Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Second Edition

59. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Operations Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms)¹

Washington, December 29, 1951.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Project Activities during December 1951

A. Political and Psychological Warfare.

[Omitted here is one paragraph of operational data.]

2. Attempts to expose and oppose the Tudeh Party in the National elections of Iran continue to be the main activity under project [6 lines not declassified].

3. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

4. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

5. Headquarters finally rejected two possibilities of fighting the Tudeh Party in the National elections because of the questionable worth of the operations. The possibility of utilizing and supporting Ayatollah Kashani, the influential and fanatic Moslem cleric, was discarded because of the difficulty in controlling him and limiting our support to an anti-Tudeh campaign. It was felt that Kashani would use the support to enhance his own position. Support of the Iranian Army as an arm of the Shah’s influence in the elections was withheld because of the shortage of time and our reluctance to take this action without approval of the court.

[Omitted here are three paragraphs of operational detail.]

[name not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 8, Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History, 21Dec51–29Dec51. Top Secret; Security Information.