Transmitting a Memorandum Entitled “Estimate of the Political Strength of
the Mossadeq Government”.
There is transmitted herewith for the consideration of the Department a
memorandum entitled “Estimate of the Political Strength of the Mossadeq Government” which has been
prepared by Mr. Stutesman and
Mr. Cuomo of the Embassy
staff.
I am confident that the Department will find the enclosed memorandum of
considerable interest. The enigmatic Dr. Mosadeq is to exert considerable influence in Iran in
the immediate future. The skill with which he conducts the affairs of
the government, and the political course which he follows will probably
determine the future not only of the vitally important oil resources of
this country, but perhaps of the country itself.
For the time being we should, I believe, show a willingness positively to
cooperate with the Mosadeq
Government, as is suggested in the concluding paragraphs of the
memorandum. The Ambassador intends to follow this policy unless the
Department instructs to the contrary.
Attachment
ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MOSADEQ GOVERNMENT
It seems appropriate at this time to make an estimate of the
situation in Iran and of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government. From this
estimate it may be possible also to perceive some indications of
further developments, although this paper will not go into that
aspect of the future.
The resignation of Prime Minister Hosein Ala and the advent of Mohammed Mosadeq to power have been adequately
described elsewhere. At the present Dr. Mosadeq and his cabinet are only establishing
themselves and, also for the present, the choice of the Prime
Minister and his cabinet appears to please many sections of the
Iranian
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public although for
different reasons, some of which are described below.
Any estimate of the political strength of the Mosadeq Government must take
cognizance of the wide speculation current in Tehran regarding the
length of time which the Prime Minister will be able to retain
power. Speculation ranges from a week to many months tenure of
office. But all such conjecture must balance the forces at play
about the new Government.
The sources of strength which are available to Prime Minister
Mosadeq of course depend
on his physical ability to survive the arduous task of leading an
Iranian Government. Dr. Mosadeq is in his seventies and also was ill last
winter to an extent that he could not come to Majlis sessions for a
period. His fainting spells, which have never been diagnosed to
Embassy satisfaction as either solely political or entirely medical
manifestations, are still with him since he fainted twice on May
3rd, once while visiting a prison and reminiscing on his own
incarceration and once when some flowers and compliments were
pressed upon him by a crowd of admirers. However, if his health
holds out it can be stated that the following sources of strength
may be utilized to keep him in power.
Primary among these sources of strength is popular support. This is
not an easy factor to describe in this country of illiterate people
who have few political aspirations and are so deeply concerned in
barely sustaining their existence. However, for the first time in
many years a Prime Minister is in power who has the confidence of
the majority of Iranians and himself believes that his primary
function is “to close the gap between the Government and the people
which has been the historic cause for discontent in the past”, a
phrase he used in speaking to the Ambassador on May 2nd.
Secondly, he may use the oil issue for his own benefit since he can
conceivably extend to any political issue today his claim that an
attack on Mosadeq is an
attack on the best interests of the people. Concurrently he can
accuse his critics of being pro-British by being anti-Mosadeq. Also in this connection
Dr. Mosadeq may well be the
only politician in Iran today who might make a deal with the British
to settle the oil question on a practical basis which it
increasingly appears must include British personnel continuing to
man the oil fields and refinery. Only Dr. Mosadeq might be able to accomplish
this without bringing a general accusation of treason on his head.
His stand against foreign influence in Iran and particularly his
well known leadership in the struggle to nationalize the AIOC has given him a good vantage
point from which to work in settling this outstanding and delicate
matter. Already there are straws in the wind showing the Prime
Minister’s interest in bringing the matter to some conclusion, for
on May 3rd he sent
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emissaries to the British Embassy, as Counselor Middleton described it “to feel us
out as to the next move”. This may be considered a move of the Prime
Minister’s to establish a framework for negotiations with the
British.
Further, Prime Minister Mosadeq is an experienced politician and he has
taken a cautious approach to the major issues of the day which could
bring him opposition. His program as announced on presentation of
his Government to the Majlis contained only two points on which
there could conceivably be Majlis debate, and both these
points—execution of nationalization of the oil industry and revision
of the electoral law—were couched in terms which allowed no
immediate opposition. His strategy in choosing a cabinet which has
been called already by one newspaper a “national union cabinet” was
apparently built to prevent controversy with the Majlis. It is
deliberately not a National Front cabinet. Another move in this
cautious line of avoiding open dissatisfaction in the Majlis was Dr.
Mosadeq’s first step to
implement his long sought program of seeking electoral reform by
calling for representatives of the Fractions of the Majlis to meet
with the cabinet ministers concerned, in working out an acceptable
electoral reform. He has avoided the open fighting on the Majlis
floor which holds such dangers for any Government.
Finally, there is presently real support for Prime Minister Mosadeq in the ranks of the
National Front coalition which, if it holds together in this
support, can materially assist him in the Majlis and before the
people. Although National Front Deputies are not entering the
cabinet they have demonstrated their support for their erstwhile
Majlis leader. Even leftist Deputies Azad and Haerizadeh on May Day urged the workers to heed and
support the Mosadeq
Government.
However, there are many factors present in the situation today which
may work to bring about the downfall of the Mosadeq Government.
First of all is the character of the man himself. His emotions under
stress have been demonstrated. He is more used to opposing than
governing, and although he has held some administrative posts in the
past his abilities to administer such complicated problems as face
the Prime Minister today are doubtful. His age and recent ill health
also leave him weak in face of these tremendous burdens,
administration and leadership. Finally, and it may be, most
dangerously, he has not shown a clear perception of the problems
facing Iran and his solutions as presented in the Majlis and to the
Ambassador on May 2nd are notably vague and ill-defined in detail.
Possibly this has been deliberate political shrewdness but it might
be disastrous if he continues such a vague approach to future
problems.
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Internal political forces which may defeat the Mosadeq program certainly include
the reactionaries who can be expected to oppose vigorously any
social or economic reform program. The Court and the Parliament
represent landed and wealthy interests who will resist any attacks
on their prerogatives or profits. Already several representatives of
the Court and old line political circles have indicated delight that
Mosadeq is Prime Minister
because he must now wrestle with the problems which he previously
forced on the Government. Close candidate for Premiership, Seyid
Zia, on the day that Mosadeq’s appointment was announced, gleefully told an
Embassy officer that he was very pleased at this development which
would remove Mosadeq from the
Majlis and surely cause him to fall on his face while Prime
Minister. The Shah reportedly indicated to a British Embassy source
on May 3rd that Dr. Mosadeq’s
stay in power was not expected to continue for a long time.
If Dr. Mosadeq fails to
correct the ancient evils of oppressive Government and economic woes
he will lose much popular support and increase popular
disappointment and cynicism. Distrust and dislike of Government is
deep-rooted in Iran and even a popular hero like Dr. Mosadeq will have difficulty in
overcoming this, even without the added problems of possible loss of
oil revenues and lack of U.S. economic aid. He has emphasized his
concern in this regard and his strong desire to have an economic
program for the alleviation of popular discontent.
The leftist part in the picture is not yet clear. Several National
Front Deputies who were close to Mosadeq represent a radical leftist approach to
politics. Their brand of political action will probably be pressed
on Mosadeq who may be forced
to take such action which will split his National Front supporters,
presently a coalition of radical and moderate elements, into
opposing elements.
In summary, while there are many forces which may well work to bring
the downfall of this Mosadeq
Government it is not inevitable that it will fall in the immediate
future. Further, it is entirely possible that a complete failure of
the Mosadeq Government to
implement the social program which the nation so evidently expects
will be blamed on the reactionaries and the British and possibly on
us. His utter failure might drive numbers of presently moderate
Iranian liberals, discontented with further abortive attempts to
improve conditions within the existing frame work of Government, to
seek alliance with the Communists in achieving reforms through
drastic means.
It may well be advisable for the United States to indicate support of
the Mosadeq Government. By
increasing Dr. Mosadeq’s
confidence in U.S. efforts to assist Iran we may well bring his
Government to cooperate in implementing our programs here. His aims,
while presently
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vague in
definition and detail, are basically similar to ours in removing
economic and political causes for discontent which allow present
opportunities for Communist activity. Furthermore, by developing
cooperation with Mosadeq we
may be able to guide him toward working out an equitable settlement
on the oil question in negotiation with the British. Further, our
assistance and advice can surely help him to gain a clearer
understanding of present issues in Iran and their complications. Our
support, advice and possibly economic assistance could also
contribute towards maintaining Dr. Mosadeq free from domination of the radical leftist
elements which have had some influence on him in the past.
It is quite conceivable that if we play our cards right we can exert
real influences over Dr. Mosadeq, whose Government might well be able to
assist our aims in Iran. It certainly does not appear advisable to
refuse cooperation or to accept a policy of waiting for him to
demonstrate alone whether he can remain in power.
