I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation
regarding the Qashqai tribes which took place on January 7,
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1954, between General
Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime
Minister of Iran, and myself.
Enclosure
Memorandum of Conversation
Tehran, January 7, 1954.
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Prime Minister
Zahedi on January 7, 1954, regarding present
status of the Qashqai Khans
During a conversation which I had on January 7th with General
Fazlollah Zahedi I asked
him what was the latest development with regard to the dissident
Qashqai Khans.
The Prime Minister said he assumed that I was aware that Nasser Khan, the former Senator
who had been acting as chief spokesman for the four brothers, had
been in Tehran for some time. Following his arrival in Tehran Nasser
had approached the Prime Minister and informed him that he would be
prepared (a) to call upon the Shah if the latter would receive him
in order to promise upon his solemn oath that he and his brothers
would loyally serve the Shah and obey the laws of the country, or
(b) if the Shah would not receive him, in any event to promise that
he and his brothers would be loyal citizens of Iran, would obey the
laws of the country, and would live quietly in their tribal areas in
the south, or (c) to leave the country if the Shah should so desire.
If they were to leave the country they hoped that the Government
would be willing to purchase some of their possessions with foreign
currency so that they would have the means for supporting themselves
abroad.
Nasser had insisted in
talking to the Prime Minister that his brothers were prepared to
join him in pursuing any of the above-mentioned courses which might
be agreeable to the Shah. They would prefer of course to be
permitted to swear allegiance to the Shah and to prove by their acts
that they desired in the future to be loyal subjects and law-abiding
citizens.
Zahedi told me that he had discussed this matter with the Shah who
had taken the position that no matter what the Khans might promise
the Qashqais were not to be trusted, and that therefore three of the
brothers, Nasser, Khosrow,
and Mahammed Hosein, should leave the country. The Prime Minister
said that he had imparted this infor
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mation to Nasser “this very morning”, and Nasser had taken the decision
without any great display of surprise. Nasser had maintained that he and his brothers did
not have sufficient funds abroad on which to live. He himself had
only $17,000 in foreign banks. He had begged, therefore, that they
be permitted to sell some of their property and convert the proceeds
into foreign currency. Although the Prime Minister had not given
Nasser any definite
answer he told him that it would be extremely difficult to prevail
upon the Minister of Finance to give foreign exchange for this
purpose.
The Prime Minister indicated to me that he was happy that the Qashqai
situation was developing so favorably. Both the Shah and the Chief
of Staff in the past had insisted that the Iranian Army move against
the Qashqai tribes. The Prime Minister, however, had adhered to the
position that with patience and firmness the Qashqai problem could
be solved bloodlessly. The Government had succeeded in breaking down
Qashqai unity and gaining the support of three of the most important
subtribes. It was only when the Khans had discovered that their
tribal empire was crumbling and that the Tudeh was not living up to
its promises to them to stir up uprisings in various parts of the
country that they capitulated. He was proud of the fact that the
Government had won in its struggle with the Qashqai Khans without
firing a shot. Of course much work remained to be done before the
problem of the Qashqais could be said to be definitely
eliminated.
