Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5 MAP/8–1751: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

top secret priority

Washington, August 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 112. ToISA. Fol message contains ISAC agencies’ guidance re coordinated CD, FEB, DPB country mission action program to insure positive decisions Oct Council Mtg on increased force contributions, production programs, and financing. Part One outlines gen’l presentation of overall situation based on further consideration D–4/7a² exercise. You are authorized introduce to CD soonest after receipt SG costing and SG 20/31,³ which airpouched to you by courier Aug 17. Part Two outlines coordinated series steps to be taken by US elements NATO prior to Oct Council Mtg to achieve US goal of closing forces gap. Part Three outlines guidance to country missions re their part in coordinated program. Your comments on Parts Two and Three requested before final agreement and transmittal by Wash to Missions.

Part One

1. Question of closing forces gap now being studied by govts from military point view. Govts also have, for first time, estimate of 4-year costs of commitments. Now at half-way point in buildup. With this info and other military recommendations, is appropriate to take decisive action at Oct Council Mtg to meet total requirements MTDP. Essential that we now take a long look at job ahead, evaluate progress and pinpoint problems ahead which we must, by joint efforts, overcome.

2. In connection with preparation ’52 Mutual Aid request, US has necessarily made own analysis of costs of mtg requirements for Eur NATO allies, including cost of gap, and evaluated their capabilities for doing job. Have screened SG costing on US experience to make first refinement of this first approximation. While figures subject error, believe best now available and gen’l conclusions US study shld be tabled to aid other countries in reviewing problem in preparation for Oct decision to fill gap.

3. Screened cost of major materiel to meet Eur NATO requirements about $35 billion, of which Eur NATO forces gap accounts for between $3 billion and $4 billion. Non-major matériel costs estimated at $30 billion against which US estimates shld be substantial offset as result Ger occupation costs or mutual aid. Of total, less than $2 billion is add’l cost of mtg full Eur allocation of forces gap. (FYI, present estimate is between $2 and $3 billion Ger offset and $1 billion Canadian aid.) Believe no question each country can and shld find resources cover non-matériel costs. Believe Eur can also provide substantial proportion equipment. Feasibility mtg full MTDP requirements boils down to question whether they willing make sacrifices to raise budgets this year and next 2 fiscal years to level to permit rapid letting production contracts to insure mtg equipment requirements.

4. Given adequate Eur effort, US prepared meet major share initial equipment requirements. However, US aid after capital buildup period must taper off sharply. Unless Eur is in position maintain own defense effort post ‘54 will not have achieved goal of NAT adequate security, based on economic and political health and independence in Eur.

5. US prepared accept continuation present heavy burden if allies accept commitments meet full MTDP and make realistic plans to raise own level effort to insure achievement MTDP thru joint efforts. US administration prepared to recommend aid for NATO allies of same total amount of appropriations for ’53 and ’54 as for this year, i.e. roughly add’l $11 billion for ’53–54. This means US wld produce and deliver in time meet time-phased requirements about $21 billion equipment in addition to economic aid. Believe other allies, including Canadian friends, can and shld produce balance of essential equipment, if really try and we make sure are wasting nothing on nonessentials. But must plan to meet all essential requirements. SACEUR cannot operate on planned shortfalls.

6. Obviously, cannot do this on present level of Eur efforts or present approach in letting production contracts. Given increase GNP, greater productivity, no question Eur can do more this year and much more in ’53–54 than present rate. In fact, our analysis indicates possible for Eur, with moderate US economic aid, raise their expenditures enough to do balance of job. Cannot expect US to make up difference.

7. Best military judgment, recently reaffirmed, calls for fulfillment MTDP. SACEUR has warned that greater efforts in next two years can provide success, whereas longer and drawn out buildup wld be overly dangerous. Our task now is to figure out ways to make sure MTDP will be achieved on time.

8. Critically important to make further increases this FY and start planning now for adequate budgets in coming FY. In this connection, you can state US already working on ’53 and plans propose budget in Jan to implement our part if they accept commitments at Oct Mtg.

9. Must prepare for Oct Mtg with fol in mind:

a. No security in inadequate forces too late. MTDP must be achieved, including forces gap.

b. Ways must be found to make it feasible. US judgment is that together we can do job, if accelerate progress towards maximum effort.

c. US will do its part by requesting funds for ’53 and ’54 at present rate.

10. Propose fol specific course action:

a. Refer SG costing and US presentation to Steering Grp, DPB and FEB. US will make available experts familiar with preparation SG report and US screening to facilitate consideration.

b. Ask Steering Grp to come up with recommendation along line visualized in Depto 202.⁴ Shld strive for FEB report for Oct Mtg on steps to be taken to lift financial effort to level needed meet full MTDP requirement on above assumption re US aid and positive DPB program of action which will point way to attaining Eur financed production over next three years sufficient to meet full requirement.

Part Two

Fol is guidance for US elements in NATO bodies:

1. Deps shld set earliest possible deadline for Steering Grp to come up with recommendations re action programs for NATO bodies.

2. US elements shld attempt persuade Steering Grp as interim action on revision of SG costing accept promptly US screening of NATO costing. Wash reps will be prepared to explain country differences between NATO and US costing. Immediate object is to make countries look at forces gap on more realistic basis. Equally important, wld hope Steering Grp wld recognize critical importance of eliminating any excessive requirements now in country plans and costing. Might consider specific recommendation in Sept report to Council that appropriate military bodies be urged provide necessary guidance for austerity screening of present plans which cld facilitate decisions close forces gap and pave way for more realistic costing, essential before presentation Congress ’53 program.

3. Canada presents special problem. While US presentation necessarily addressed to Eur, because of aid angle, US objective of achieving adequate effort equally applicable to Canada. Wld hope that Steering Grp, FEB and NATO wld highlight possibility higher level effort and Mutual Aid by Canada and make specific recommendations for action to overcome any bottlenecks cited by Canada.

4. FEB shld first complete report re European economic mobilization for FY 51–52. Recommendations this report on country-by-country basis shld provoke sufficient acceleration European military expenditures to implement ’52 phase of total MTDP requirements. Both increased rate military expenditures and measures recommended for adoption to support this rate in FY 52 shld provide preliminary for more gen’l report on financial feasibility of total MTDP requirements and recommendations re specific measures which must be taken. These measures shld not include US aid total at rate higher than $5.56 million requested from Congress for NATO countries for FY 52. Recognize initial position European countries may be that MTDP cost feasible only if level US aid much higher, but US shld not consider stating before Oct NAC Mtg that it might consider increasing aid in ’53–54.

5. Emphasis in NATO bodies shld be on production and financial implications of filling forces gap, with object of achieving MTDP goal. US position at this stage of negots must be that military have decided MTDP necessary and discussion of lowering requirements or lengthening period must be firmly squelched.

6. It is our firm view that every precaution must be taken to avoid discussion of feasibility closing forces gap at Sept Council Mtg and believe that other govts will agree that issues posed in costing and US presentation are so weighty that national govts shld not contemplate formulating definitive positions on other than procedural matters to be covered in Steering Comite report in short period between date of your presentation and Sept Mtg. It is further noted, FYI, that possible pessimism among Europeans resulting from first look at US presentation cld, if made public at time of Sept Mtg, be highly embarrassing with regard Congressional action on MSP. It is further pointed out that consideration of entire problem by Council in Oct cannot be undertaken until SACEUR views are available on present MTDP.

7. On these matters, there will be transmitted soonest a phasing of NATO consideration of forces gap problem on which we are operating and on which we believe you shld seek agreement of Steering Comite.

8. US goal in Oct Mtg is to obtain govt commitments on full force requirements, including agreement on necessary production and financial backup, sufficiently firm to convince Congress have reasonable expectation job will be done. This means commitments at least as firm as US offer of aid for ’53–54.

9. Status Action on Gap

FYI, on 28 May JCS presented proposed allocation of forces by NATO countries to “fill gap” between planned requirements and planned contributions of DC–28.⁵ This initial study was used as basis for economic and fin analysis shown in ISAC D–4/7a.⁶ On basis of D–4/7a and 4/8⁷ JCS modified their 28 May views, and forwarded listing of these revised forces to US reps in SG on 28 June as initial US mil view. Resulting SG action (SG 20/31) represents limited adjustments to JCS view necessary in order reach agreement. Country allocation of forces to close gap and meet total requirements of DC–28 as shown in SG 20/31 are therefore considered to represent initial US mil position for consideration of this problem. This initial US position is useful for econ planning purposes and is intended to give order of magnitude of effort each nation may have to make, and represents US judgment of what can be done. After comment on SG 20/31 by NATO nations thru Mil Rep Comite, requested by Sept 25, final mil study will be prepared for consideration by MC prior to Oct NAC mtg. At present time, you shld work on pol, econ and fin aspects of SG 20/31 to facilitate mil agreement by NATO nations on this plan for presentation to MC prior to Oct Council mtg, and insofar as possible seek agreement by countries to make this plan a basis for Oct Council decision.

10. Reftel 182.⁸ Paris Plan has been included without change in initial SG paper on national contributions to close forces gap as air part of overall plan. Note End B to SG 20/31. In overall work on gap Paris Plan shld be considered in above light. However, due long-lead times required to meet requirements of this plan, it warrants special and earliest consideration by all NATO nations. JCS presently have this plan under study and firm US position cannot be developed until their recommendations are completed. It is desired you bring this subject up in CD in conjunction with gen’l gap presentation, pointing out that magnitude and lead-time aspects of air gap require immediate attention by NATO nations. Economic aspects of Paris Plan are, as you know, before DPB and FEB. You shld avoid any CD discussions of mil factors of gap, including Paris Plan.

Part Three Country Mission Guidance

1. US object is to assure that each country receives full picture overall situation as seen by US. This approach is apart from and shld not interfere with 53 programming or current negots re level of effort or economic aid, all of which deal with specific country programs.

2. Mission shld, however, play leading US role in obtaining favorable decision on SG mil judgments re force role which country shld play. Mil reps have been asked give govt views to SG on military grounds by Sept 25. Second role of Missions is to reinforce and supplement US multilateral efforts to accept production and fin consequences of closing forces gap. This latter will enter action phase after Sept NAC mtg. Country guidance re approach will be forthcoming.

3. When Spofford gives green light Amb shld present Part one analysis of problem to FonOff. Use own discretion re method presentation. Convey action schedule as seen by this govt and impress urgency of matter and necessity earliest possible collective decision to meet forces gap. Offer full team assistance in providing info, etc. Indicate matter so important and implications so profound US considers undesirable attempt discuss Sept Council mtg except to blueprint action program leading to decision in Oct.

Webb

1. Repeated to Paris for MacArthur and OSR. Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Vass (RA); cleared by Vass with Martin (RA), Kaplan (ECA), Nash (Defense), Bray (S/ISA), and Widmer (Treasury).
2. Ante, p. 193.
3. Not printed, but see the reference to the genesis and composition of this Standing Group paper at numbered paragraph 9, p. 252.
4. Not printed; it outlined a plan agreed upon by representatives of the DPB, the FEB, the Council Deputies, and the Standing Group liaison to the CD, in an informal meeting on August 14. The plan called for lower level representatives of the NATO civilian bodies to start accumulating at once data on the total NATO cost picture. This compilation would be presented to the top inter-NATO working group in London about August 29. By that time, the Working Group would have substantially completed preparation of the FEB report to the NATO Council and could then use the compilation of cost data to help develop recommended courses of action to be followed by each NATO body between the projected September and October Council meetings in order to present at the latter meeting a maximum number of specific recommendations. (740.5/8–1551)
5. Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1.
6. Ante, p. 193.
7. ISAC D–4/8 not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 206.
8. Not printed. This telegram to Paris dated July 9 expressed the ISAC agencies’ general agreement with the course of action proposed by the ECC in telegram Depto 15 of July 4, p. 213, and commented on certain matters of detail and timing (740.5/7–451).