661.00/10–1950: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State 1
secret
891. The amiable side of the Soviet countenance beginning to emerge into sharp focus with increasing rapidity wears not cheerful grin of a good comrade but rather forced smile of an exposed scoundrel. Failure of Soviets to intervene openly in Korea, mild tone of their recent notes on POW’s and strafing of Soviet airfield, recent overtures apparently seeking a conference on Germany, their attempts, half-hearted as they may appear, to seem cooperative in UN are not indications of basic Soviet change of heart but may be early ephemeral fruit of policy of containment and building of areas of strength. If this so it important convert them into tangible benefits as quickly as possible while not relaxing to any degree the developing of the counter-strength that has evoked them.
Although our thinking appears based on concept equality of strength will force Soviets negotiate compromises and although USSR may indeed enter into some otherwise unfavorable agreements in order create some action toward diminishing or stopping present defense efforts in West, there is strong possibility Soviets would never be willing negotiate loss such as would actually be case in meeting US or UN demands at any present sensitive spots. Experience with Greece and now with Korea seems bear this out and it likely situation must approach that of Soviet regime at time of Brest-Litovsk Treaty2 before such could be achieved. It possible then that Soviets would either enter upon agreements which as in past would represent superficial compromises but be unenforceable or while continuing to indicate readiness to enter upon settlements would avoid any formal commitments. It might hope lull West back into apathy by exaggerating its peace policy, playing upon burden of armaments in countries of free world and refraining from military adventures on part of its satellites as well as itself for a reasonable extended period of time. It would of course use this time to continue perfecting its subversive organization road and pounding away at such themes as American imperialism, the replacement of Germany by US as the barbaric menace to civilization.
The present atmosphere therefore may offer US prospect of testing the exploitability of the recent Soviet manifestations of less truculence. It might well stress in a lucid manner that Soviets desire for “peaceful [Page 1265] co-existence” with the capitalist world can find an immediate and clear expression in the signing of an Austrian treaty and that given that sign which amounts to implementation of an actual agreed decision of the CFM, US would be willing respond favorably to Soviet requests for CFM on Germany. It is not too likely this would be successful but a rejection on these terms would at minimum be another exhibition of Soviet recalcitrance on the Austrian question.
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- This telegram was relayed to Vienna at 11:49 a.m. on October 19.↩
- For documentation on the conclusion of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, between the Central Powers and the Soviet Government of Russia, see Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, pp. 404–476; and for the text of the treaty, see ibid., p. 442.↩