126. Memorandum From the Chief of the Political Action Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Chief of the Political and Psychological Warfare Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])1
- Attached Program to Support the Shah, from NE–4
1. If the briefing on Thornburg in our last meeting with NEA was inadequate, [name not declassified] will forward a brief biography at your request. As you will see from the attachments to the main paper, [Page 360] Thornburg is full of ideas if occasionally vague as to their implementation and not always aware of area problems.2
2. As for the program, I find it basically sound but “sensitive” and, with due regard for proper operational security, most difficult to phase.
3. The appearance of George Allen on a general Middle Eastern tour is bound to draw Soviet fire from the onset which, however, ought to dissipate to some extent by the time he gets to Iran. What Allen can do with the willy-nilly Shah is the moot question.
4. Other problems that you undoubtedly will be interested in are:
a. The question of the British. It seems to me that we cannot take unilateral action in Iran without, at least, their concurrence. It will certainly require considerable diplomacy in winning them over to this plan.
b. [1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]
c. Timing will be a vital problem once the program is translated into a project.
5. Once you have reviewed this program, the obvious next step is to get Byroade or Jernegan in State to study it.3
[name not declassified][Page 361]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations. Secret; Security Information.↩
- See Documents 117 and 118. In the margin is a handwritten note by [name not declassified] to Kermit Roosevelt that reads: “Kim—will appreciate your keeping me informed of the progress of the proposal.”↩
- On October 24, [name not declassified], Special Assistant for Liaison with the Department of State, wrote a memorandum to NEA/CPP stating, “I discussed this matter in State with Mr. Berry, who said you would find one hundred per cent support in the Department of State for the premise that Mr. Thornburg’s program, based as it is on strong action by the Shah of Iran, is completely unrealistic. He said that he had discussed this problem with Mr. Joyce, who concurred. If the Shah were such a man as his father had been, Thornburg’s suggestions might prove of value. As it is, there is a universal acceptance in the Department of State of the view that the personality of the Shah is such that he would be incapable of carrying out the action suggested by Mr. Thornburg.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 41, Folder 20, Shah of Iran Operations)↩