Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/6–2051

Paper Prepared by the International Security Affairs Committee¹

[Extract]¹

top secret
u.s. eyes only

[Washington, Undated.]

North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan and Related United States Assistance

summary and recommendations

1. Costing of the Medium Term Defense Plan and estimates of European economic capacity indicate a short-fall between (a) total defense of the European NAT countries plus Germany, and (b) maximum probable European defense efforts plus United States assistance programmed through FY 1952, amounting to approximately $25 billion. U.S. assistance for FY 1953 and 1954 if projected at the rate requested in the Mutual Security Program for 1952 would amount to $12½ billion for the two years combined. The problem is to find ways and means of bringing the European portion of the North Atlantic defense program within politically and economically tolerable limits of European military efforts and U.S. (plus Canadian) assistance, without sacrificing the essential character of the military objective.

2. It is considered impossible to obtain a sufficiently large European effort to meet the full remaining deficiency, and undesirable to press upon the Europeans a probably unattainable additional defense effort over and above the very large increases already projected. It is considered impracticable and undesirable for the U.S. to cover the full deficiency through increased aid. The costing and capacity estimates now available are not believed to warrant the abandonment of the MTDP as a basic objective or fundamental alterations in strategic plans for European defense. At the same time, it is not feasible, in relation to the requirements either of Congressional presentation or of further negotiation in the NATO, to evade or postpone the problem posed by these estimates.

3. It is recommended that a solution to this problem be composed of the following elements:

a. Continued efforts to induce and enable the Europeans to make the maximum practicable contribution to Western defense, but without expecting or seeking military efforts so far beyond political and economic capacities as to cause either their discouragement or the acceptance of tasks inconsistent with political and economic stability. Negotiations may be directed toward increased efforts somewhat in excess of those assumed in deriving the figures mentioned above, but planning should not assume the realization of such increases;

b. Seeking adjustments in the timing, quality or quantity of MTDP requirements in such fashion that total expenditures to July 1, 1954, may be reduced by perhaps $8 to $9 billion (⅛ of total cost) without sacrificing the basic military objectives of the Plan;

c. Consideration of the possibility of U.S. assistance during the remainder of MTDP on a scale perhaps 30% greater than the annual rate now programmed for FY 1952, i.e., a sum through FY 1954 totaling $15 to $17 billion beyond the amounts already recommended to the Congress for FY 1952.

4. It is recommended that a position paper for the Congressional presentation be prepared on the size and duration of U.S. assistance to NATO envisaging a possible substantial increase in the level of U.S. assistance in FY 1953 and 1954 and otherwise reflecting the general analysis in the attached paper although not including the specific quantitative estimates.

5. It is recommended that the U.S. members of the Standing Group, the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Finance and Economic Board be authorized to initiate negotiations in the NATO, and that the appropriate agencies be authorized to initiate negotiations bilaterally, working toward completion of the Medium Term Defense Plan, if necessary with acceptable modifications which do not jeopardize the central military objectives. In so doing, the U.S. representative should make clear that the preliminary U.S. appraisal of total costs indicates serious economic and production difficulties which will require intensive collective efforts to overcome and which may require adjustments in quality, quantity, or timing, though not basic objectives; and that the U.S. desires to work out with its Allies an effective solution during the summer and early autumn of 1951.

6. It should also be made clear that, in view of the substantially larger probable total costs than previously anticipated, the U.S. Administration would consider recommending to the Congress a significant increase in annual rates of military end-item and economic support assistance for the Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954, provided, and only provided, that the Plan multilaterally worked out and the expanded undertakings of the other members demonstrates the possibility of obtaining the basic military objectives of the MTDP, even if not the full Plan on the target dates in every respect.

7. It is recommended that the appropriate military authorities be requested to intensify and accelerate their efforts to find means of meeting the necessary military objectives of Western European defense but with a significant reduction in the total defense expenditure requirement through mid-1954.

8. It is recommended that the agencies concerned be directed to initiate immediately, making full use of regional and country as well as Washington representatives, a refinement of the costing of the Plan and the estimates of European capacity, together with the development of specific U.S. proposals for expanded production, accelerated force build up, and other steps to effect the maximum practicable realization of the Plan within the limits of realistically appraised political and economic capacity.

Scope, Duration and Feasibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan and Related United States Assistance

1. Assuming that the objective of the U.S. program for Europe is to assist in creating military strength in Western Europe which will (a) deter Soviet aggression and (b) resist invasion if it occurs, an appreciation of the scope, duration and cost of achieving this objective is essential to further planning and action.

2. This paper provides such an appreciation and states certain possible U.S. courses of action. It is designed for use in connection with (a) Congressional presentation of the Mutual Security Program, (b) NATO planning and negotiation and bilateral negotiation with our European Allies, (c) as general background for Cabinet level consideration of the major issues presented. It should also be useful in connection with (d) U.S. budget planning for FY 1953, and (e) revision of NSC 68/4.²

background

3. In late 1950, the governments of the NAT nations agreed on the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) and accepted certain commitments to raise, maintain and equip combat-ready ground, sea and air forces toward meeting its requirements. That plan was agreed, and those commitments accepted, in the absence of any joint estimate of total costs and, in all likelihood, in the absence of more than a most rudimentary estimate on the part of each country of the cost if its own force contribution, but with the expectation of substantial but unknown amounts of U.S. assistance. The MTDP and the national force commitments have always been assumed to be subject to a feasibility check.

4. The national commitments to raise forces thus far undertaken fall 20 percent (ground forces) to 40 percent (air forces) short of the total forces required in support of the Plan by July 1954, the accepted planning date. This difference between commitments and requirements is referred to as the “Gap”.

5. The MTDP, which was approved as to military desirability by all the NATO Chiefs of Staffs and Defense Ministers on behalf of all their governments, is of course under continuous review. However, the JCS in May 1951 reaffirmed their view that reduction in the force requirements could not be accepted from a military point of view. SHAPE is now preparing its official comments.

6. Since November 1950, the process of approximating the annual and total costs of meeting the MTDP requirements has been underway in NATO and in this Government. Each NAT nation in response to a Standing Group directive has submitted its estimate of national military costs involved in meeting the MTDP commitments it had undertaken in NATO. The Standing Group has these submissions under study. Simultaneously the Joint American Military Advisory Group and the U.S. Missions in Europe have been evaluating country estimates and the total estimate of cost. This process of successive approximations here and abroad will continue. For the present, it is believed that the costing process reflected herein is reasonably reliable within the limitations of available data.

7. There have been completed within the past three weeks (a) a preliminary Joint Chiefs of Staff position on the country-by-country distribution of forces desirable from a military viewpoint to meet the “Gap”, this position subject to checking from the economic and political viewpoints; (b) a cost estimate of the European portion of the full MTDP (and European non-NATO requirements), based on U.S. screening of country submissions to the Standing Group, with requirements for the “Gap” distributed as in (a); and (c) a preliminary ECA estimate of European political and economic capacity to carry enlarged military efforts. Each of these studies has assumed full German participation in western defense.

8. The salient results of these studies, which cover total military costs for nine European NATO countries and Germany, are summarized in the table on the following page. Since they show substantially larger costs than the estimates developed last December for NSC–68/3³ and since the size and duration of this program have implications of great significance to the security programs and policies of the U.S. and the other NAT nations, it is believed that this estimate should, together with certain conclusions and possible courses of action described below, be presented to the Cabinet level for urgent consideration.

[The remainder of this paper is a detailed presentation of the points covered in the earlier section of “Summary and Recommendations.” Omitted too is the above-mentioned table, marked “Tentative—Under Revision” and its accompanying page of explanatory notes.]

1. This extract is part of ISAC Document D–4/7a whose overall title was “Scope, Duration and Feasibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan and Related United States Assistance.” The extract, plus a section which embodied modifications of the earlier draft, D–4/7 (not printed), was distributed on June 20 to the ISAC member agencies to serve as a basis for Cabinet-level discussion of the problem by the afternoon of June 21 or as soon after that as possible. A copy of D–4/7a was pouched to the other NATO capitals on August 13 (740.5/8–1351). For information on the background of this study, see numbered paragraph 9 of telegram Todep 112, August 17, p. 252.
1. This extract is part of ISAC Document D–4/7a whose overall title was “Scope, Duration and Feasibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan and Related United States Assistance.” The extract, plus a section which embodied modifications of the earlier draft, D–4/7 (not printed), was distributed on June 20 to the ISAC member agencies to serve as a basis for Cabinet-level discussion of the problem by the afternoon of June 21 or as soon after that as possible. A copy of D–4/7a was pouched to the other NATO capitals on August 13 (740.5/8–1351). For information on the background of this study, see numbered paragraph 9 of telegram Todep 112, August 17, p. 252.
2. See footnote 2, p. 63.
3. For portions of report NSC 68/3, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security,” December 8, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, pp. 432 ff. For subsequent material on overall U.S. national security programs, see ibid., 1951, vol.i, pp 1. ff.