360. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)1
Tehran, January 16, 1954.
Yesterday morning I dictated a telegram summarizing some of the comments
made to me by the Shah during our conversation of January 14 with regard
to Iran’s need for additional American aid. When I saw the rough draft
of this telegram I decided not to send it as a telegram but rather to
forward it as an enclosure to this personal letter to you.
I am sending this summary of conversation in this informal fashion
because I was afraid that if I sent it as a telegram it might make too
great an impression upon the Department of State and other interested
Departments. Although the Shah plays a great role in Iran it did not
seem to me quite fair to Iran to disseminate throughout the Department
and other agencies of the Government statements disadvantageous to Iran
made by the Shah in one of his petulant moods.
During our conversation the Shah displayed considerable venom as far as
Zahedi was concerned. He
accused the ailing Prime Minister not only of bungling the elections but
of taking a complacent attitude with respect to corruption. He said that
up to this time Amini, the
Minister of Finance, had not been guilty of corrupt practices but that
he was now convinced that Amini,
as well as Panahy, who is at present in charge of the Plan Organization,
and Radji, Panahy’s Deputy, were out to make as much money for
themselves as possible.
He then launched a vigorous attack upon Wright, the British Chargé
d’Affaires. He said, “I do not know why the British should have sent as
Chargé d’Affaires a person who is no diplomat. Wright has had no
political experience. He seems to have been some kind of an economist.”
The Shah further indicated that he expected to have nothing whatsoever
to do with Wright. When I defended Wright His Majesty showed signs of
temper and said it was not necessary for him to have relations with a
mere Chargé d’Affaires. He is of course annoyed with Wright because he
sent Perron, behind the back of
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, to Wright for purposes of
intrigue. Wright discussed the matter with the Foreign Minister who took
it up with the Prime Minister, who, in turn, took it up with the Shah. I
personally think Wright has done a noble job in this respect, but it
would seem that for a time at least he has incurred the vindictive
hostility of the Shah.
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Since the pouch is going out in a few moments I will not have time to
elaborate in more detail in this letter regarding my conversation with
His Majesty. I believe I have written enough, however, to let you know
that His Majesty is not easy to deal with these days. On the other hand
this bad humor might be merely a reflection of internal troubles.
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During our conversation
reference was made to domestic troubles of Amini whose wife the Shah told me with relish had been
behaving badly in Europe. When I remarked that I thought Amini had been doing extremely well in
the circumstances the Shah stated with emphasis that “no one could be
having more family trouble than I encounter constantly”. I understand
that among the members of his family who are causing the Shah worry are
not only his Mother but the Empress herself.
I hope that the Shah’s outburst, as set forth in the enclosure, will not
cause anyone in the Department who sees it from considering Iran’s need
for further aid on any other than an unprejudiced sympathetic basis.
With warmest regards, I am
Sincerely,
Loy W. Henderson
2
P.S. I am sending a copy of this to Evan Wilson in London. It is extremely important that the
contents of this letter, particularly those portions relating to
Wright, not be brought to the attention of the British
Government.
Enclosure
Memorandum of Conversation
Tehran, January 14, 1954.
PARTICIPANTS
- His Majesty the Shah of Iran
- Loy W. Henderson,
American Ambassador
At my request the Shah granted me an audience yesterday at the
beginning of which I presented him with a copy of Persepolis, as a gift of the Oriental Institute of Chicago
University.
During our conversation subsequent to the presentation the Shah asked
me again what the U.S. was planning to do for Iran, what kind of
report re economic and military aid had Vice President Nixon made to the National
Security Council, etc.3 The
Shah, who appeared to be in a petulant humor, commenced to complain
re the state of the Iranian budget. The available funds even with
American emergency aid were not sufficient to meet the urgent
economic and security needs of the country. What would happen after
several months when emergency aid was exhausted he did not know
unless the U.S. could find some way to supplement emergency aid at
least until conclusion of the oil agreement. Eden had expressed in a recent
speech the hope that the oil agreement would be achieved during the
year 1954. That did not indicate expectation on the part of the
British for an early agreement. Even if an early agreement could be
obtained he could not believe that the agreement or the oil flowing
from it would provide Iran with adequate budgetary funds for some
time to come. Iran furthermore needed more than budgetary funds. It
must after the empty promises of many years begin to do something
concrete in the direction of economic development. If not, a
disillusioned population might be easy prey for communism.
Stressing the needs of the Army the Shah said the Army budget was so
limited that it was not even able to transfer military stores from
one place to another. The funds available are barely sufficient to
pay salary, allowances, quarters, etc. There was nothing left for
operations. I remarked that perhaps with more expert management the
Army could within the framework of the present budget take care of
elementary operational needs. General McClure in describing to me earlier in the day a
recent conversation which he had had with General Batmanqilich, said
Batmanqilich had declared solemnly to him that the Army did not even
possess personnel to distribute clothing and blankets which the U.S.
Government was giving to it. I said that a statement of this kind on
the part of the Chief of Staff was shocking to both General
McClure and myself. It
seemed to us to denote lack of resourcefulness and organizational
ability. Shah said somewhat apologetically that he was sure General
Batmanqilich had made this statement merely in order to impress
General McClure with their
military needs. Batmanqilich would, of course, find means of
distributing this material. He had
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been talking with General Batmanqilich a few
moments before he received me. General Batmanqilich, known for his
administrative and organizational ability, was a loyal, honest, and
capable military leader. If he was experiencing difficulties under
the present budget, no successor was likely to be found who would
not. Even without re-organization the Army should have 10,000 more
men, particularly non-commissioned and junior officers to make it
efficient. Re-organization which would give the Army defensive
capabilities would require 15,000 more men. Needs therefore for a
re-organized Army were for 25,000 men in addition to the 125,000
already in uniform. This required budgetary funds and no such funds
were as yet in sight.
Turning to civilian needs the Shah asked if there was not something I
could tell him re U.S. plans. Did Secretary Dulles’ speech on December 12
indicate a radical change in U.S. policy?4 Was the U.S. planning to call home its troops
and turn the defense of the world against aggression over to the
United Nations? Had the U.S. Government decided to refrain from
giving further economic aid to Iran at this time when Iran was in
such need? The U.S. had helped Turkey and Greece to get started in
their economic development; was he to understand that at the moment
when Iran was in a position to use such aid, and was urgently in
need of it, the U.S. had decided to extend no more aid of a
financial and economic development character? If Iran was not to
receive any additional aid, the Government should know at once so
decisions could be made as to what, if anything, could be done.
I told the Shah that we had endeavored to make it clear when the $45
million aid was granted that the grant was on the basis of
emergency; that it would be difficult to find additional funds for
Iran’s budgetary use; that it had not been easy to obtain funds
wherewith to give this emergency aid and that no additional funds
were in sight. The U.S. Government had, of course, hoped that by the
time the emergency funds had been exhausted there would be an oil
agreement which together with fresh funds obtained by Iran locally
would take care of Iran’s most urgent needs. Shah interrupted to say
that Iran was not entirely to blame for delay in achievement of an
oil agreement. I replied that it was true that the present Iranian
Government could not be entirely to blame for this delay but that I
was sure His Majesty would agree with me that Iran as a country had
primarily itself to blame for a situation in which it now found
itself. In fact, the U.S. Government had spent many millions of
dollars in order to help Iran out of a predicament in which it had
put itself. The Shah asked if he was to understand that the U.S. did
not intend to give Iran any additional financial aid re
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gardless of delays in
achieving an oil agreement. I told him that I was not in a position
at this time to state what the U.S. might or might not do. The Shah
asked if he was to understand also that in the event an oil
agreement would be achieved the U.S. would consider it unnecessary
to give Iran financial or economic aid? I told the Shah that I was
not in a position to state at this time what the U.S. Government
might or might not do in circumstances which could not be foreseen.
I knew the U.S. Government hoped that Iran with funds obtained as
the result of an oil agreement could meet its budgetary needs and
have a surplus for use in economic development. The U.S. Government
had in the past come to Iran’s aid in time of great stress and I was
sure that the U.S. Government would not permit Iran to collapse
financially or economically if it should be convinced that Iran,
although doing its utmost to make the best use of its own human and
natural resources, needed U.S. aid for its survival. I was not,
however, making any promises and I did not believe the U.S.
Government was in a position to make any promises at this time.
Reverting to Secretary Dulles’ speech I said that if the Shah had read it
carefully it should have given him encouragement. It indicated that
the U.S. was determined to hold the initiative in its struggle to
avert international communist aggression. It further indicated that
although the U.S. was willing to come to an understanding with the
Soviet Union it was not prepared to do so on the basis of division
of the world into spheres of influence or of sacrifice of interests
of other countries. In my opinion, the speech showed more rather
than less determination to oppose international communist
aggression. I then discussed certain aspects of the speech in some
detail.
The Shah then reverted to a discussion of certain Iranian domestic
problems which were treated in a telegram.
