Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.5/9–2650

The Department of State to the British Embassy ¹

top secret

Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State has considered the questions raised in Earl Jellicoe’s communication of August 14, 1950, regarding the Department’s proposal that a tripartite working party should meet in Washington to discuss the present views of the United Kingdom, French and United States Governments, and to coordinate their planning in the event it is determined to accord the Yugoslav Government certain military assistance.² It is now in a position to agree that the working party should not concern itself with questions of political policy such as the action to be taken in the Security Council in the event of an invasion of Yugoslavia. Also, the Department has arranged with the Department of Defense for the deletion of the last sentence of page 6 of the staff study transmitted under cover of its aide-mémoire of July 10, 1950.³ As regards the Embassy’s suggestion that a service mission should be sent to Yugoslavia in the event the Yugoslav Government submits a request for arms, the Department agrees that this is a subject for consideration by the working party.

The French Government has also agreed to the suggestions for a tripartite technical working party to consider this subject.⁴ The Department therefore suggests that the technical working party should hold its first meeting on Monday, October 2, 1950, and that it continue to meet thereafter as necessary. The United States will be represented by several field grade officers from the Department of Defense numbering perhaps ten, one of whom shall act as spokesman for the United States, and by a couple of officers from the Department of State. There is enclosed a suggested outline of the subject to be considered and the manner in which it might be approached.

Washington , September 26, 1950.

[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

U.S. Suggestions for Initiation of Tripartite Discussions on Military Assistance to Yugoslavia

1. The Problem:

To consider, in view of the possibility of aggression against Yugoslavia by one or more of the Soviet Satellites with or without the participation of Soviet forces, the Yugoslav materiel and supply situation and the character of the materiel and supply assistance which might be provided to Yugoslavia by the Western Powers.

2. Detailed Aspects for Consideration:

a. Assumptions as to circumstances prevailing when the emergency arises.

b. Estimate of Soviet and Satellite capabilities against Yugoslav forces and of the timing and character of operations.

c. Estimate of materiel and supplies now in possession of Yugoslav forces.

d. Estimate of Yugoslav requirements and deficiencies.

e. U.K., French, and U.S. resources available to meet deficiencies.

f. Nature, location and timing of stockpiling.

g. Circumstances under which a mission should be sent.

h. Training Problems.

i. Transportation and other logistic problems.

3. Suggested Conduct of Initial Discussions:

a. U.S. representatives will be prepared to present their views on the preliminary aspects of the problem at the initial meeting. Presumably the U.K. and French delegations will desire to do likewise.

b. It is conceived that at subsequent meetings, appropriate sections of the representation will meet progressively to develop a concurrence of views on the various aspects of the problem.

4. Proposed Initial Meeting:

Room 3E 949, The Pentagon, 9:30 a.m., 2 October 1950.

1. A similar but briefer aide-mémoire incorporating most of the substance of paragraph 2 of the communication printed here, was sent to the French Embassy on September 26, not printed (768.5/7–2450).
2. Lord Jellicoe’s memorandum under reference here, not printed, responded to the Department of State aide-mémoire sent to the British Embassy on July 10 and summarized in telegram 186, July 12, to London, p. 1432. A similar aide-mémoire was also sent to the French Embassy on July 10.
3. The staff study under reference here is not printed, but see footnote 5, ibid . The sentence at issue here dealt with the possible availability of surplus British naval craft for assignment to Yugoslavia.
4. The French Embassy aide-mémoire, dated July 24, is not printed.