Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/7–750: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret

Paris, July 7, 1950—8 p. m.

137. Excon. 1. Embassy concerned about implications contained following June 30 Deptels: 2368 to Rome, repeated Paris 3135; 3249 to London, repeated Paris 3134; 458 to Stockholm, repeated Paris 3136, and Deptel 18 to London July 3, repeated Paris 14 as affecting current US efforts in CoCom and CG.¹

2. From point of view of consistency we do not believe US can say (a) US in pursuing policy of obtaining voluntary agreement for parallel export control program on basis mutual recognition common interests and dangers (Deptel 1627, April 13²), and at same time say (b) US proposes withhold export items it unilaterally determines to be strategic unless PC’s accept US conclusion that item is strategic (see reftels).

3. Embassy has proceeded on presumption Torep 816 August 27, 1948³ still basis US policy in international export control field. Therefore, Embassy does not feel implied threats by US to restrict or deny exports of items not yet agreed for embargo consistent with such policy, yet Deptel 14 clearly implies US has taken such action. Results of such action can only weaken if not completely destroy the concept that the primary objective of US in CoCom and CG negotiations is to develop a mutually agreed-upon export control list on the basis voluntary agreement by PC’s which implies to us that views of other PC’s entitled same weight those of US.

4. If US has in fact now adopted a coercive policy as indicated in reftels, Embassy fails see logic in granting licenses to UK (Deptel 3134) while denying licenses to Italy (3135), since both cases involve unsettled int. list III items. In any case it seems strange to allow exports to UK which is spearhead opposition to US present policy in CoCom and to Sweden (Deptel 3136) which is not a PC and uncooperative in export control program, while denying license to Italy which thus far has cooperated fully with US and has often taken lead in CoCom.

5. While Embassy not advocating pro or con on matter of pressure we do feel that, if voluntary and mutual aspects of policy still in force, even in name only, pressure should be used solely with respect to matters of principle and not with respect to individual unsettled items. On such matters as transit trade effective pressure might be brought to force reluctant PC’s install effective measures of control of transit trade and free ports. If, on the other hand, Department has decided to exert pressure re individual items as implied Deptel 14, Embassy feels pressure should not be dissipated by statements contained in second paragraph reftel.

6. Re questions raised Deptel 3135, Embassy feels ECA financing should be examined in light strategic export controls same as MDAP items (Deptel 2759, June 13⁴). Nevertheless because of possible effect Department’s suggested approach to Italian Government, Embassy feels Rome comments on advisability such approach should be given careful consideration.

Bruce

1. None printed. In them the Department of State expressed concern over the apparent inconsistency of the American exportation of capital equipment to be used in the production of highly important security items which might be shipped to the Soviet bloc by the countries importing that machinery when at the same time the shipment of those items from the United States was prohibited. The Department referred specifically to license applications for the export of ball bearing manufacturing machinery to Italy and the United Kingdom and of a steel strip mill to Sweden. Approval of the license to Italy was being held up while the Embassy in Rome indicated American concern to the Italian Government and raised the question of Italian intentions regarding the export of bearings. The licenses to Sweden and the United Kingdom were approved but the Embassies in Stockholm and London were instructed to express concern to the Swedish and British Governments over the apparent inconsistency and to point out that if shipments of strategic items to the Soviet bloc resulted from the licensing, public opinion in the United States might force the government to adopt a more restrictive policy toward licensing to the United Kingdom and Sweden (441.119/6–3050).
2. Ante, p. 81.
3. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 564.
4. Not printed. In it the Department of State, after consultation with the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Department of Defense, set forth the interim policy on the East-West trade control aspects of military production projects furnished to cooperating countries under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Where an item was on the American 1–A List (embargo) but not on the International List I, American approval would not be denied unless a substantially similar item was believed moving eastward from the recipient country. Where an item was on the American 1–B List (restricted), American approval would not be denied unless a substantially similar item was believed moving eastward from the recipient country in significant amounts. The Department believed that such an interim policy represented a realistic measure of cooperation that ought to be brought to the attention of all negotiators in other countries. While it was American policy not to use such approvals of additional military projects as bludgeons, the Department believed that such cooperation by the United States Government strongly invited similar measures of cooperation on the part of other governments toward including the appropriate items on International Lists I and II, thereby accepting and implementing stricter standards of export control of major items of military significance (451.119/6–1350).