Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/6–1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

secret

Washington, June 12, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 513. For Spofford. 1. ReDepto 990,² Dept regrets draft “Principles Governing the Relationship Between the UN and Collective Self-Defense and Regional Orgs” (Todep 437³) did not embody discussion of reasons prompting analysis these relationships at this time. Principles are in no sense rigid. Several changes therein have now been embodied in revised draft, and others may be appropriate.

2. Revised memo containing principles was considered at mtg of Dep Under Secy with S/ISA and Assistant Secretaries June 5, at which it was decided to transmit memo to Dept Def to obtain views JCS on military implications. The covering letter to Dept Def notes that enumeration of principles is still in formative stage in State Dept and expresses intention to discuss matter with other CMC members after clearances within State and Def Depts. It was further decided that each geographic Bureau within Dept shld prepare papers considering how relationships between regional and collective self-defense arrangements coming within their areas of responsibilities can best be developed along with UN security measures.

3. Principles represent concept which we believe is worth further study and development. They are still in exploratory stage. Question of relationships between UN and other security arrangements may arise in UN because of terms ref CMC, although timing and extent of any internatl discussion this problem, on which your views will also be sought, remains to be decided. However, important that US position be formulated. In addition to memo fol may be helpful to you as background info.

a. The basic relationship between UN and NATO has remained unchanged since NAT became effective. See FM D F–6a, Apr 28, 1950.⁴ Moreover, since Treaty GA has on US initiation adopted Uniting for Peace Res⁵ which makes elaboration of relationship important.

Our policy of support for the development of UN collective security system is long-range one which will make it increasingly possible obtain more than theoretical benefits to our own security and that of our closest allies. For this reason we attached great importance Uniting for Peace Res in GA last fall and to res adopted at recent mtg Mins of Am States.⁶ With adoption of Uniting for Peace Res there is now real possibility of carrying forward basic Charter purposes. Such progress will be possible, of course, only if various members take steps to maintain units within their armed forces and to make available other resources and facilities for UN use. If Members take such action, UN strength and universal security will be materially increased. This is so because contributions from non-members of such groupings wld be forthcoming more promptly and with broader participation than if we relied solely on our own strength and that of our formal partners in regional and self-defense arrangements.

Foregoing gen considerations raise question of potential relationship between NATO and UN in foreseeable circumstances. It is our assumption that in event of aggression against NAT area we wld seek immed UN support for action taken by NAT. This wld probably mean UN endorsement of action taken pursuant to Treaty, recommendation to all States to make contributions to UN to repel aggression, and appointment of SG or individual members as executive military agency on behalf of UN authorized to negotiate with UN Members for contribution of forces and other assistance. In this way NATO members wld received political, legal and moral approval of world community through UN and cooperation and material support of states outside NAT.

US response to Uniting for Peace Res already reflects a relationship between UN and NAT.

b. Classified elements of foregoing analysis of course will not be discussed in CMC, GA or other UN organs.

c. Principles do not call for estab formal machinery linking UN and NATO prior to any incident calling for armed action in defense of NAT Area. Greatest portion of principles applies to situations arising after aggression under circumstances in which NAT members will want UN help.

Finally, as introductory memo shows, draft principles do not contemplate that UN wld enter strategic planning, nor wld they deprive collective self-defense arrangements of capacity for independent action when necessary.

4. FYI Amb Dulles examined revised draft in Dept prior leaving for London. Dulles giving further consideration to insertion in Pacific Treaties of appropriate ref to UN relationships. You may find opportunity discuss with Dulles.

5. Text revised draft memo and principles contained in fol tel.

Acheson

1. Repeated to Paris for MacArthur. Drafted by Bancroft (UNA) and Angelo (UNP); cleared with the Deputy Under Secretary of State, in substance with Martin (EUR), and in draft with Bray (S/ISA).
2. May 24, p. 163.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 163.
4. Not printed.
5. For documentation regarding this UN resolution and other similar items, see vol. ii, pp. 455 ff.
6. For documentation on the action taken at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American Republics, which opened at Washington March 26, see vol. ii, pp. 925 ff.