Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.00/2–1950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

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Belgrade, February 19, 1950—6 p. m.

215. Tito opened election campaign¹ yesterday with important speech at Uzice, in Which he repeated many times that Yugoslavia would not join any bloc, east or west, and would not permit interference in internal Yugoslav affairs. He made a clear implication that if political conditions were attached to economic assistance from US, Yugoslavia would reject such assistance and do best it could on its own.²

His most significant and pointed statement clearly referred to Indochina. He said that if Yugoslavia decided that recognition any government was just, Yugoslavia would grant recognition even though this would deprive Yugoslavia of economic assistance from West.

It is evident that Tito’s speech was indirect reference our attitude toward possible Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh as indicated in Deptel 84, February 7.³ Following receipt of Deptel under reference, First Secretary Fowler, under my instructions, let Yugoslavs know that recognition Ho would not fail to affect attitude of many Americans towards economic assistance to Yugoslavia. Tito clearly interpreted this to be pressure on Yugoslav Government and he took occasion to let us know that he would not countenance pressure from US. I was today asked by American journalists whether political conditions were attached to US assistance to Yugoslavia. I repeated that US had no desire to interfere in internal Yugoslav affairs, that no conditions had been attached to previous US loan, and that no such provisions were concerned with pending loan application.

It is obvious that Tito has been angered by implication that US attitude toward economic assistance will be affected by Yugoslav action re recognition Ho Chi Minh. He has taken this occasion to let us and Cominform know forcefully that he will not allow interference from any quarter.

I do not believe we should become excited by Tito’s speech. It was partly for domestic consumption, even though attendant reason may have been warning to US not to interfere in Yugoslav affairs.⁴

Allen

1. The reference here is to the forthcoming elections for the Yugoslav People’s Assembly, scheduled for March 26, 1950.
2. A full English translation of Marshal Tito’s election speech at the Serbian town of Titovo Užice on February 18, as published in the Yugoslav press, was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure to despatch 189, February 24, from Belgrade, neither printed (768.00/2–2450). For the Serbian text of the speech, see Josip Broz Tito: Govori i Chlantsi, vol. V (Zagreb: 1959), pp. 7–26.
3. Ante, p. 1365.
4. In his telegram 216, February 20, from Selgrade, not printed, Ambassador Allen observed that Tito’s Užice speech was a vigorous, fighting oration opening the national election campaign. By strongly attacking both the East and the West, Tito had appealed to the stubborn nationalistic pride of the Yugoslavs, thereby gaining some support for his party and his own candidacy. Allen took the view that the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people remained opposed to Communism and to the police state methods of the current government. Allen commented that Tito’s repeated insistence that Yugoslavia would not accept political conditions with economic aid might have been ill-advised as regards American public opinion, but it would be difficult to quarrel with Tito’s attitude. Allen expressed the view that Yugoslavia’s greatest immediate value to the West was as a Communist state independent of both East and West, and he concluded: “Our ultimate aim must of course be democratic institutions in Yugoslavia but for the moment a Marxist state independent of Moscow suits our purposes.” (768.00/2–2050)