Since dictating the above, I received this morning the following cable
from Max Thornburg: “Yours 16th
can come anytime after few days if your judgement warrants stop. Would
appreciate whatever notice possible also probable duration visit so can
rearrange other plans as otherwise not returning USA until early summer. Max.” Shall I ask
him to come here?
Attachment3
Umm a’Sabaan Island, Bahrain, Persian Gulf,
February 10,
1953.
Dear Allen,
I attach no particular importance to the enclosed clipping which
represents the views of a certain Mr. McGaffin of London, but it
does seem to run uncomfortably close to the thinking in Washington,
as well as one can judge by external evidence.4 Because of that apparent
parallelism it caught my attention.
According to McGaffin, a “new” development faces us in Persia—new,
that is, in December. During these last weeks in office Dean has had revealed to him that
Mossedegh is now faced with a struggle between two rival
factions—Kashani and
Tudeh—as a result of which he might be replaced with someone even
less desirable to the West. Dean has therefore remained close to his desk and
Loy has rushed home to acquaint Eisenhower (and no doubt Foster) with this disquieting
intelligence, and to urge that Mossedegh be supported by us at all
costs, even though this means disregarding British views. “They say”
that Dean told Eisenhower that the next forty
days might mean either peace or war, depending upon events in
Tehran.
Accepting this depiction of the good Doctor’s dilemma, what is “new”
about it?
Even after we bow McGaffin out, queasy feeling remains that he has
been recently in Washington and reports what he observes, there as
well as in Tehran, and that Washington has
recently discovered the situation and is prepared to meet it
resolutely.
You are quite familiar with my views concerning Persia, but just to
put my mind at ease—and to keep yours from getting that way—I would
like to restate my own appraisal of that situation briefly. You will
recognize it as the same appraisal I expressed in Tehran in 1950, to
Dean in 1951, to
David Bruce in 1952,
and to many others throughout that period.
Mossedegh was put into power by the unholy coalition between
Kashani and Tudeh in
the summer of 1951 following Razmara’s murder and Husain Ala’s brief interregnum. His popularity,
based upon the emotional appeal of a skillfully conducted
“out-with-all-foreigners” propaganda campaign, and supported by
terrorist control of the government, made him the logical compromise
candidate of the rival factions, until they were ready to fight it
out between themselves.
[Page 451]
From time to time he has been able to strike out at one or the other
of them, where their interests differ, but at no time has he been in
a position to move against them both where their interests
coincide—as they do in blocking any kind of an oil agreement that
might help to restore order and prosperity in the country, which
neither of the rival factions wants. Mossedegh just isn’t that kind
of a Prime Minister, whatever his personal virtues may be, nor has
he ever been. Naguib is, and
Shishakly may be, but Mossedegh is not. He is as much a captive as
the Shah himself, and as unable to make a deal which would stand up
against the opposition of Kashani and Tudeh, or against the anti-alien
hostility which he himself has done so much to arouse.
“But that”, the Department would say, “is exactly why we must make
the oil agreement—to strengthen him so he can put the rest of his
house in order”.
Suppose that we were successful in supporting him to the extent
necessary to produce an oil agreement, thereafter supplementing this
with aids of various kinds, and a month later he retires or perhaps
joins his fathers, one or the other of which may reasonably be
expected. We would be right back where we were in 1950—looking for
another Razmara.
Anyone who knows the men around Mossedegh as well as I do must know
that they are not the kind of men who can carry any practical
program through to completion. Fatemi, Kazemi, Makki, Hassibi and the rest are all
ineffective political flaneurs. In other words, in backing Mossedegh
we are not backing an institution which possesses the quality of
continuity apart from the individuals in it, but only a volatile
personality that has become the popular symbol of “liberation”. Such
symbols don’t have successors.
If we want really to support Mossedegh, not as a symbol but as the
effective leader of a movement robust enough to survive the
onslaughts of Kashani,
Tudeh and other opposing forces, our effort must be to make him part
of an institution capable of doing what we have in mind. Unless we
are ready to create and support a Republic there (which Persian
voting power in the United States hardly warrants) the answer seems
to be to accept the institution traditionally and constitutionally
represented by the Shah, and make Mossedegh part of that. While he
lasts he could be as big a part of it as he wanted to be, and step
out when he chooses to with all flags flying, leaving in his place
the best man that can be found.
As you know, I am not one of those who regards the Shah as “weak”,
but only as young, beaten-down and understandably sceptical about
any real support coming from the United States or Britain.
For some time I have not been in a position to know details, but it
appears that instead of putting this kind of a proposition up to
Mos
[Page 452]
sedegh we have
continued to pester him with the oil agreement—just as though he
could make one stick if he wanted to.
The question as I see it is not how to make an oil agreement that
will bolster up the government in Persia, but how to bolster up the
government in Persia so it can make an oil agreement and then get on
with all the other things that need to be done there.
I grant that this might involve 48 hours of tough going for some
people—but this seems to be the order of the day, and anyway it
would be preferable to the alternative of watching Persia drift
behind the Curtain.
As ever,
