Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.03/11–750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia

secret

Washington, November 14, 1950—8 p. m.

379. Dept agrees Emb view (urtel 458 Nov 7¹) that Popovic remark that YuGovt wld like to know what measures it might take to improve chances favorable US action on food assistance shld be followed up on US side with some concrete suggestions.² In conversations with Yugo officials here we shall make use of appropriate openings to make such suggestions. However, agree that Popovic not the ideal man to deal with on this subj and that main effort must be made in Belgrade with Tito or, in ur discretion, other high Yugo officials.

In such talks it wld be advisable to refer to steps already taken by Yugos which have contributed to more favorable atmosphere, e.g. (a) Tito’s recent statements to US Congressmen³ and in Sulzberger interview⁴ re Yugo fulfillment of UN obligations in case of war; (b) Tito’s reference in Zagreb speech to US aid and to US role in UNRRA (Embdesp 290 Oct 31⁵); (c) recent improvement Yugo relations with Italy; (d) return of Grk soldiers to Greece and indications forthcoming on Grk children. On this last point it might be mentioned Yugo’s position in public opinon here wld be much better when some children have actually arrived in Greece.

Fol points seem appropriate for mention in talks you may have. We do not suggest they all be mentioned at one time or that they be specifically tied to the aid program. All are matters on which YuGovt may wish to consider its policies in light of known attitudes of US public, to which you can refer.

1. Chi intervention in Korea⁶ has aroused strong feelings in US. While we have no intention of trying to tell YuGovt what position it shld take on this or that question before UN, nevertheless we think it wld be appropriate and useful to remark, if occasion arises, that any apparent condoning by the Yugos of Chi Commie aggression in Korea or elsewhere cld only adversely affect attitude Amer public. Further, any Yugo implementation of Bebler’s⁷ recent suggestion to USUN that immed seating Chi Commies in SC⁸ shld be promoted wld prejudice case Yugos in eyes both Amer Congress and Amer people at time when Yugo cld ill afford it. We are not trying to “pressure” Yugos as regards their voting on question seating Chi Commies in UN: that matter will of course be determined by individ govts, at proper time, in accord with their interpretations resolutions before GA on this gen subj. We believe it fitting to note, however, that any appearance that Yugos interested in sponsoring Chi Commie causes at time when Commie China embarking on aggressive adventures at various points on its periphery wld almost inevitably bring about unfavorable reaction in USA at very time when USA is being asked contribute aid to Yugo economy.

2. Granting of exit permits to dual nationals and relatives of US cits wld be well recd by US opinion.

3. In connection food aid program Amers regard as of great importance full freedom for US press correspondents and officials to observe and report on reception and distribution of food shipments, and provision for publicity within Yugo. Separate tel deals with proposed agreement on this subj.⁹

4. While US intends scrupulously to avoid intervention in Yugo internal affairs, YuGovt must realize Amer people, if asked to give aid to Yugo, will necessarily be concerned over conditions there and will be favorably impressed by any measures which increase degree of polit and religious liberty enjoyed by Yugo people, such as amnesty non-Cominform polit prisoners (mentioned by Tito in Sulzberger interview) or relaxation of govt control over churches. Dept does not believe any specific proposal shld be made re liberation Stepinac,¹⁰ but his continued imprisonment cld be referred to as a factor which makes it most difficult for many in US, Catholics and non-Catholics, to support aid to Yugo.

5. Collectivization program admittedly hard question to deal with in connection aid program, as we cannot attempt force any particular internal econ policies on YuGovt. However, it can be made clear (a) that Amer people will insist that their aid be distributed equitably and not be used as means of benefiting some groups, such as collective farms, at expense of others, or of coercing independent peasantry, and (b) that Amer people will consider YuGovt has duty to maximize benefits of US aid by measures which maximize Yugo’s own production and which conciliate rather than alienate the peasants on whom that production depends.

Acheson

1. Not printed.
2. In the telegram cited here, Ambassador Allen was responding to a suggestion made by Ambassador Popović to Secretary of State Acheson on November 1 and reported upon in telegram 323, November 1, to Belgrade. Ambassador Allen further observed that while it was an important subject to be handled in a way to achieve a maximum result and avoid the impression of conditions connected with food relief, he believed that a good opportunity existed at least for the mitigation of some of the more glaring aspects of the police state and perhaps for the further reorientation of Yugoslav foreign policy (868.03/11–750).
3. See telegram 396, October 23, from Belgrade, p. 1478.
4. New York Times Chief Foreign Correspondent C. L. Sulzberger interviewed Marshal Tito on the evening of November 6. Sulzberger’s account of the interview was carried in the Times on November 8. For additional recollections of the interview, see Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, pp. 582–584.
5. Not printed.
6. Communist Chinese military forces attacked United Nations forces in Korea in late October 1950.
7. Aleš Bebler, Yugoslav Permanent Delegate to the United Nations and Representative to the United Nations Security Council.
8. For documentation on the attitude of the United States on the question of Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.
9. Telegram 386, November 15, to Belgrade, under reference here, is not printed (868.03/11–1550). Regarding the exchange of notes between Ambassador Allen and Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Mates on this subject, see footnote 1, p. 1504.
10. Alojzize (Aloysius) Stepinac, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 16 years on October 11, 1946, for alleged crimes against the Yugoslav Government