Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

441.119/8–950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret

Washington, August 29, 1950—7 p. m.

1093. Excon. Re last para Embtel 811 Aug 9, rptd Paris 210.² In prelim FonMin talks starting here this week and in subsequent Sept mtgs NYC, Dept proposes discuss with Brit and Fr only one major issue, namely question criteria as to what is strategic. Fol approach similar Deptel 972,³ Dept desires press these arguments at highest level in effort obtain agreement on these principles:

(a) An effective Excon program in interest of Western security must retard long-term development Sov bloc war potential well as limit its short term striking power;

(b) Such program requires adequate restrictions on export of selected list of items substantially contributing to basic industrial potential of Sov bloc well as on export of items of direct mil significance; and

(c) Each country shld be prepared make necessary econ sacrifices and cooperate with other countries to reduce burden.

If agreement reached on these principles we wld point out that it follows logically that US, UK and Fr shld follow up through CG structure by (a) reintroducing and reexamining 1–B items which CoCom has recommended be rejected for intl control and (b) proceeding promptly to clarify status of List III items in order bring them under intl control rapidly as possible.

We are not raising question of mechanics of control at this time or level on grounds that (a) question of strategic criteria is greater issue and if satisfactorily resolved shld permit discussion methods of control in more coop spirit, (b) if question strategic criteria not satisfactorily resolved, US will want to reconsider many aspects Excon policy, (c) raising these two issues concurrently might suggest compromise on control methods which we are not ready to enter upon (see a), and (d) by its nature this question seems probably best resolved in CG/CoCom where it can be related to specific items or categories of items in effort find most workable methods of control.

Dept aware Brit position reflects great emphasis given to econ costs involved in expanded control program, but believes probable econ burden exaggerated. Moore⁴ has copies statistic tables on E-W trade (showing W Eur exp and imp by countries with EE as percent total for trade, estim percent “strategic” exports to total, etc) which might be useful to Emb in effort get Brit be more specific as to trade reduction actually likely. Brit might also consider extent to which reduction may be offset by coop action in West (e.g., diverting part of strategic exports to meet needs of greater rearmament programs in West).

Dept will inform Emb re results prelim talks.⁵

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated to Paris as 1033.
2. Not printed. It reported that in discussions the previous day British officials generally maintained that American-British policy differences on export controls were not great and that progress had been made in Paris in developing a control program. The British admitted that the differences became significant in the evaluation of the strategic importance of particular items, particularly those which had civilian use in Eastern Europe. The British indicated a fear that British trade with Eastern Europe would be entirely eliminated and that the United States would press in the direction of full-scale economic warfare. The Embassy asked for guidance for further discussions with the British in preparation for the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meetings in New York (441.119/8–950).
3. August 22, p. 174.
4. Not further identified.
5. American, British, and French Representatives held five preliminary conversations in New York, August 29–September 1 in preparation for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers later in September. A tripartite paper reviewing the preliminary discussion of East-West trade, document 3[D–5], August 31, is printed in vol. iii, p. 1165.