Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/6–1351: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Paris, June 13, 1951—8 p. m.

7748. From MacArthur. Re immed preceding tel² fol is resume Eisenhower–Van Zeeland discussion yesterday.

1. Force commitments under MTDP. Van Zeeland brought up methods of force commitments under MTDP. He said force commitments thus far made were nothing more than unilateral declarations of what individual countries willing to contribute without regard to comparability of forces effort of different NAT countries. He personally believed total force requirements should be divided on equitable multilateral basis and that NATO should develop suitable criteria for over-all effort and for allocating force requirements, rather than existing system of individual offers.

Gen Eisenhower agreed in theory with foregoing but pointed out that sharing of burden on basis specific criteria alone was extremely complicated because of many inter-related factors: mil, econ, polit, and psychological. He expressed strong belief that if Eur def is to be organized, each country must make its very best effort. He also emphasized MTDP is useful document in terms target for force requirements; that it is undergoing study; that existing requirements are absolute minimum.

Van Zeeland agreed with “very best effort” concept altho he pointed out strong tendency of nations to consider contribution other members to judge justness of individual loads.

2. Present org of NATO. Van Zeeland asked whether Gen Eisenhower satisfied with present structure NATO and whether it was organized in most effective possible manner. Van Zeeland doubted that it was. Gen Eisenhower agreed with Van Zeeland pointing out that altho deps doing excellent work they appear handicapped by lack of sufficient delegated exec auth. This seemed to be generally true of NATO. For example, when SACEUR has requirements they must pass through series of comites which has become time consuming process and which hampers efforts to build Eur strength as rapidly as desirable. If NAT Govts cld be represented by top level people with considerable greater auth in NATO bodies, more rapid progress might be made.

Van Zeeland believed NAT Council shld meet more often preferably every three months and when Council not in session greater exec auth shld be delegated to deps to carry out policy within Council directives. Gen Eisenhower concurred generally with Van Zeeland’s views; Van Zeeland said on basis of his conversation and his own views he intended propose fol for next Council agenda:

(a) Council meet regularly every three months,

(b) Council review work individual NATO bodies and issue broad policy guidance;

(c) In interim period between Council mtgs deps have greater auth to act within agreed policy guidance incl auth to commit certain limited funds for necessary proj such as infra-structure requirements.

3. Belg def effort. Van Zeeland said Belg Govt surprised at US criticism of over-all Belg effort. He felt criticism unjust since Belg doing everything it had agreed to do and appeared to be well ahead other NAT countries this respect. Van Zeeland inquired whether Gen Eisenhower believed Belg effort adequate and if not where it was deficient. General replied that what Van Zeeland seemed to be saying was that Belg was doing everything it said it wld do. Gen Eisenhower asked whether NAT countries shld be asked to do only what they said they wld do or to do their very best. He personally believed strongly each country shld do its very best and that in final analysis only country itself cld determine whether it was really making all-out effort.

4. Infra-structure. Van Zeeland inquired whether Gen Eisenhower believed infra-structure problem on road to settlement. Gen Eisenhower replied that while problem very complicated, it did not appear to be going well and matter was one of utmost urgency. Gen Gruenther felt NATO was doing badly on infra-structure problems. While recognizing individual govts wished to know to talk cost infrastructure, this would take considerable time. Meanwhile certain infrastructure projs such as airfields were of vital importance if Eur were to be defended. For this interim financing shld be rapidly arranged. He personally surprised Eurs holding back when their very security depended on rapid solution. Van Zeeland said he wished to help in every possible way to get countries to move forward and suggested he have mil info on comparative efforts by different countries on which to base his action.

5. Maximum utilization Eur armament production capacity. Van Zeeland expressed conviction Eur in its own interest shld produce own armaments to maximum extent possible. Unless existing Eur capacity utilized, defense will not be organized as rapidly as necessary. He had made great effort to get Belg industry to expand armament production but Belg industry unwilling unless: (a) it recd firm orders, (b) it was assured of payment. If these two conditions cld be met problem wld be partially solved. He thought one practical way to make progress this field was to estab list of mil items approved for NAT forces and second by detailed list (with countries’ breakdown) of items which different forces [need?] and what different countries can produce. If this were done a bookkeeping arrangement to encourage Eur exchange of armaments might be worked out. For example, Belg has surplus capacity for small arms. It cld ship certain number small arms to Denmark debiting Danish acct to value of shipment. Danes cld ship canned butter to Belg for use Belg Armed Forces. Value Danish shipment wld be credited against Belg shipment. Both shipments wld be duty free since for mil use. At termination certain period books wld be closed and final balances drawn. Creditor country wld extend long term credit of say 10 years which wld be guaranteed by 12 NAT countries. Van Zeeland said he discussed this possibility with Herod who also believed something along foregoing lines possible. Van Zeeland said he heard informally from Murphy US thinking of interim solution envisaging placing by US of limited number of orders with Eur industry. This might be helpful as interim solution but from psychological as well as practical view it wld not be as good as plan which wld require Eur themselves to make maximum use their total productive facilities.

6. Status of Brussels’ pact. Gen Gruenther inquired Van Zeeland’s views re future of Brussels’ pact org incl mil machinery. Van Zeeland replied all Brussels’ pact countries felt all machinery of pact incl mil shld be continued because:

(a) It provided for social, econ, and cultural coop not envisaged in NAT.

(b) Automatic clause bringing all into war if one attacked is very important.

(c) It provides possible framework for future Eur org. Van Zeeland said mil machinery Brussels’ pact while continuing on paper is virtually replaced by NAT mil machinery and that Brussels machinery shld in no way be permitted interfere with NAT mil machinery which has responsibility for def of Western Europe.

7. Eur army. Van Zeeland said Belg supported Fr proposal for Eur army not on merits but largely as means of finding solution to Franco-Ger differences re Ger rearmament.³ He was disturbed by newspaper article datelined Bonn in Paris Herald Tribune June 11 which talked about 12 Ger divs and other details. He had only vague and conflicting reports re negots in Bonn⁴ and asked if details in Tribune art were correct. Gen Eisenhower said he had not read art. Gen Gruenther believed art probably based on various rumors and reports re discussion. He pointed out one of main problems in connection with Bonn talks is size Ger units and level of integration (i.e., division or corps). Solution these problems not yet reached. Therefore it premature to become disturbed re newspaper reports. Gen Eisenhower said he had taken no position re Eur Army. He wished maximum number effective units. If Eur Army cld produce such units he wld accept them. On other hand he felt Eur Army as conceived by Fr seemed to require certain unified polit, econ, and fin institutions, which might take considerable time to develop. Ger contribution is most important and shld be arranged at earliest possible moment. In meantime he felt Eur countries shld build up their own strength since this wld attract Gers.

8. Next mtg NAT Council. Van Zeeland reiterated belief Council shld meet regularly four times yearly. He recently contacted all NAT Govts re mtg in July. Consensus opinion was Council shld meet soon as feasible. While Van Zeeland believed it should meet in July he did not believe it shld meet before or during CFM.⁵ Agenda shld be carefully prepared by deps and shld include Greek-Turk question. He said he was communicating to Spofford results his soundings other NAT Govts re next mtg. He believed both Fon and Def Mins shld be present and that mtg might be held late July–Aug or Sept depending on CFM and possibility real progress. Place of mtg wld depend on date. [MacArthur.]

Bruce

1. Repeated to Brussels for the Ambassador and to London for Spofford.
2. Not printed.
3. For documentation on international discussion of the French plan for a European army, see pp. 755 ff.
4. For documentation on the military talks at Bonn, see pp. 990 ff.
5. The conference referred to here is the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris. For documentation, see pp. 1086 ff.