatives on the Executive Bureau which was to review the defense programs of the various member countries. These representatives would also be responsible for presenting a review of the U.S. defense program. (740.5/10–2451)
3. Supra.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 326.
5. Pace and Nash were designated as members of the U.S. Delegation which was to attend the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris and then the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Rome.