In response to a request for advice concerning planned or feasible United
States military courses of action in Iran in the event of a successful
Tudeh coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook military planning based
on assumptions contained in the request for advice. The studies
undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now proceeded sufficiently
to produce tentative conclusions. Their views are forwarded as inclosure
for use in connection with the current revision of NSC 107/2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
stated they will re-examine the courses of action, and initiate planning
as appropriate to implement any course(s) of action which the revision
of NSC 107/2 may indicate.
A copy of this letter and inclosure are being furnished the Director of
Central Intelligence. The study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not
being circulated to the National Security Council.
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Secretary of Defense Lovett
October 31,
1952.
SUBJECT
1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, dated 5 September 1952, on the above subject.2 The studies referred to
have proceeded sufficiently to produce tentative conclusions which
are forwarded herewith for such use as may be appropriate in
considering the revision of NSC
107/2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will reexamine the courses of
action noted below and initiate planning as appropriate to implement
any course(s) of action which the revision may indicate.
2. If the United States national policy requires the retention of the
Middle East within the free world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recognize that one action which might contribute to the security of
the Middle East would be to provide positive U.S. military support
to that area in collaboration with the British, the Turks, and the
Middle East countries involved. It is believed that U.S. armed
forces can be deployed to the Middle East with the sympathy and
cooperation of the indigenous governments. An active indication of
positive U.S. military action in the Middle East would demonstrate
both to the Communists and to the free world that the United States
is not going to permit Soviet domination of the Middle East.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that the United
States cannot deploy forces to Iran without a grave risk of inciting
the USSR to invoke, with or
without Iranian consent, the Soviet-Iranian Mutual Defense Pact of
1921.3
4. Studies were made to determine whether or not, under present
conditions, there are feasible U.S. military courses of action which
would strengthen the Western orientation of Iran and to determine
what military courses of action are feasible in the event of an
appeal by the Iranian Government to the United States for direct
military assistance. The conclusions in this regard are:
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a. Without dislocation of current force
deployments the only feasible U.S. military course of action under
present conditions, to strengthen the Western orientation of Iran,
is the present one, i.e., a continuation of arms aid and training
missions. However, recent events indicate that this course of action
alone cannot be expected to produce major results.
b. If a modification of current force
deployments is decided upon, the United States can demonstrate some
tangible evidence of greater U.S. determination to support the
nations of the Middle East in their opposition to communism by
stationing U.S. armed forces in the Middle East. The stationing of
United States forces in the Middle East would necessitate
substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of
our commitments elsewhere.
c. Further, in event of an appeal by the
Iranian Government to the United States for direct military
assistance, the following courses of action are feasible from a
military viewpoint:
(1) Conduct a show of force by periodic flights of carrier aircraft,
or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers.
(2) Assist the loyal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting
the present policy of arms aid.
5. With regard to feasible U.S. military courses of action in the
event of a Tudeh coup in Iran, studies were conducted within the
framework of four conditions:
Condition I
Communist (Tudeh) Party completely controls Iran. U.S. national
objective requires military action to prevent further spread of
communism in Middle East.
Condition II
Communist (Tudeh) Party completely controls Iran. U.S. national
objective requires military action to re-establish a Western
oriented government.
Condition III
Anti-Communist Iranian forces withdraw to south and oppose Tudeh
regime. U.S. national objective requires military action to prevent
further spread of communism in Middle East.
Condition IV
Anti-Communist Iranian forces withdraw to south and oppose Tudeh
regime. U.S. national objective requires military action to
re-establish a Western oriented government.
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6. Under Condition I—Communist (Tudeh) Party
completely controls Iran. U.S. national objective requires
military action to prevent further spread of Communism in Middle
East. The feasible military courses of action are:
a. Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate
Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the
strength to secure their frontiers against effective Communist
infiltration.
b. Encourage the U.K. and/or other
Commonwealth nations to undertake a commitment to deploy additional
forces to Iraq on the order of 1 Division reinforced and appropriate
air forces, subject to Iraqi agreement, with a mission of assisting
Middle East governments in preventing the spread of Communist power
to their countries.
c. Deploy appropriate Air Force units on the
order of 1½ wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a
mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the
spread of communist power to their countries. This mission is to be
accomplished in conjunction with friendly forces that may be
deployed to the area. Since Turkey, the key to Middle East defense,
is the strongest anti-communist nation in the Middle East and since
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission supports the U.S. war plans, stationing
of U.S. Air Forces in Turkey would materially demonstrate evidence
of U.S. support. Additionally, the combination of the U.K. forces in
Iraq mentioned above and the U.S. forces in southern Turkey would
further deployments in support of NATO war plans.
d. Deploy U.S. forces on the order of 1
Division reinforced and necessary supporting air and naval forces to
the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East
governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their
countries. This mission is to be accomplished in conjunction with
friendly forces that may be deployed to the area. It should be
recognized that such a deployment would be tantamount to associating
the United States militarily with the United Kingdom in a ground
defense of the Middle East. Current war plans do not contemplate the
deployment of U.S. ground forces in this area, and no provisions in
this regard are included in current operational or mobilization
plans.
7. Under Condition II—Communist (Tudeh) Party
completely controls Iran. U.S. national objective requires
military action to re-establish a Western oriented
government. The feasible military courses of action
are:
a. Same as Condition I.
b. These limited U.S., U.K., and/or other
Commonwealth forces probably could not insure the re-establishment
of a Western oriented government in Iran, but could cooperate with
and covertly support the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as required in the overthrow of a
Tudeh regime and re-establishment of a friendly government.
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8. Under Condition III—Anti-Communist Iranian
forces withdraw to south and oppose Tudeh regime. U.S. national
objective requires military action to prevent further spread of
Communism in Middle East. The feasible military courses of
action are:
a. Same as Condition I.
b. Provide additional logistic assistance to
the anti-Communist Iranian forces including augmentation of the U.S.
Military Missions.
9. Under Condition IV—Anti-Communist Iranian forces
withdraw to south and oppose Tudeh regime. U.S. national
objective requires military action to re-establish a Western
oriented government. The feasible military courses of
action are the same as Conditions I, II and III. These limited U.S.,
Iranian, U.K., and/or other Commonwealth forces probably could not
insure the re-establishment of a Western oriented government in
Iran, but could cooperate with and covertly support the Central
Intelligence Agency as required in the overthrow of a Tudeh regime
and re-establishment of a friendly government.
10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that in the
foregoing discussion they are not recommending that a decision be
made to employ U.S. military forces in the Middle East for the
purposes indicated in this memorandum. Rather, they are only
indicating certain courses of military action which might be
feasible in the event that such a decision is made by appropriate
governmental authorities. While this memorandum is primarily
concerned with the stationing of U.S. military forces in the Middle
East under conditions short of war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that in the event of Communist aggression in the area the
resultant situation would be not unlike that we face in Korea, and
it is unlikely that we could withdraw those forces. Under such
circumstances we would find ourselves committed to military
operations in the Middle East involving substantial forces,
supplies, and other logistical support.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W.M. Fechteler4
Chief of Naval Operations
