The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Director of Defense Mobilization, at the 95th Council meeting with the
President presiding (NSC Action No.
500),7 considered the draft
statement of policy on Iran contained in NSC 107/1 together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the recommendations of the Senior NSC Staff with respect thereto contained in the reference
memoranda of June 21, 1951; and adopted NSC 107/1 subject to the revisions recommended by the
Senior NSC Staff except for their
proposed paragraph 8, and to an amendment to paragraph 2–a and a new paragraph 8 proposed by the Secretary
of State at the meeting. NSC 107/1, as
amended and adopted, is enclosed herewith.
Accordingly, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Director of Defense Mobilization submit the enclosed statement
of policy for consideration by the President with the recommendation
that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate
executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the
coordination of the Secretary of State.
Attachment
Washington, undated.
STATEMENT OF POLICY
proposed by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Iran
1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain
an independent and sovereign nation firmly aligned with the free
world. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum
resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the
USSR, and its vulnerability to
political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing
objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by
Soviet intervention would:
a. Threaten the security of the entire Middle
Eastern area and also Pakistan and India.
b. Deny the free world access to Iranian oil
and threaten the loss of Middle Eastern oil. These developments
would seriously affect Western economic and military interests in
peace or in war in view of the great dependence of Western Europe on
Iranian oil, particularly the refinery at Abadan.
c. Increase the Soviet Union’s capability of
threatening important United States–United Kingdom lines of
communication.
d. Damage United States prestige in nearby
countries and, with the exception of Turkey, seriously weaken if not
destroy their will to resist.
e. Be one in a series of military, political,
and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously
endanger the security interests of the United States.
For these reasons the United States should continue its basic policy
of taking all feasible steps to make sure that Iran does not fall
victim to communist control.
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2. The immediate situation in Iran is such that, if not remedied, the
loss of Iran to the free world is a distinct possibility through an
internal communist uprising, possibly growing out of the present
indigenous fanaticism or through communist capture of the
nationalist movement. It is important that there be a government in
power in Iran on the side of the free world, capable of maintaining
internal order and determined to resist Soviet aggression. The
United States should therefore:
a. Continue to extend political support,
primarily to the Shah as the only present source of continuity of
leadership, and where consistent with Iran’s ability to absorb it,
accelerate and expand military, economic and technical assistance by
the United States Government whenever such assistance will help to
(1) restore stability and increase internal security, (2) strengthen
the leadership of the Shah and through him the central government,
(3) demonstrate to the Iranian people the intention of the United
States to assist in preserving Iranian independence, and (4)
strengthen the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist
communist subversion and pressure. The United States should, unless
it would be detrimental to United States policy in a particular
instance, coordinate these programs closely with the United Kingdom
and solicit British support and assistance for them.
b. Bring its influence to bear in an effort
to effect an early settlement of the oil controversy between Iran
and the United Kingdom, making clear both our recognition of the
rights of sovereign states to control their natural resources and
the importance we attach to international contractual
relationships.
c. Continue special political measures
designed to assist in aligning the Iranian Government with the free
world and promoting internal security in Iran.
d. Encourage whenever opportune the adoption
by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, judicial and
administrative reforms.
e. Encourage the Government of Turkey and
other governments whose influence might be effective to adopt a more
active general policy in Iran with a view to acting as a moderating
influence and to creating closer ties between Iran and stronger free
nations of the area.
3. Although assurances have been received, the United States should
continue to urge the United Kingdom to avoid the use of military
force in settling the oil controversy. The entry of British troops
into Iran without the consent of the Iranian Government would place
British forces in opposition to the military forces of Iran, might
split the free world, would produce a chaotic situation in Iran, and
might cause the Iranian Government to turn to the Soviet Union for
help. However, should the lives of British subjects in Iran be
placed in immediate jeopardy by mob violence, the United States
would not oppose the entry of
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British forces into the danger area for the
sole purpose of evacuating British nationals on the clear
understanding that this would be undertaken only as a last resort
and that the British forces so introduced would be withdrawn
immediately after the evacuation was completed. In the event of a
British decision to use force against the advice of the United
States, the situation would be so critical that the position of
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the United States would
have to be determined in the light of the world situation at the
time.
4. Because of United States commitments in other areas, the current
understanding with the United Kingdom that it is responsible for the
initiative in military support of Iran in the event of communist
aggression should be continued but should be kept under review in
light of the importance of Middle Eastern oil, the situation in
Iran, British capabilities, increasing United States influence in
the Middle East, and increasing United States strength.
5. The United States should be prepared in conjunction with the
United Kingdom to counter possible communist subversion in Iran and,
in event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of
power in one or more of the Provinces or in Tehran, to increase
support of the legal Iranian Government. Such plans and preparations
should envisage joint support to the legal Iranian Government
including:
a. Correlated political action and military
discussions by the United States and the United Kingdom. The
dispatch of British forces at the request of the legal Iranian
Government to southern Iran should be supported in every practicable
manner by the United States in the event of a seizure or a clearly
imminent seizure of power by Iranian Communists. The United States
should be prepared to give the British in this event full political
support and to consider whether or not military support would be
desirable or feasible.
b. The conduct of special political
operations by the United States and the United Kingdom.
c. Coordinated United States–United Kingdom
support for pro-Western Iranian elements.
d. Efforts to induce nearby countries,
particularly Turkey, to assist the legal Iranian Government.
e. As desirable, consultation with selected
countries to attain support for the United States position.
f. The perfection of plans concerning the
handling of the matter by the United Nations when that becomes
necessary.
6. In the event a communist government achieves such complete control
of Iran that there is no legal Iranian Government to request Western
assistance, and pending further study of this contingency by the
United States and jointly with the United Kingdom, the position of
the United States would have to be determined in the light of the
situation at the time.
7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran,
the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the
assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the
United States should then immediately:
a. Seek by political measures to localize the
action, to stop the aggression, to restore the status quo, and to
ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows.
These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to
the United Nations with the objectives of:
(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful
solution and the conditions upon which the United States would, in
concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a
settlement.
(2) Obtaining the agreement of the United Nations authorizing member
nations to take appropriate action in the name of the United Nations
to assist Iran.
b. Consider the possibility of a direct
approach to the highest Soviet leaders.
c. Place itself in the best possible position
to meet the increased threat of global war.
d. Consult with selected allies to perfect
coordination of plans.
e. While minimizing United States military
commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action
with reference to the aggression in this critical area to the extent
and in the manner which would best contribute to the implementation
of United States national war plans.
8. In view of the current situation in Iran, the United States
should, individually and where appropriate jointly with the United
Kingdom, examine what additional steps, political and military,
might be taken to secure or deny Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Bahrein.
