There is attached for the Department’s information a memorandum of a
conversation which I recently had with a source2 close to the Shah in the presence of two
members of the Embassy. In this instance it is believed that the
memorandum is self-explanatory. It should be noted that this emissary of
the Shah expresses on behalf of the Shah views which differ from those
expressed by Acting Minister of the Court Amini. The Acting Minister has taken the position that
it would be advantageous to Iran and to the Western world for the
British to try to come to an oil settlement regardless of whether the
Government of Iran is headed by Dr. Mosadeq or some other prime minister.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation
Tehran, May 14, 1953.
On the evening of May 13, the Ambassador had a conversation with a
person extremely close to the Shah. Commander Pollard, Embassy Naval Attaché,
and Mr. Melbourne, First
Secretary of Embassy, were present.
The emissary of the Shah stated he had a message from the Sovereign
expressing strong appreciation for the efforts that the Ambassador
had made during the period when pressure was being applied to oblige
the Shah to leave the country. The Shah wished the Ambassador to
know that he believed if it had not been for the actions of the
Ambassador at that time the institution of monarchy in Iran would
have been [Page 563] overthrown and
the country would have been partitioned. Further, the emissary
wished the Ambassador to know that the Shah deeply appreciated the
continuing support for him which was being given by the American
Government.
The emissary wished to make clear to the Ambassador certain
fundamental features of the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq. The latter had come to
power as the result of careful planning over a period of several
years before actually assuming power. He had stirred the emotions of
the Iranian people when he took office, and he had had public and
Majlis support. The Shah had not willingly agreed to make Mosadeq Prime Minister, but he had
bowed to the forces behind him and now believed that the only way to
obtain Mosadeq’s eventual
dismissal from office was through the same parliamentary means which
had granted him the premiership. The Shah believed that time was
discrediting Mosadeq and that
the Soviet menace to Iran had receded since the death of Stalin so
that Mosadeq’s removal in a
legal way would be achieved in the not too distant future. The Shah
preferred this method to others, such as a military coup, an
arbitrary move of the Shah removing Mosadeq and appointing another prime minister, the
imprisonment of Mosadeq, his
exile, or even his death at the hands of a Tehran mob. In all of
these alternatives Mosadeq
would be made a martyr or a source of serious future trouble. It was
the Shah’s policy toward Dr. Mosadeq to bow slowly to Mosadeq’s pressure, but at the same time to regain
as much ground as possible through taking advantage of shifting
conditions. If the Shah had rigidly opposed Mosadeq, the Shah would have been
completely eliminated, like a tree which would have crashed through
the force of a violent wind. Such explanations were made by the
emissary to depict the Shah’s policy, which he understood had caused
a certain dissatisfaction on the part of American officials who
wished the Shah to take a much stronger stand toward Mosadeq.
In discussing various personalities, the emissary said that the Shah
did not extend confidence to the newly appointed Acting Minister of
Court, Mr. Abol Qasem Amini.
However, Amini was important
under present circumstances and the Shah did not therefore wish to
antagonize him. The emissary hoped that the Ambassador would keep
the Shah’s attitude toward Mr. Amini in mind in determining his own relations with
Amini.
Turning to a discussion of the oil situation, the emissary said that
the Shah believed that it was in the real interest of Iran and of
free world unity for the Ambassador in the course of official
meetings with Dr. Mosadeq to
discourage any attempts by the latter to discuss the oil question
and possible means of settling it. Dr. Mosadeq was not serious in such talk. It would be
possible to discuss oil matters, such as the [Page 564] question of compensation, only with a
government other than that of Dr. Mosadeq. The emissary said the Shah was gratified
that the Ambassador was following the practice of telling Dr.
Mosadeq, when the
question of oil was raised in the course of their official visits,
that the United States was not in a position to make further efforts
to help solve the oil problem and that if Dr. Mosadeq had any ideas in this
regard it would be wise to bring them, by other means than the
United States Government, to the attention of the British
Government. The emissary concluded that although it would serve no
useful purpose for oil discussions to be reopened with Mosadeq, nevertheless the United
States and Great Britain should, without loss of time, reach a full
agreement between themselves as to the kind of oil settlement which
could be made with Iran in the future. It was important that the
problem of Iran should not be aggravated by Great Britain and the
United States pursuing conflicting policies with respect to it.
