Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.00/3–1150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia

top secret

Washington, March 11, 1950—2 p. m.

184. Reurtel 280 Mar 3.¹ Dept appreciates value of direct personal talks between you and Tito when considerations of highest importance in US-Yugo relations require. You are authorized to seek interview with him when you consider desirable from this point of view. However, Dept believes ur normal contact with Yugo Govt shld be through FonOff and doubts desirability, for reasons cited urtel, establishing practice of regular periodic talks with Tito.

At present stage, Dept considers it preferable avoid in conversations with Yugos any statement concerning US attitude in event of Sov attack on Yugo more precise than those, made to press after ur interview with President. We are not yet prepared give Tito assurance he can count on mil supplies in such event. If direct question is put to you, you shld say you must refer it to ur Govt. For your info, study now being made of possibility having available such supplies for diversion to Yugo, in case of emergency, from those assigned to MAP countries.

In conversations with Tito and other leading Yugo officials you may bring out such of fol points as you consider appropriate and timely in order to clear away misunderstandings which may have arisen in recent weeks:

1. Reemphasize two major purposes of US financial aid being granted Yugo: (a) to support Yugo’s effort to maintain independence in the face of political pressures and economic blockade from East, and (b) to promote mutually beneficial trade between two countries. Similarly, US support of Yugo at last UNGA for seat on SC was based on view that Yugo wld act on SC as independent state rather than as satellite of a great power and that existing threat to Yugo security might to some degree be lessened by its holding seat on SC.

2. As Yugo Govt know, US has not sought either favors or polit concessions as price of loans. Differences in economic and political philosophy need not and shld not prevent fruitful relations between two countries and mutual respect for each other’s rights within framework of principles and purposes of UN.

3. US considers it desirable that Yugo’s relations with nations with which it now has expanding trade, especially neighboring states, shld be as normal and friendly as possible, and that irritating problems which are obstacles to such relations shld be cleared up wherever possible. While these problems may not be directly connected with credits and trade, it must be obvious to Yugos that commercial and other relations with other nations cld be further developed to benefit of all concerned if such problems were settled by mutual agreement of parties directly involved, and that they can be settled without sacrifice of sovereignty or independence on part of any nation.

4. US has given no consideration to proposing Yugo participation in ERP. If Yugo Govt has recd impression US has had such proposal in mind, this must have been due to misunderstanding. US aware of obvious polit objections, from Yugo as from US point of view. However, Yugos shld not overlook possible help in solving own dollar problem which purchase of Yugo products by ERP countries for dollars wld represent. Dept and ECA prepared to discuss with Yugo reps in Wash means of increasing such purchases.

5. Yugos shld realize Congress and public opinion play essential role in US foreign policy. It is in Yugo Govt’s own interest to know, and to take into account in making its decisions, that Amer people are vitally concerned about such matters as human rights, religious liberty, freedom of information, as well as efforts of the free peoples of Western Europe to achieve recovery with US assistance. We may therefore have occasion from time to time, in the interest of improving understanding and cooperation between our two countries, to bring up questions relating to the abovementioned matters on which we believe action by the Yugo Govt wld be helpful. Such suggestions, however, will be unaccompanied by any form of pressure whatsoever and will be unrelated to US aid to Yugo, except insofar as cooperative action by Yugo Govt on these matters, when possible, will make it easier to obtain necessary public support in US for aid to Yugo. In this connection, although ExIm loan granted shortly after strong Tito speeches alleging Western pressures and failure to fulfill promises, Yugos shld not have illusion such tactics speeded up decision to grant loan; on contrary, they only made it more difficult. US rejects pressure just as Yugo does.

6. There is every reason to believe US and Yugo can arrive at workable arrangements in their varied relations on basis mutual respect and understanding. For example, we hope for full Yugo cooperation in working out most efficient use of US credits already granted. Both countries have interest in having dollars put to maximum use in Yugo economy.

For your info, Dept wld prefer discussions with Yugos not extend at this time to Trieste² or question of possible mil aid to Yugo unless raised by Tito or other Yugo leaders. On former, Dept is consulting with Brit with view to agreement on next step (see Deptel 173 Mar 8). On question of mil aid as indicated above Dept awaiting completion joint State-Defense study probable Yugo requirements and means of meeting them, to be followed by consultation with Brit and Fr in order be in position to evaluate any Yugo request if and when made. On both these questions Dept believes official public comment shld be avoided for the present.

Acheson

1. Ante, p. 1380.
2. For documentation regarding Trieste, see vol. iii, pp. 1302 ff.