Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.419/9–2750: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret
no distribution outside department

Washington, September 27, 1950—7 p. m.

1636. Excon. Embtel 1810, Sept 26 for Dept only rptd London 1579² and Embtel 1829, Sept 27, rptd Paris 515.³ Dept recognizes Emb’s concern re negotiating difficulties in light Sawyer program and agrees that if program were implemented its coercive aspects wld alter nature of present voluntary multilateral negots. Dept is objecting strongly to Sawyer program in present form (which is applicable thus far only to 1–A items), and will keep Emb informed.

During recent efforts to defeat Wherry amendment,⁴ major attack was directed at its coercive nature. Desirability of non-coercive policy was strongly reaffirmed by the President, Gen Bradley, Hoffman and Dept in letters to Rep Cannon and Sen McKellar (see Cong Rec Sept 22).⁵ Cannon amendment requires NSC finding that “trade” of country is contrary to US security interest, and Dept considers it unlikely this wld be interpreted narrowly (e.g., to cover exports but not imports) or automatically (e.g., by delegation of auth to Secty Commerce to implement some rigid formula). Narrow and automatic interpretation wld imply Cannon amendment no different from Wherry amendment, which was rejected by Congress. Broader interpretation shld provide adequate opportunity to examine all aspects of any case which might arise. Stoppage of trade wld be serious step since wld be deliberate rather than automatic. Threat stoppage also wld be deliberate and directed to specific country.

NSC action on which Sawyer program based, furthermore, refers only to US Excon policy and shld not therefore have broader implications such as cutting off of US aid program or even, in Dept view, attempting to compel other countries to adopt Excon policies same as those of US.

Brit have acknowledged principle that items of high strategic importance shld be embargoed and that UK shld not export to Sovbloc items same as those it imports from US under MDAP or items needed for defense WE. Dept hopes that as result forthcoming tripartite talks Brit will have accepted practically all US 1–A items for embargo, or else have demonstrated that any remaining items need not be embargoed to Sovbloc, so that anomalous US position (recommending internatl agreement be reached and then refusing to accept it) will be ended.

In view Dept’s attempt to modify Sawyer program there seems no need to delay tripartite talks. On contrary, Dept believes it preferable seek earliest possible resolution of outstanding problems so that all PCs, incl US, can acquiesce in a specific control list.

Webb

1. Repeated to Paris as telegram 1584.
2. Not printed. It reported that the Embassy in London was greatly concerned over Secretary of Commerce Sawyer’s program for the denial to Western European countries of American strategic items unless assurances were received that the countries in question would embargo the items to the Soviet bloc (see telegram 1498, September 23, to Paris, p. 194). The Embassy felt that the Sawyer program contradicted the continued efforts to reach international agreement on export controls through negotiation, and, if implemented, would prevent the United States from reaching a compromise agreement at the forthcoming tripartite meeting in October on security export controls (460.509/9–2650).
3. Not printed. It expressed the fear that implementation of the Sawyer program would result in the denial of U.S. financial assistance to noncomplying nations (460.509/9–2750).
4. Regarding the Wherry amendment, see footnotes 1 and 2, p. 189.
5. Regarding the communications under reference here, see footnotes 3, 4, 5, and 6, p. 192.