740.5 MAP/9–451: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 323. ToISA. 1. In surveying NATO situation as it will apparently exist at Ottawa, we believe there are three important points, among many others, which US shld take carefully into account in developing our tactics for mtg.
2. First of these points relates to urgency for completing full MTDP and time element therein involved. There have been a number of indications here that there may not yet have been a real “meeting of minds” at highest governmental levels on either (a) need for full MTDP or (b) necessity for doing total job soonest, preferably before but certainly not later than 1 July 1954. The whole tenor of FEB report which concentrates rather pessimistically on DC 28 country commitments rather than on total job—and UK position that we shld work to meet DC 28 commitments before tackling total job—indicate an acceptance of the proposition that two-thirds of MTDP is sufficient to grapple with for time being. If this approach is followed much longer, it will be physically impossible meet full MTDP on time. On timing, there have been numerous indications by FEB and DPB reps that the way to resolve the total problem is to permit such slippage past target date as will enable build-up be carried out without necessity any strong measures of econ mobilization in Eur countries being applied. Therefore, we suggest consideration be given to thought that, at Ottawa, US opening statement on world situation shld give as much as possible of intelligence info and other arguments to emphasize why we believe piecemeal approach must cease and idea accepted that MTDP shld be fulfilled soonest. It might be possible in fol discussions to try to get nearer to real mtg of minds on full MTDP plus timing than NATO govts seem to have at present. Possible developments San Francisco may make this easier.2
3. Next two points derive from para above. First is obvious, but some times underestimated, controlling character of political aspects in reaching agreement on full MTDP forces and intent to fulfill MTDP on time. The mil and production aspects, while difficult, can be resolved if govts take political decision with all its implications to cooperate to do the full job. The politics involved are much less internatl in character than they are internal. There is no easy answer, but fact is symptomatic that UK govt seems desire not to discuss [Page 262] total job at Ottawa, perhaps because of possible gen election near future and “Bevanism”. In CD on 29 Aug, Dutch deputy stated his govt fully concurred in program of action implicit in US statement per Todep 1123 but added he must make clear that approval of procedural action involved did not include acceptance of statement (para 7, US statement) that Eur cld do more this year and much more in succeeding years. He said for record Neth cld not do more than present program. This emphasizes need, soon as possible, to put total mil-production-fin plan before all NAT govts showing appropriate task of each in relation tasks all others and showing feasibility of overall job.
4. Second point deriving from para 2 above is financial-econ. Discussions in coordinating group and comments by delegations here have emphasized preoccupation in keeping burden-sharing on basis DC–28 commitments. There has also been a great deal of comment to effect that US position, assuming aid figure as firm and Eur effort as variable required to fill gap must be balance against Eur view that its efforts and US aid is item which must fill the gap.4 There has also been very definite effort to get away from expressing a problem in terms of meeting MTDP requirements. This means that program of action which coordinating group has developed may not be aimed specifically at MTDP. In this regard we shld bear in mind difference in tone between “European manifesto” just issued by OEEC ministers and the FEB report. Perhaps something can be made of former as being views of high level looking at total situation including Sov threat as against narrower viewpoint drafters of FEB report. With regard agreeing at Ottawa on NATO program of action envisaged Todep 112, any suggestion for comprehensive program of work will be vulnerable if it cld be shown that mil side NATO wld not or could not provide, as at least tentative “planning assumptions” for other NATO bodies, certain rough statements on full force requirements, materiel requirements and infrastructure requirements shortly after Ottawa mtg so that DPB and FEB can do their parts in time. Therefore, strong US action may be necessary to get assurance that SG wld provide such info on urgent basis needed.
5. We feel importance Ottawa mtg is likely be very much greater than originally anticipated because debate there will involve FEB report (with its concentration on burden-sharing of only DC 28 commitments) [Page 263] and US program envisaged Todep 112. There probably will be collisions between these differing points of view and we shld by no means take it for granted that US proposals will be readily agreed. US shld therefore be prepared for measures which may be required in Ottawa to resolve debate in favor of Todep 112 program. In this connection strong Dept of Def representation wld seem advisable.
- Repeated to Paris and Heidelberg.↩
- This is a reference to the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco on September 8 and the negotiations preceding it. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see vol. vi, pp. 777 ff.↩
- Dated August 17, p. 248.↩
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In telegram Depto 327 from London, September 5, this sentence was corrected to read as follows:
↩“‘There has also been great deal of Eur comment to effect that US position, which assumes aid figure as firm and Eur effort as variable required to fill gap, must be balanced against Eur view that its efforts are nearly firm and US aid is item which must fill gap’” (740.5 MAP/9–551)