335. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Greek,
Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Affairs (Richards)1
Tehran, October 20, 1953.
Attached hereto is a memorandum prepared by [name not
declassified] which is almost self-explanatory. General
Batmanqilich seems to be dominated by his two deputies, Generals
Deihimi and Akhavi, who owe allegiance to Dr.
Baqai and who owe their
present positions to the support of the Shah. General Batmanqilich, in
my opinion, means well but he is politically an infant and fears what
might happen to him if Baqai and
Baqai’s friends should turn
against him.
I met Batmanqilich on the evening of October 17 at a reception and had a
frank talk with him. I told him that [name not
declassified] had described to me the conversation which [name not declassified] had had with Baqai, as arranged by Batmanqilich.
Batmanqilich said that he was glad that [name not
declassified] had seen Baqai. Baqai was
probably the greatest man in Iran and it was important that the American
Embassy should work with him. I said that Baqai had been arguing publicly for
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an oilless economy and had advocated such
an economy in his conversation with [name not
declassified]. If Baqai
intended to oppose a solution to the oil problem and the exploitation by
Iran of its oil, he was in my opinion one of the most dangerous enemies
of Iran. Iran could not afford to have dangerous internal enemies at the
present time and if Batmanqilich was following a policy of strengthening
and collaborating with an Iranian who favored an “oilless economy” he
was doing his country great disservice. An oilless economy would mean
the doom of Iran.
Batmanqilich was somewhat taken aback. He asked if I could not arrange to
meet him, General Deihimi and
Baqai secretly. I said the
American Ambassador met no one surreptitiously. If Baqai would care to call on me I would
be glad to meet him. If Baqai
would like to invite me to his house I would go there. There would,
however, be nothing secret about such a meeting. The General asked if I
would be willing to speak to the Shah about the matter. He was afraid to
arrange for me to meet Baqai
without the consent of the Shah. I said I would be glad to discuss the
whole matter with the Shah.
It is my intention when I next see the Shah to talk with him frankly
about the situation in General Staff. I have already touched on the
matter during previous conversations with the Shah, who on each occasion
changed the subject. During my last talk with the Shah on October 14, I
mentioned the danger to the country from the direction of Baqai. The Shah minimized this danger.
He said that an opposition was a good thing and in his opinion it was
better for Baqai, who was loyal
to the regime, to be leader of an opposition than someone who was
opposed to the regime. It was clear that the Shah in referring to the
regime meant himself. It would seem that the Shah is endeavoring to
placate Baqai at a time when
Baqai is undermining
Zahedi.
The Shah did make the concession in talking with me that it might be a
good thing to send Baqai out of
the country for a time. He thought Baqai might be a good man to serve as a contact with
Iranian students in Europe and America. Baqai was a learned man and could probably be useful in
convincing Iranian youth abroad that the Iranian Government was after
all progressive. When I suggested to the Shah that Baqai’s particular type of “socialism”
might not be a good thing with which to infect the students, the Shah
reminded me that he personally thought that socialism might be good for
Iran. He repeated that he was rather sympathetic to socialism and in his
opinion the future of Iran lay in a marriage between socialism and
capitalism.
I have been so busy during the last week with the Congressmen and am at
present so much occupied with Mr. Hoover that I fear that I am unable to keep the
Department currently informed to the extent
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that I would like of political developments
here.2 I may say that I am not happy with the
situation, which seems to be gradually deteriorating. I hope that the
Shah and Zahedi will have come to
a better working arrangement during their trip to Isfahan. They are
returning this morning.
Sincerely,
Loy
Attachment
Tehran, October 19, 1953.
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Dr. Mozaffar
Baqai
1. This conversation was held during the night of October 16, 1953,
at the request of Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Batmangelich. While talking with the undersigned
between 1600 and 1800 hours on October 16th, Gen. Batmangelich insisted that the
undersigned meet with Dr. Baqai. Gen.
Batmangelich repeated several times that Iran should have two top
men: Zahedi and Baqai. Undersigned accepted Gen. Batmangelich’s invitation to meet
Dr. Baqai.
2. At 2100 hours undersigned met with Dr. Baqai and Brig. Gen.
Deihimi in the latter’s home;
Dr. F. Taylor Gurney of the Embassy interpreted.
3. The undersigned asked Dr. Baqai what he thought of the present situation. Dr.
Baqai replied that in his
opinion the situation is not good. He severely criticized the
Zahedi Cabinet, saying
that Gen.
Zahedi had retained several
members of the old Razmara
Cabinet: Dr. Jehan Shah Saleh, Maj. Gen.
Hedayat, Hekmat, and Eng. Sharif Emami. Dr.
Baqai also severely
criticized the appointment of Dolatabadi and Amidi-Nuri as
assistants to the Prime Minister.
4. Dr. Baqai charged that only
“poor” members of the Tudeh Party were being arrested, while those
with influence and money were not. Dr. Baqai said that no real effort was being made to
arrest the real leaders of the Tudeh Party and that among those
arrested who were important Tudeh members, Lankarani, Noruzi, and Hormoz had immediately
been released. Dr. Baqai said
that the same thing occurred under Dr. Mossadeq. He said, “When we saw that and also the
way
[Page 808]
Mossadeq was helping the
Tudehs secretly, we worked for his overthrow—to get him out and to
get Zahedi in.”
5. Dr. Baqai severely
criticized the opening of the Senate and said that he had not been
consulted in advance concerning that event.
6. When asked about his opinion concerning the possibility of
achieving an oil settlement, Dr. Baqai launched on a long dissertation about the
possibility of achieving an oilless economy. He said that Iran had
never really enjoyed any oil profits. He said that those profits
which were intended for use by the Seven Year Plan Organization had
been dissipated by quarreling between the British and Americans.
Undersigned asked Dr. Baqai
to expatiate upon that statement but Dr. Baqai changed the subject. Dr. Baqai expressed the
opinion that Dr. Mossadeq had
always used the oil question as a means of silencing his opponents,
who were constantly told that they must remain silent because a
settlement was imminent. He said that he did not propose to remain
silent any longer, although it was perfectly true that Zahedi could force an oil
settlement on Iran should he desire to do so. Undersigned then asked
Dr. Baqai if he believed an
oil settlement to be important to the future of the country, and Dr.
Baqai replied that he did
not necessarily believe it was. He then praised the economic
assistance that the United States had given Iran, and said that
because of that policy, the prestige of the U.S. had been very high.
Dr. Baqai was asked if he
realized that the present administration in the U.S. had been
elected on a platform of balancing the budget, reducing the national
debt, and cutting costs wherever possible. In the same line of
questioning, Dr. Baqai was
asked if he believed an oilless economy were possible if the
American government found it necessary to reduce in FY 1954 economic assistance to Iran.
Dr. Baqai then answered by
saying that he did not know if an oilless economy were possible
without American economic assistance but that he was certain that if
the Zahedi administration
continued to blunder as it was now doing, the country would be
ruined anyhow. Dr. Baqai
stated that he had appointed a small commission to study the oil
question on behalf of the Toilers’ Party and that he would print the
results of that study when it was completed. He said that he would
support “an honorable oil settlement based upon the nine points of
the Nationalization Law.”
7. Dr. Baqai stated that he
was identified with the Zahedi government whether he liked it or not, but
that he would criticize that government whenever he felt it
necessary. When asked if he were a supporter of the Zahedi administration or an
opponent of it, Dr. Baqai
replied that he found himself in a dilemma: he had helped bring the
Zahedi government to
power and was politically identified with it, but he felt Zahedi’s gang would ruin the
government if it continued in the way that it has started. He made
it clear that he was neither identifying
[Page 809]
himself with the Zahedi government nor with the opponents of that
government. He was then asked if he would accept a proposal to join
the Hassibi, Sangabi,
Zirakzadeh group now
working against Zahedi. Dr. Baqai replied that those men were traitors and that
he would never join them. He was then asked if he would join Makki
against Zahedi and he skirted
that question.
8. Dr. Baqai made it clear
that he did not identify his political future with the present group
surrounding Gen.
Zahedi but that he was still
open to a move from Zahedi
designed to bring him into closer working relationship with the
Prime Minister.
9. Conclusions by Undersigned
A. Dr. Baqai’s political
future can quickly be ended by the prosecution of the Afshartus affair.3 The Military Governor of Tehran, Maj.
Gen.
Dadsetan, stated on October
18th that he had proof certain that Dr. Baqai was directly implicated in the murder of the
former Police Chief. That fact means that in order to be safe, Dr.
Baqai and his men must
control the General Staff, the Police Department, and the Office of
the Military Governor. During the last two weeks Dr. Baqai’s men have been attempting to
capture those positions or to neutralize them. Gen.
Zahedi’s hands are
momentarily tied in this matter because he has decided to free all
of the military officers who plotted against the life of Afshartus and who executed him. At
the moment, therefore, Dr. Baqai may with impunity criticize the Zahedi administration. As an
insurance measure, however, his men continue to attempt to capture
the posts mentioned above.
B. Involved also in this whole business is the fact that Gens.
Deihimi and Akhavi meet Maj. Gen.
Arfa every Thursday night in
Gen.
Arfa’s home. Maj. Gen. Guilanshah is of the opinion
that Gens.
Akhavi and Deihimi are closer to Gen.
Arfa than to Dr. Baqai. CAS did not necessarily
agree with that estimate but, nevertheless, the hand of the British
may very well be a part of this particular problem.
C. Dr. Baqai’s friends in the
General Staff continue to insist that the U.S. urge Gen.
Zahedi to make Dr. Baqai his right-hand.
D. There can be little doubt that HIM the Shah is perfectly aware of Dr. Baqai’s influence with the Army.
Whether or not the Shah desires that Dr. Baqai become the leader of Zahedi’s political opposition is
not clear at the moment.
E. CAS will know on Wednesday, October 21st, whether or not Dr.
Baqai accepts Makki’s
offer to join him against Zahedi.
*17 [name not declassified]
