Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Second Edition

110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Joyce)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Joint US–UK Planning on Emergency Operations in Iran

1. Following a meeting held in the office of the Secretary of State, the Department of State, on 31 July 1952² authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to plan with the British on the service level for unconventional activities in the event of the deterioration or collapse of the non-Communist central Government of Iran.

2. This proposal was taken up with the British, and we have been advised by London that the British Foreign Office³ feels it is premature to enter into discussions on this subject at this time.⁴

Frank G. Wisner⁵

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, Iran 1951–1953. Top Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to Generals Magruder and Balmer.
2. See Document 109.
3. Wisner deleted the word “Service” following “British” and added “Foreign Office.”
4. At the end of the memorandum is a handwritten note by Wisner that reads: “This memorandum not used—subject matter was fully covered orally with the three addressees at the Senior Consultants meeting of August 6, 1952. F.G. Wisner.” At the “Senior Consultants meeting”, i.e. a meeting with representatives from State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs, held on August 6, Wisner “recalled that the Representatives had previously agreed on a service to service approach to the British for the purpose of developing plans for implementation if, as and when a total crisis situation developed in Iran. Mr. Wisner reported that the approach had been made to SIS and that an answer had been received to the effect that the Foreign Office felt it would be premature to enter into joint planning at this time. There was no further explanation. Speculating on the reasons for this position Mr. Wisner said it might be because we were still ‘poles apart’ on policy questions or that the British are in the process of developing a change in their current policy toward Iran.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 11, Folder 7, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 8Aug52–29Aug52)
5. Printed from a copy that bears Wisner’s typed signature.