Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/8–3051: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

London, August 30, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 298. Re Depto 297.² We assume US Govt, and in particular US Chiefs of Staff, continue to attach same importance as always to authority and position of SG. On this assumption SG refusal to present report or be represented at Ottawa has had repercussions adversely affecting this important US interest.

It would be mistake to underestimate resentment which SG decision has caused in view of (1) sensitivity which non-SG countries have shown about SG since it was first established, (2) various proposals they have presented from time to time on reorganization of milit side, and their reluctant acquiescence in having these proposals put aside pending further experience with existing arrangements.

We believe govts of non-SG countries do recognize both special responsibilities of big three and need for small milit group capable of reaching decisions quickly and efficiently. At same time their agrmt to yield substantial portion of their sovereignty with respect to defense of their countries to group which may consult them, but which takes by itself decisions vital to them, has throughout been conditioned by (1) their insistence on polit control in which they have some share over SG decisions and (2) their feeling that existing arrangement could be considered satis only if in practice SG would keep them informed, consult adequately with them and take adequate acct of their interests in reaching decisions. Consequently part of price big three must pay for consent of others to SG capable of performing its essential functions of division on vital matters in peace or war is maintenance of relations between SG and govts not represented on it (particularly on day to day basis and in matters where vital decisions are not involved) of nature to maintain their confidence. (See also Kraft statement to Eisenhower (Paris 1292³) recognizing fully need for big three leadership, but that “way in which this was done created real feelings of bitterness”.)

We do not believe that smaller govts will seriously question continued existence of SG, but we do believe that its absence from Ottawa will evoke number of proposals for reorganization of milit side designed to exert greater control over SG, that these proposals will be strongly pressed, and that it will be neither possible to brush off nor easy to deal satisfactorily with them.

Believe this sitn merits personal attention of senior US officials in State, Def and SHAPE and of Adm. Wright.

Ernst concurs and is sending Def msg parallel to this and reftel.

Spofford

1. Repeated to Paris for personal attention of MacArthur.
2. August 30, not printed. This telegram reported on a difference of opinion that arose in the December 29 meeting of the Council Deputies between certain Deputies and the Standing Group representative present at that meeting. The action, concerning the Standing Group decision not to send a representative to the NAC meeting at Ottawa, was summarized in despatch Usdep 17, September 4, from London, p. 643.
3. Not printed.