740.5/6–2051
The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur)1 to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)
Dear Jamie: It seems increasingly clear to me that there are growing pressures both from elements in the US as well as in other NAT countries to revise the NATO structure so that there will be greater executive authority. A case in point from the foreign side is Van Zeeland’s conversation with General Eisenhower, which I reported telegraphically.2 From the US side, I know that Mr. Paul Hoffman and other prominent Americans who have been in Paris and have seen the General have mentioned to him their belief that until there is some form of NATO reorganization, we will not get the best, or in fact even reasonable results from our efforts. General Eisenhower has given some thought to this question, and I know he generally concurs with the idea that something must be done to vest the organization with greater executive authority. Mr. Harriman arrived yesterday, and I believe will be talking about this problem with the General during his visit here.
[Page 189]I assume that you are familiar with the thinking described above and the fact that prominent US people, such as Hoffman for example, will probably raise the question in high quarters at home and also possibly with members of Congress. The purpose of this brief note is to give you some idea of the lines along which I believe General Eisenhower is thinking. The General has no pre-conceived ideas, but I have the definite impression that he believes the Council should meet every three months and that in the interim period there should be a considerably stronger NATO executive set-up than now exists to carry out the policy guidance of the Council. Since under such a plan there would only be a lapse of three months between Council sessions, deadlocks or sticky points which might develop would be resolved at the next meeting of the Council, so there would not be the present long periods of months where the Deputies are debating questions with constant reference back to government but no decisions. I would like to make clear that General Eisenhower is not critical of the Deputies, but he just does not feel they have the organization, terms of reference, and level of representation which make for the most effective action.
I also have the opinion that he feels that our own backstopping set-up at home is far from perfect. It is my impression that he believes strongly that the three elements (State-Defense-ECA) should participate together in the formation of policy. But at the same time, I believe, he feels there should be a man of Cabinet stature who rides herd on the operation and who will be in a sense an arbiter who will resolve questions where there is inter-Departmental and agency disagreement. I believe the General tends to think that such a man of Cabinet stature (equivalent in rank to a Cabinet officer) should not be a member of either State, Defense, or ECA, but someone in a role such as Charlie Wilson has in the war mobilization program. If the General’s views on this question are sought—and I believe they may well be sooner or later—I think his views generally may run along the foregoing lines.
If such a concept were adopted, our whole foreign aid and NATO defense program would not, I imagine, be under as obvious Department of State administration as now exists under Mr. Cabot’s set-up, since any administrator or man of Cabinet stature would most probably be more directly responsible to the White House than to the Secretary of State. I would like to make clear that the General is not “anti-State Department” in any sense whatsoever, but has, I believe, a sincere belief that a separate administrator for foreign aid and security matters is the best way in which to get rapid action and solution to many questions which now are batted about among the different agencies in Washington for protracted periods of time. I might add that by and large, General Eisenhower speaks very favorably of our [Page 190] Department representation in Europe, and particularly of David Bruce, who did an outstanding job with the Congressional Committee which was just over here. I attended David’s briefing of the Committee last Sunday where he made his presentation and then took question after question for a period of almost three hours. When it was all over, he received an ovation from the Committee, which agreed unanimously that it was the finest presentation they had had by any diplomatic mission.
I am passing the foregoing information along to you on a personal basis, since I would not, for obvious reasons, wish to be quoted. However, I do feel that this whole question is rapidly coming to a head, and I wished you and Mr. Perkins to have the benefit of what little background I have been able to pick up here on the general line of thinking, as well as the views of people such as Hoffman who have recently passed through.
Yours ever,
P.S. There is, of course, another possibility regarding a NATO reorganization, which someone might raise. It would, in effect, be to put General Eisenhower at the head of the whole NATO structure, civilian and military—perhaps giving him some kind of civilian hat and maintaining his international capacity. I have not heard anyone put this forward, but I assume that if the question comes up, someone might well suggest something along these lines. You will understand that this is speculation on my part, but it seems a possibility.