Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/9–2150: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

Washington, September 22, 1950—7 p. m.

1483. Excon. Depcirtel Sept 21, 11 a. m.² As text agreed minute on Excon policies indicates, Brit accepted paras 1, 2 and 3 US proposed draft³ with very minor changes, thus recognizing strategic considerations shld be predominant in selecting items for control and recognizing controls shld be extended cover selected items in key industrial areas contributing substantially to war production. In principle at least, this shld eliminate Brit opposition to controls where normal peacetime uses are said predominate over strategic uses. Brit position that only “key items” in industrial sectors shld be controlled, believed to be greatly weakened. Dept confident further negots with Brit and Fr as soon as possible (ref para 6 of agreed minute) shld therefore yield considerable further progress toward more adequate controls.

Doubtful much more cld have been achieved at FonMin level, although US draft para 4, which Brit refused accept, represented effort to be more specific as to treatment items selected for control. Brit stated they cld not go along with anything so definite until econ as well as strategic factors given proper weight. Result was revised draft which Dept interprets as agreement draw up list items which will “have regard to” US 1–B list and specify items to be embargoed (including items of “direct strategic value” and items “required for defense needs of WE”), those to be restricted quantitatively, and those subj exchange info. Revised para 4 also includes agreement take account econ impact, which Dept had expected and construes as applying to extent of control which shld be imposed and not to whether an item shld be accepted for control.

Main drawback revised para 4, as compared with original draft, is less direct ref to US 1–B list and no specific ref to types of 1–B items (e.g., Group I and II) which shld be controlled in specific manner. Only agreement was to work out details promptly in tripartite conference.

There was no agreement on our part to have conference in London (re London’s 1728 Sept 21, rptd Paris 489⁴) although this probably best. Either Paris or Washington acceptable although mtg in Paris might suggest CG caucus and if mtg held here Brit might handicap mtgs by continual ref to London for instrs. Wherever held, believe preferable mtgs start Oct 2 if possible. Dept believes sizable US Del probably necessary since experts needed expedite discussion. Useful if King, Moore and Armstrong cld review situation and comment jointly or separately on plan action for conference.

Although it is recognized there may be divergence views on questions such as inclusion additional 1–A items in Internatl List I, transit trade problems, action toward Sweden and Switz, continued secrecy re CG/CoCom and Internatl lists, and possible degrees informal relationship between CG/CoCom and NATO structure. Dept reluctant include these matters on formal agenda for tripartite mtg since they are more properly function CG/CoCom.

Webb

1. Repeated to London as telegram 1571.
2. Not printed. It transmitted the text of the Agreed Minute of the United States, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 19, p. 187.
3. The text of the American draft minute under reference here, circulated to the New York Foreign Ministers meetings as document 33, September 13, is printed in vol. iii, p. 1285.
4. Not printed; it reported that the Embassy was informed by the British Foreign Office that a tripartite conference to work out further details of the agreement on East-West trade was planned for London in the near future (460.509/9–2150).