740.5/9–2751: Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
288. ToISA. Fol msg concurred in by State, Def and ECA.
Preparation of material required for development proposed FY 1953 aid program as discussed in recent regional mtg at London obviously necessitates consultation with govts in order obtain or check data. In order avoid misunderstanding as to purpose U.S. unilateral programming and its relation to NATO plans of action, and to elicit full coop from govts you are authorized use such of fol and in such manner as you deem most effective.
U.S. welcomes adoption by NATO at Ottawa of program of action covering comprehensive review of job yet to be done. Prompt completion this NATO work will be essential to U.S. admin if it is to obtain Congressional approval of adequate U.S. aid. It is nec that U.S. admin place proposals for FY 1953 aid before Congress at start of new session in Jan. No decision as to scope and magnitude those proposals has yet been made and no commitments are involved in present initial programming. Admin hopes to place before Cong a program which can be demonstrated to be one which together with U.S. and other NATO countries natl efforts and mutual aid among them, will achieve that level of strength during FY 1953 that is called for to meet agreed NATO def requirements arising out of NATO decisions. Further, program shld be one which includes provision for those actions which must be taken in FY 1953 to assure ability to do those things which will have to be done in FY 1954 (e.g., provision for contracting for long lead time items of equip).
Our desire and intention is to conform these programs with decisions re MTDP which may result from NATO course of action set in motion at Ottawa. If these decisions result in allocation or time phasing of requirements differing from present SG proposals we wld expect to shape our program accordingly. However, in order to meet admin’s sched for preparation 1953 program U.S. must proceed in first instance with estimating total residual deficiencies after full [Page 290] estimate Eur and Canad efforts on assumption that force allocations proposed by SG will be accepted. Our estimates of Eur efforts in FYs 1953 and 1954 will of necessity have to be based on assumptions of econ and fin capability and consonant polit decisions and will also have to assume certain demands on Eur mil budgets for non-NATO expenditures.
Care shld be exercised to avoid creating impression U.S. aid will be planned meet total residual requirement irrespective of size or Eur effort. As stated above no decisions yet made re amt of aid. But to have basis for decisions must obtain appraisal of requirements and availabilities. Govts coop in furnishing data will enable us make decisions more efficiently and rapidly.
Also shld be clearly understood by govts that U.S. in obtaining these data for purposes program decisions is not undertaking to negotiate re MTDP nor gap allocation which it regards as multilateral task for NATO, nor re 1952 aid. Our use of SG proposals as basis for calculation not intended to prejudice decisions nor signify intransigent position on this problem.
- Drafted by Bell of S/ISA and cleared with Hains of Defense, Paul of ECA, Schelling of the Executive Office of the White House, and Vass of RA; repeated to the other NATO capitals.↩