Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.56/12–2750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret

Washington, December 27, 1950—7 p. m.

3443. Re para 4 urtel 3619 Dec 26 rptd London 888 Belgrade 54.¹ Brit Emb here has informed Dept informally as follows:

1. Although question of supplying war materiel to Yugo was not discussed by three ForMins at recent meeting in Brussels, Mr. Bevin had intended to inform Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman that Brit Govt favored (a) recommendation in para 48 of report of Washington Tripartite Comite² that three govts should approach Yugo Govt at early date with offer of eventual military aid and (b) proposal that small team of Allied service experts be sent to Yugo to conduct on-the-spot investigations of Yugo requirements.

2. Brit FonOff favors early tripartite approach of this nature in Belgrade because (a) proposal constitutes natural development of tripartite policy of “keeping Tito afloat” and internal position of Tito, Who has openly admitted that state of Yugo armed forces is deteriorating in relation to those of neighboring satellites, would probably be strengthened by offer of Western arms; (b) Tito has now drifted so far from Cominform that admitted risk of supplying him with arms seems worth accepting; and (c) present inability of Brit Govt to provide Yugo with war materiel and uncertainty whether US Govt can do so in near future is in FonOff opinion not sufficient ground for not making offer. Arms which Fr Govt could supply would represent first installment of Western aid and when report of suggested team of Allied experts has been received supply position of US and Brit Govts may be easier.

3. Brit FonOff believes it is in interest of three Western govts and also of Yugo Govt that Yugo requirements for war materiel be determined without delay; means of helping Yugo most effectively in emergency can not be determined until after full investigation Yugo needs, which can only be accomplished by on-the-spot examination. Brit FonOff therefore considers it most important that any Fr agreement to supply Yugo Govt with war materiel should be dependent on latter’s acceptance of team of Allied service experts, since Fr agreement is “only card of immediate entry” we possess.

4. FonOff suggests proposed tripartite approach to Yugo Govt be based on recent Yugo request to Fr Govt for furnishing war materiel as recommended in paras 39 and 48 (b) of tripartite report. Fr Amb at Belgrade might make first approach to Yugo Govt in name of three govts after concerting with US and Brit colleagues; subsequently US and Brit Amb could separately confirm to Yugo Govt that Fr Amb had spoken on behalf of three govts.

Dept believes foregoing represents firm position of Brit Govt and considers it likely that it will be favored also by Fr Govt. US view on this question has not yet been determined, although Dept tentatively feels there is serious question as to desirability of direct tripartite approach to Tito at present time (see Belgrade’s 668 Dec 11 to Dept, rptd Paris 99, London 40³).

Dept would appreciate receiving urgently Paris, Belgrade, London Emb comments. Sent Paris as 3443, rptd London as 3175, Belgrade as 599.

Acheson

1. Not printed. It asked for information about any approach made by British Foreign Secretary Bevin on the question of military assistance to Yugoslavia at the December 19 meeting of American, British, and French Foreign Ministers at Brussels (768.56/12–2650). The three Foreign Ministers, who were in Brussels in connection with the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council, met to discuss the question of the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany in the community of free nations. For documentation on the meeting, see vol. iii, PP. 1 ff.
2. Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1482.
3. Not printed. In it the Embassy in Belgrade fully concurred with telegram 3184, December 9, to Paris, p. 1510, that tripartite discussions regarding military aid to Yugoslavia should continue to be centered in Washington. The Embassy also repeated its view that the United States should not associate itself with any approach to Yugoslavia on the subject which might be met with a rebuff or be construed as pressing unrequested military assistance on Yugoslavia (768.5/12–1150).