While the attached joint study of the American and the British Embassies
at Tehran upon the current Iranian situation has been cabled to the
Department in the above reference, this Embassy has believed it
desirable to transmit the fully-phrased text decided upon by the two
Embassies to provide a complete-reference document for the
Department.
The document provides its own commentary, and it might be added that in
the interests of Anglo-American solidarity the British Embassy agreed
that for its spelling of Mosadeq
(Mussadiq) it would accept general American spelling throughout and
American usage of Iran instead of “Persia.”
Attachment
JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN, NOVEMBER
1951
prepared by the American and British Embassies at
Tehran
Policy
We assume that the immediate, mutual and overriding United
States–United Kingdom objective in Iran is to prevent that country
from falling into communist hands.
Principal Factors in Iran Today
A. Corrupt and inefficient system of government.
[Page 155]
B. Strong popular current of anti-foreign nationalism, personified
and led by Prime Minister Musaddiq, Kashani and National Front supporters.
C. Constitutional monarchy, headed by indecisive and weak though
well-intentioned Shah.
D. Small oligarchy of landowners and merchants, motivated primarily
by self-interest, and currently supporting the constitutional
regime.
E. Running sore of oil dispute with British, with attendant
dislocation of Iran’s economy and politics.
F. Security forces in general still loyal to the Shah.
G. Moslem religion which affects all phases of Iranian life.
H. Depressed economic and social conditions of the majority of the
population, with resultant discontent. (Detailed report submitted
separately)3
I. Communist exploitation of the situation.
J. Decline of western influence.
A. There are elements in Iran which wish for good government, honest
government, and government for the good of the people. But they are
not in control. Corruption and nepotism are rife. Many officials
great and small take advantage of their positions to extract money
from the people. The result is that there exists a vast gulf between
officialdom and the people. In the absence of any effective, really
democratic reform party the discontent of the people is bound to
attract them towards the extreme of communism.
Corruption and nepotism are as prevalent under the Musaddiq
Government as under previous governments. Likewise, the general
public, accustomed to regarding all governments as oppressive and
indifferent to their interests, has little, if any, different
feeling for the Musaddiq regime.
B. Iranians in general resent and suspect all foreigners. Their
national pride was inflated by Reza
Shah and deflated by the Allied occupation during the
war. The national post-war upsurge was vented first on the Soviets
and then on the British against whose oil company in Iran there had
long been a latent feeling of resentment. Nothing that is likely to
happen in the near future is likely to make the Iranians less
nationalist in outlook. Regardless of the possible removal or defeat
of Musaddiq and his National Front, the public could almost
certainly be induced to support another leader or movement in the
future which
[Page 156]
panders to
this nationalism and to oppose what might be considered as
appeasement of the foreigner at the expense of Iran. However, it is
important to recognize the potential ability of politicians in power
to control the police and largely to monopolize the means of
propaganda, which can have at least short-run effects upon the basic
nationalistic feelings of the people.
The above is common ground to both Embassies. They disagree, however,
as to the extent Iranian nationalism will limit the freedom of
action of any future government.
The demonstrated political ability of Musaddiq as a shrewd leader of
the National Front minority and a demagogue who well understands
Iranian emotions and character, his personal prejudices against the
British, and his almost megalomaniac desire to act as champion of
the Iranian people in the struggle for “independence” are important
factors to be considered in the present situation. Aside from the
popularity of Mussadiq because of his oil program, which thus far
seems to be the only definite program of the National Front, much
support is brought to him by the demagogic Mullah Kashani, who is
notoriously venal and very probably would desert him if any of
Mosadeq’s rivals offered
an inducement outweighing the “spoils” which he derives from his
influence with the present government.
C. The Shah might be a factor for stability, continuity of leadership
and resistance to communism in Iran. He appears, however, to have
too little confidence in his own influence; at least he apparently
does not regard it as opportune to endeavor to exert it against the
present government.
He has thus far been unable to use nationalist elements to strengthen
the Crown or to effect much needed reforms in the face of the
landowning-merchant oligarchy.
The Shah realizes that Musaddiq and Kashani, with their followers, are anxious to limit
his powers and he is also aware that National Front hostility
towards the Army arises from the fear that he might use it against
them. However, he currently feels if he should actively try to
remove Musaddiq there could be an upheaval in which the prestige and
influence of the Crown would probably suffer.
The disappearance of the Shah would mean the loss to the western
world of a friendly and potentially powerful stabilizing element and
the ensuing struggle for power might lead to chaos which an
organized Tudeh Party would exploit.
D. The landowner-merchant oligarchy, with the support of powerful
religious leaders, has been one of the main obstacles to progress of
the Iranian people and to the development of the country’s
resources. It has tenaciously fought for maintenance of the status
quo. While supporting the Shah as a stabilizing factor in the
country, it has obstructed
[Page 157]
his inclinations towards reforms. This feudal group is anxious to
perpetuate itself and is governed by short-sighted
self-interest.
E. The oil dispute with the British, with attendant dislocation of
Iran’s economy as a result of cessation of the oil industry, is the
most acute factor for instability in Iran today. Political and
popular emotions have been increasingly exacerbated by this issue
during the past year. Failure to obtain the usual oil revenues will
affect the government bureaucracy and the military forces seriously
as salaries and supplies lag behind. Trade standstill and general
economic consequences are discussed in Section H. Finally, until
revenues again begin to flow from the oil industry, no government,
even if so inclined, can turn to public works or improvement of the
miserable social and economic conditions of the majority of the
population.
F. There is still considerable loyalty to the Shah among security
forces. United States advisory missions to these forces assist in
maintaining their effectiveness for internal security.
Nevertheless, the armed forces in Iran are weak reeds for the Shah,
the government and the free world to rely upon. Lower ranks are
discontented and ill-paid, many junior officers are receptive to
communist propaganda, and senior officers often are incompetent and
corrupt. In view of the anti-military sentiments and the
“neutralist” foreign policy of Musaddiq, it is not unlikely that
United States military missions could be hampered in their
operations and could even be forced eventually to leave. This last
development would be a serious blow to the Anglo-United States
position in Iran.
G. In the Moslem world religion is both a stabilizing factor and a
serious obstacle to reform. At the same time demagogic religious
leaders in Iran appealing to the intolerant aspects of Islam can
contribute towards political instability. This has been the case
under the Musaddiq government when such men as Mullah Kashani have been gaining
increased prominence and influence. They gave to the movement to
drive out the British almost the significance of a religious
crusade. There are signs, however, that the conservative religious
leaders are disturbed by and opposed to the activities of the
demagogues.
H. See report submitted separately.
I. The Tudeh Party is effectively organized as a force in politics
and in industry with an estimated full membership in Tehran of
8,000, in Khuzistan of 5,000 and a strong membership in Azerbaijan
and Gilan. The demonstration of July 15 showed considerable
organizing capacity. It also has influence in sections of the army,
the police and government departments. Its cover organizations such
as the Partisans of Peace are allowed to operate and communist line
newspapers are allowed to appear.
[Page 158]
It already adopts an extreme line over the oil question and any
deviation of the National Front leaders from their present extremist
course would add to its propaganda strength. Much of its strength
lies in the Iranian popular misconception of the nature of the
Tudeh. It is widely viewed as an indigenous political movement
advocating reforms close to the heart of the populace. In fact, many
Iranians have not forgotten certain reforms sponsored by the Party
during the time of its ascendancy.
The average Iranian has an historic suspicion of the USSR, but at the same time he has an
ostrich-like attitude in viewing current Soviet intentions. He is
being diverted by the current oil dispute and communist efforts to
interpret it as Anglo-American imperialism. His imagination in this
regard is continually sharpened by a steady barrage of clever Soviet
propaganda. The USSR is queen of
the airwaves in this area. At any time one can hear Soviet
propaganda on the various short and long wave-lengths in several
languages.
At present the communists are spurring the nationalists’ drive to
oust the British from Iran, while trying to link this with their own
anti-American line. When the western powers are driven from Iran and
their influence destroyed, the communists may be expected to
introduce the second stage of their long-range objectives—the
destruction of internal rivals for power in Iran.
The United States recent position in the Security Council regarding
the oil dispute has been construed here as substantive support of
the United Kingdom, thus offsetting the previous impression in
Iranian minds that the United States favored the Iranian case, and
may be expected to increase Tudeh potential directly and indirectly
through the resultant tendency of the National Front and its popular
supporters to turn toward the USSR.4 In
time this may create an environment favorable to the Tudeh ambition
to seize power.
There is little indication of an immediate intention to seize power
by force. However, if an exceptional opportunity presents itself in
the uncertain near future through the disintegration of forces for
stability in Iran, the Party will certainly make its bid. At present
it appears that the Party’s immediate aim is to strengthen its
political position by securing the election to the 17th Majlis of a
small number of deputies. These would seek the legalization of the
Party, and in this they could expect support from some right-wing
politicians, especially those with estates in the north, who by this
means would try to curry favor with the Russians. Then the Party
would try to increase its influence in the
[Page 159]
government to the extent that the latter could
no longer raise effective opposition to the Party’s extra-legal
methods of terror and force.
In the event of the fall of Musaddiq and the advent to power of a
government opposed to the peaceful development of the Tudeh Party,
it seems likely:
1) that the Tudeh Party would adopt more vigorous tactics directed
against the government; and
2) that the government in its turn would adopt more vigorous measures
to implement the anti-Tudeh laws.
We believe that it is not yet too late for a resolutely anti-Tudeh
government to take fairly effective security action to hamper the
development of the Party. The fact is, however, that no matter how
anti-Tudeh any government may be, it will in the long run play into
the hands of the communists if it engages in the corrupt practices
and possesses the reactionary outlook of most Iranian governments of
recent years.
J. The present direction taken by Iranian nationalism, as exemplified
by its attitude towards the British oil interests, has served to
decrease western influence, particularly the British. British
influence has been effective in the past in keeping the Russians
from gaining control of all of Iran, whereas Soviet policy has
sought to eliminate western influence in Iran and to deny Iranian
oil to the non-communist world except on Soviet terms.
The present decline in western influence in Iran in turn weakens
Iranian resistance to communism and Soviet pressure. Iranians long
accustomed to playing foreign powers against each other and
over-fond of hoping that their country can remain neutral may
dangerously open themselves to Soviet penetration to such an extent
that, if or when they turn later to the western world to save them
from Soviet domination, their position will already have become
irretrievable. Hence, with this prospect in view, the relative
responsibility of the United States has increased on behalf of the
free world in preventing Iran from passing into the Soviet
sphere.
Despite the present outburst of anti-British feeling, the British
still have a body of opinion in their favor which, although
temporarily submerged, might be effectively mobilized in certain
circumstances. For instance, if the oil dispute could be settled in
a manner inoffensive to reasonable Iranian nationalist elements, or
if the Russians or communists should make a misstep, the British
might still stage a comeback.
