Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Second Edition

131. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans (Roosevelt) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Becker)¹

Washington, October 9, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Revision of NSC 107/2²

1. The most notable aspect of this draft is the emphasis it places on “special political measures”. It seems to me that we have taken the place of the token forces contemplated in Defense’s proposal.

2. This is very flattering but it seems to me that if the NSC proposes to depend heavily upon our operations, they had better have a clear understanding of what our operational capabilities are. I would suggest, therefore, the appointment of an ad hoc committee with representation from State, Defense and this Agency to assess U.S. capabilities for action in the face of eventualities contemplated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft paper. You might also wish to consider the desirability of having a member of the DD/P staff accompany you in discussion of this paper.

Kermit Roosevelt

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 33R00601A, Box 17, Folder 4, National Security Council 107 Series. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum was sent through Wisner.
2. In the proposed revision prepared by State and circulated on October 7, paragraph 5 stated that if an attempted or actual Communist seizure of power took place in Iran, “the United States should be prepared to support a legal Iranian Government, if requested to do so.” To prepare for such a contingency, the U.S. Government should a) seek prior agreement with the British Government as to military responsibility, b) consider “measures necessary for the implementation of special political operations by the United States and the United Kingdom in Iran and adjacent Middle Eastern areas,” and c) consider how to handle the matter in the United Nations. Paragraph 6 stated that if no legal Iranian Government could request such assistance, the United States, while discussing the situation with the United Kingdom, would nevertheless “make every feasible effort, particularly through special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.” (National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 210, NSC 136—US Pol re Iran)