Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951: Telegram

The Chairman of the Screening and Costing Committee (McNarney) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)¹

secret

Paris, 21 October 1951.

Har 109. This message is Topent 2 in two parts.

Part 1:

Opening statement by Chairman.²

The sense of urgency and willingness to delve into a difficult situation—that is the keynote of the TCC and of the SCC. If a listing were made of the attributes we must possess to accomplish the task before us, I am certain the list would be lengthy. Paramount among our qualifications must be cooperation and understanding. Let me say at the outset that our overall task is a 12 nation task and therefore its accomplishment will require the cooperation and understanding of the 12 nations. I wish to welcome the representatives of the North Atlantic Organization countries on that basis.

Although this is my first opportunity to be a member of the treaty organization it is not my first contact with North Atlantic Treaty Organization affairs. Those of us in Washington who are involved in defense programs are well aware of this important segment in the world wide preparations to resist any aggression. I have watched the steady development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense planning and am keenly aware of the importance of achieving its stated objectives. There can be no doubt in our minds of the requirement to complete an effective defense of the North Atlantic community. I mention this lest there be any thought towards representing the temporary costing committee and screening and costing committee endeavors as evidence of hesitancy or indecision to reach our goal. Such is obviously not the case. Our work will center on clarification and discernment of problems so that North Atlantic Treaty Organization can quickly reach decisions that will make present defense efforts even more effective.

I have had an advantage over others associated in this present work by being able to meditate on the problems before somewhat in advance. I have also had the opportunity of discussing certain aspects of our problem with the Standing Group in Washington. This has led me to an initial, but still tentative, conclusion as the particular direction this committee should take. Our basic task is to further progress in reaching agreed North Atlantic Organization strategic objectives. A medium term defense plan that is effective and attainable is the specific goal I have in mind. Our task is not to change this plan in its objectives, but to suggest ways and means by which the fundamental military strength inherent in the plan can be secured. This is a very difficult task, but it is an old and familar one. In peacetime military planning, it is usually habitual to absorb within the plan costly projects created through uncertainties and difficulties which in peacetime, seem insurmountable.

We are prone to overestimate, but rarely to underestimate our requirements for one or more of the millions of items or the millions of men that are required for raising, maintaining and fighting a military machine. In addition to our common North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems, each country has its own military establishment problems which in the aggregate may well consume an even greater portion of our total resources than those devoted to purely North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems. The inevitable trend is to produce very large requirements which are difficult, if not impossible to attain short of total mobilization. I believe, frankly, that is our present situation.

The creation of the temporary council committee and the screening and costing committee under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concept deals with the old problem in a somewhat new and different manner, but that is the end of the novelty. Since it is an old problem, one with which most of us have had previous experience, I am sure that we can agree that the way to a solution is as clear as it has been in the past: In times of scarcity it is necessary to see to it that men, money and materials be put to the most effective use and to resort to priorities and to allocations of our available resources if we are to reach our primary objective.

I have previously cabled my general views to Mr Harriman and I trust that you have had an opportunity to learn of them. I do not foresee any easy road to settling the problem facing the screening and costing committee. As I told Mister Harriman, any routine handling of this situation would end in failure. In fact, if it were routine in nature it would be within the capability of each nation to accomplish its share of the total problem. But, obviously, that has not yet been fully accomplished and each country or the countries collectively, must receive further guidance. It is not our role to be a voice of authority in making such decisions. It is our role, however, to be a voice of authority in making recommendations. I propose that from the very beginning here, now, at this meeting, each consideration that we make be aimed specifically at practical, professional recommendations which will accomplish some portion of our objective. We must not be led down the side-streets of theoretical discussion, however invaluable or enjoyable that may be. We are not here to promote efficiency alone, or to recommend variations in theoretical patterns. We are here for only one purpose—and that is to make practical, specific recommendations which, if carried out, would in many ways directly contribute to obtaining the primary objectives.

It will be impossible for us to do our work with any degree of popularity. Realizing this, I have disassociated myself from our own military planners. I do not mean that we consider ourselves above our national or North Atlantic Treaty Organizations planners, for our recommendations must finally be acceptable to them, but that we must be without prejudice. We need more than a fresh viewpoint. We need a determination to break through and separate out points of interest. Our mission is a special one. Based upon my own experience, I believe it can best be solved by searching out the major problem areas where economies can be realized without reducing military effectiveness or where military effectiveness can be enhanced without increased cost. We must take into account as best we can our total military. Other matters of the agenda to table the initial thinking of my staff on problem areas I believe we should investigate. I ask that you study these and be prepared to consider at our next meeting a certain number of these objectives to permit this committee to proceed. These papers have been prepared in quick fashion, but I am convinced that, though the working may be rough in these staff papers, the objectives are sound. I therefore ask your very serious consideration so that we may be prepared to outline an immediate work program.

As Chairman, I would like to make a few statements on procedure for meetings of the screening and costing committee. It is obvious that our work be informal and conducted within a limited group—otherwise we shall not get ahead. Until developments indicate otherwise, I suggest daily sessions of the screening and costing committee beginning at 1000 hours. At these first sessions I visualize discussions between the screening and costing committee and the responsible team of the staff on selected problem areas with a view to initiating screening and costing committee action by correspondence to appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies and countries. I desire to limit attendance at these working meetings to the minimum. When discussions by the screening and costing committee concern problem areas of particular significance to an individual country, I will specifically request that the country representative to the screening and costing committee be present. I therefore ask that country representatives be available on reasonably short notice. Under normal procedures screening and costing committee action, in seeking information from individual countries, will be accomplished through the country representatives. I trust that they are prepared to assist us fully and that screening and costing committee may rely on them to take the necessary action involved. From time to time, as sufficient progress is made, I shall call for general meetings in order that the respective views of each nation may be presented and shared by all.

Part 2:

Proposed work program for SCC, statement by the Chairman.

When I was first appointed to this committee I informed Mr Harriman that it was of the utmost importance that the SCC begin its work upon convening and that it was my hope that SCC would get into matters of substance without delay. My understanding of the schedule of the TCC leads the conclusion that within two weeks the SCC must make an initial report, that within a month the SCC must have completed a substantial portion of its task. Let us not be under any illusions that every aspect of our work can meet such a schedule. However, I do believe that important conclusions backed by sound facts can, indeed must, be achieved. With your agreement I propose we set about our business with that objective.

I would like to spend a few minutes on outlining the probable nature of our program, as I see it. I would like to have the benefit of your views either today or at the next meeting.

I have proposed that the SCC staff be composed of 4 basic teams: Force Analysis, Logistics, Budget and Costing. Their titles represent the professional scope of our work. In some fields it will be difficult to distinguish the work to be done by such titles, but I have suggested this division because of the apparent sequence in which our type of analytical task must be approached.

In military planning the basic step is the determination of forces required. The strategic concept which engendered the MTDP forces has been set for us. The tedious process of compiling the essential combat forces required to support the strategic objective has been accomplished and a revised proposal on major units has been issued recently by the Standing Group. The broad operational planning task has been accomplished. But there is yet another task concerning forces that has not been done which I feel is the mission of the first-mentioned team—the Force Analysis Team—this requirement is the technical review of the compilation of force requirements to discover ways and means of reducing the inevitable high cost of major plans and of promoting the most efficient utilization of troops to accomplish the necessary tasks. I propose to touch on this aspect in detail at an early meeting.

After a measure has been secured of the required forces the next step is obviously the requirement to equip and supply them, as well as the ability to do so. I know that each country has planned this in detail. However a cardinal principle in NATO is the promotion of efficiency through more effective use of our overall allied resources. The fact that NATO plans have not yet been refined makes it even more necessary to inspect the possibilities of eliminating duplications, errors and faulty assumptions in logistics planning. There can be little doubt but that in the early phases of our combined operations there is much room for improvement in the logistics field.

Having established force and logistics requirements from the military viewpoint there is the detailed analysis and review of their translation into and procurement of the end items necessary to equip, maintain and operate the forces both in peace and war. I term this the budget review, or the defense ministry type of action. I consider this a most important aspect of the SCC operations.

After the above 3 actions have been accomplished we are ready to proceed with the important task of “costing” the military requirements. This is the work of the Costing Team. They have two principal fields of operations: The costing of the revised MTDP and the analysis of probable savings, if recommendations by the SCC were to be carried out. In the last analysis the SCC mission is intended to provide a measure of economy and we must be able to demonstrate the worth of our recommendations.

The orderly method suggested above cannot be followed very precisely but it appears to be the basic pattern. The TCC requires an early assessment of the financial implications in the revised MTDP. It will be necessary to proceed at once with certain aspects of the costing exercise. I have had my staff draw up certain proposals on this.

The complexity of our task and the need to tie in with the TCC requires a work program of a flexible but yet positive character. At this time I would propose the following tasks as those of first importance:

a. An immediate rough assessment of the cost of the revised MTDP by November 5.

b. A constructive series of questionnaires to NATO agencies and countries designed to provide information in the costing assessment as well as the details of present defense programs. Some of this has already been accomplished.

c. Select certain major fields of investigation wherein substantial savings in material might be effected and reach tentative conclusions by November 5 on what recommendations could be made.

d. Isolate areas where insufficient information is obtainable in order that corrective measures can be initiated.

At the close of this meeting I shall distribute to the SCC the preliminary staff studies that I mentioned earlier. Are there any general comments, suggestions or questions on this aspect of our work?

1. Telegrams from General McNarney and his staff were sent to the Secretary of Defense through the facilities of SACEUR in Paris and bore the series indicator “Har”; copies of some of these cables are in a special lot file in the Department of State entitled the Military cable files, lot 52–246.
2. This opening statement by General McNarney was presented at the first formal meeting of the Screening and Costing Committee of the TCC which met on October 20. For information concerning the committee’s origins, see the editorial note, p. 316.